

**POLITICAL DEMOCRACY AND MILITARIZED CONFLICT
IN EVOLVING INTERSTATE RIVALRIES**

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ABSTRACT

In this paper I study the relationship between political democracy, interstate rivalry, and militarized interstate conflict. Past research has shown dyadic democracy to have a strong pacifying effect on relations between states; democracies have rarely if ever gone to war against each other. Much of the research in this area has been static and cross-sectional in nature, though, overlooking the history of relations between the states in question. Recent research on interstate rivalry has suggested that relations between adversaries tend to become increasingly hostile and conflictual as the adversaries accumulate a longer history of past conflict and rivalry. Particularly important for the present study, two adversaries are more likely to become involved in further episodes of future conflict in the future when they have accumulated a lengthier history of past conflict. This evolutionary approach to interstate conflict and rivalry suggests that the pacifying effects of dyadic democracy may decrease over time in ongoing interstate relationships, as the adversaries become involved in more confrontations and accumulate hostility and grievances toward each other from these multiple confrontations.

The paper begins by laying out the general theoretical framework of an evolutionary approach to interstate conflict and rivalry, and by formulating a series of hypotheses on how an evolving interstate relationship should affect the relationship between democracy and conflict. These hypotheses are then tested statistically, using logistic regression analysis. The analyses suggest that dyadic democracy has not been entirely effective at preventing the recurrence of conflict between former adversaries, particularly for contiguous adversaries. These results suggest the need for further research on the introduction of democracy into an ongoing conflictual relationship, and for continued caution in applying the democratic peace proposition to policymaking.

Political Democracy and Militarized Conflict in Evolving Interstate Rivalries

Recent scholarship has identified a phenomenon that is commonly termed the “democratic peace,” or the notion that political democracies rarely if ever fight against one another. The empirical relationship of the democratic peace has generally held up under a variety of empirical tests, utilizing different measures of democracy and of conflict, and controlling for the effects of numerous potential confounding variables (e.g., Small and Singer 1976; Maoz and Abdolali 1989; Bremer 1992; Morgan and Schwebach 1992; Russett 1993; Dixon 1994; Ray 1995). This relationship is argued to come as close as anything to an empirical law in international relations (Levy 1988: 662; Russett 1993: 123), and Gleditsch (1992) suggests that future empirical research should be regarded as suspect if it is not first corrected for the democracy-conflict relationship.

In addition to academic studies, the democratic peace proposition has come to be seen as a basis for formulating foreign policy. One prominent article about the democratic peace was entitled “Take Two Democracies and Call Me In The Morning” (Morgan and Schwebach 1992), and -- even if that particular article may not have made concrete policy prescriptions -- scholars and policymakers are seizing the idea as a basis for policy. Huntington (1991: 29-30) suggests on the basis of the democratic peace proposition that “the spread of democracy in the world means the expansion of a zone of peace in the world,” and that the “futures of liberty, stability, peace, and the United States thus depend, in some measure, on the future of democracy.” Russett (1993: 128-129) notes a number of instances where U.S. President Bush and Secretary of State Baker mentioned policy positions based on the propositions that “Real democracies do not go to war with each other,” that freedom and democracy in the former Soviet Union would be “the surest foundation for peace -- and the strongest guarantee of our national security -- for decades to come,” and that “A democratic Russia is the best guarantee against a renewed danger of competition and the threat of nuclear rivalry.” Russett (1993: 133ff) reinforced these notions by encouraging the wider spread of democratic institutions and norms and by calling for greater economic assistance to struggling democracies, in order to help widen the scope of the democratic peace.

With the substantial attention that this particular set of empirical results has received among scholars, media, and policymakers, the democratic peace represents a rare opportunity for empirical research by international relations scholars to influence state policies directly. As Singer (1979) noted, social scientists have typically been unsuccessful at applying their basic research to help solve social problems, either because policymakers do not listen to them or because they do not even try to bring it to the attention of policy circles. The widespread appeal of the democratic peace proposition, though, would seem to offer a promising example of just such an application of social science findings to real-world problems.

Yet with the prominence of this empirical result, and with its apparent appeal to policymakers, comes great responsibility. For one of the first times in recent memory, empirical social scientists are faced with the prospect of policymakers explicitly following our advice on how to avoid war, which makes it especially important to be confident that this advice is accurate. And if there are important caveats or exceptions to this advice, we must be careful to identify them before policymakers act on an incomplete understanding of the processes or relationships involved in the democratic peace. Morgan and Schwebach (1992), for example, found that democracies are less likely than other adversaries to escalate disputes to war, but that this inhibition against war was not total and that it may not be entirely dependent on the nature of the opponent. On the basis of these results, Morgan and Schwebach (1992: 318) expressed doubts about the value of the democratic peace proposition as a basis for state policies: “While we cannot say with certainty that two democracies will someday fight, we can say that the spread of democracy is not a well-

proven prescription for peace... The spread of democracy may be desirable for other reasons; but we should not pay dearly for it only as a cure for war.”

In the present paper I seek to test an important potential caveat to the democratic peace, involving the recurrence of militarized conflict and the previous conflict history of two democratic adversaries. I begin by discussing the theoretical underpinnings of the democratic peace and of recurrent conflict, and present a set of hypotheses on the relationship between dyadic democracy, certain relevant control variables, and conflict recurrence. I then present a research design, test the hypotheses empirically, and discuss the results and their implications for policy and for future research.

Theoretical Development

Dyadic Democracy and Interstate Conflict

Several theoretical explanations have been offered to explain the phenomenon of the democratic peace. The first explanation involves the institutional structure of the two sides' governments, which are politically open and can be vulnerable to public opinion and slow to act in matters of military security, at least as long as they know that their adversary is similarly constrained by a similar institutional structure (e.g., Morgan and Campbell 1991; Morgan and Schwebach 1992). The second, normative explanation argues that democracies have a norm against fighting other democracies, and are much more willing to try to resolve their differences by less violent means (e.g., Doyle 1986; Russett 1990; Dixon 1993, 1994). The existing empirical evidence offers some support for both the normative and structural perspectives, and Morgan (1993) has called for the integration of both approaches into future theorizing in this area.

A wide variety of recent empirical research has addressed the democratic peace proposition, focusing on the initial outbreak of militarized confrontations, the management of these confrontations, and the escalation of confrontations to full-scale war. The research on each of these topics has suggested that beyond considerations of such realpolitik-based factors as relative capabilities or capability shifts, the regime types of potential adversaries are extremely important influences on their conflict propensity. Dyads composed of two democratic states engage in militarized conflict of any type (militarized disputes, crises, and so on) less frequently than do dyads that include one or more authoritarian states (e.g., Maoz and Abdolali 1989; Bremer 1992, 1993; Russett 1993). When democratic dyads become involved in confrontations, they are more likely than other dyads to be amenable to third-party efforts to resolve their differences, and mediation efforts are more likely to be successful for democratic dyads (Dixon 1993, 1994). Furthermore, confrontations between democratic adversaries tend to be less severe or escalatory, and much less likely to escalate to the level of full-scale interstate war (e.g., Morgan and Campbell 1991; Maoz and Russett 1992; Morgan and Schwebach 1992; Russett 1993; Ray 1995).

One area that has been ignored in the existing research on the democratic peace proposition involves the context of relations between the potential adversaries being studied. We know from recent studies of interstate rivalry that so-called “rival” states account for the majority of interstate conflict, including militarized disputes, crises, violent territorial changes, and interstate wars (e.g., Goertz and Diehl 1992; Brecher 1984; Brecher and James 1988). We also know from recent research on the evolution of interstate rivalry that “conflict begets conflict,” or that the more confrontations two adversaries have had in the recent past, the more likely they are to engage in further confrontations in the future (Hensel 1995). Little is known, though, about the impact of democracy on the recurrence of conflict, particularly in the context of long-time enemies who become democratic in the course of an ongoing rivalry.

Even if democracies are less likely than other adversaries overall to become involved in militarized conflict or to escalate their confrontations to full-scale war, the relationship may weaken or disappear for adversaries with a lengthy history of past conflict before they became democracies. Rivalries are typically described as involving (and resulting from) the accumulation of hostility and grievances between adversaries through

multiple confrontations (see, e.g., Goertz and Diehl 1993; Vasquez 1993; Hensel 1995). Over time and after enough confrontations, these built-up grievances and feelings of hostility or hatred toward the rival come to drive relations between the rival states, likely leading to more conflictual relations and further confrontations in the future.

With regard to the democratic peace proposition, the history of past conflict behavior between a given pair of states may weaken the impact of the democratic peace. Dyadic democracy has been found to have a strong pacifying effect on relations between potential adversaries, in the sense that few confrontations have occurred between two democracies. These existing studies, though, have not looked at the impact of democracy on ongoing adversarial relationships. Most of the results of the thousands of dyads examined in these studies' analyses never became involved in militarized conflict at any point in their histories, regardless of their regime type.

A potentially important test of the effects of dyadic democracy on conflict behavior involves the impact of democracy on relations between historical adversaries -- states that have engaged in recent confrontations. If context, or the history of conflictual relations, exerts an important influence on interstate conflict behavior, then we might expect the impact of hypothesized pacifying effects such as democracy to weaken as the potential adversaries in question accumulate longer histories of past conflict (whether or not the past conflict occurred while they were democratic). While democracy has already been shown to be effective at decreasing the likelihood that two states will turn to militarized means to resolve their differences, it seems likely to be less important with regard to the recurrence of conflict in already-conflictual adversaries. I thus expect that the pacifying effect of democracy will decrease for adversaries with longer histories of recent conflict against each other.

If joint democracy is shown to have little or no effect on the conflict behavior of historical adversaries, then this paper will have identified an important caveat to the democratic peace proposition. Such a finding would highlight an important area for future study, and would suggest much greater caution in treating democracy as a way to keep peace among current adversaries in Eastern Europe or elsewhere. Alternatively, if democracy is shown to have powerful pacifying effects even among historical enemies, then we will have gained greater confidence in the democratic peace as a basis for foreign policymaking in potentially explosive world trouble spots.

An Evolutionary Approach to Interstate Rivalry

The term "rivalry" is conventionally used to refer to a set of two or more actors "having the same pretensions and claims" or "striving to reach or obtain something that only one can possess" (Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary). Applications of the concept of rivalry to international relations have typically focused on a very specific form of rivalry, which might be described as "enduring, militarized, interstate rivalry" (e.g., Goertz and Diehl 1992, 1993; Bennett 1993; Wayman 1989). Such a relationship occurs between two or more nation-states, involves the frequent resort to militarized force by the adversaries as a means of pursuing their respective interests, and endures for a protracted period of time. Examples of relationships characterized as "enduring rivalries" include the United States and the Soviet Union during the Cold War, Israel and her Arab neighbors since 1948, and France and Germany for much of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.

Rivalry, along with related concepts such as international enmity (Finlay, Holsti, and Fagen 1967; Feste 1982) and protracted conflict (Azar, et al. 1978; Brecher 1984), is generally seen as involving several important dimensions: competition between the same set of adversaries, the perception of threat and hostility by each side, and a temporal dimension. Enduring rivals are thus actors whose relations are characterized by disagreement or competition over some stakes that are viewed as important, where each perceives that the other poses a significant security threat, and where this competition and threat perception last for substantial periods of time. It should be noted, of course, that

these elements refer to a general ideal-type conception of rivalry; specific rivalries or specific forms of rivalry will differ in the extent to which each element is present.

Hensel (1994b, 1995) and Thompson (1995b) have advocated an evolutionary approach to the study of rivalry, focusing on the possibility of changing opportunities, constraints, and preferences in a long-term interstate relationship. An evolutionary approach to interstate rivalry is based on the premise that rivalry -- rather than being inevitable or predetermined by structural conditions -- is a dynamic concept and changes over time, with the eventual end results not being known with any certainty at the start of the process or at any point during the process. This evolutionary approach treats rivalry as a continuous, dynamic concept, rather than the static "enduring rival" versus "non-rival" distinction used in most of the existing literature. That is, rather than studying the differences between adversaries that do and do not qualify as enduring rivals, this evolutionary approach focuses on new issues: how do some states reach the stage of full-fledged enduring rivalry, while other adversaries stop somewhere short of enduring rivalry? How do relationships between adversaries change over time, either as they approach rivalry or after they have reached a stage where they can be classified as rivals?

The evolutionary classification of rivalry that I employ in this study is based on the specific rivalry context between two adversaries at any given point in time. The existing literature on rivalries tends to classify an entire interstate relationship as a case of "isolated conflict," "proto-rivalry," or "enduring rivalry," not allowing for the possibility of changes in the context of relations between the rivals over time. My evolutionary approach refocuses our attention on the changes within each individual relationship and might more appropriately be seen as the study of a dynamic, continuous notion of "interstate rivalry" instead of a static, all-or-nothing notion of "enduring rivalry" or "proto-rivalry."

This evolutionary approach utilizes a series of phases that must each be passed through en route to the most severe forms of rivalry; each of these phases will be described in more detail later. A dyad that has just begun to use militarized means of resolving its differences is classified as being in the "early phase" of a rivalry relationship. If the adversaries continue to pursue their goals through the threat or use of military force, events in the early phase may lead to the classification of later events between the same adversaries as occurring in the "intermediate phase." Ultimately, if two adversaries in the intermediate phase of rivalry continue to engage in further conflict, they may reach a point after which their subsequent relations will be classified as occurring in the "advanced phase" of rivalry.

It should be emphasized that because this is an evolutionary conception of rivalry, it allows for (and expects) changes in context over time. Before a dyad can reach full-fledged enduring rivalry, which is comparable to the advanced phase here, it must first pass through both the early and intermediate phases. Unlike the post hoc approach used in most existing research on rivalry, this evolutionary approach does not reclassify an event at one time on the basis of later events. Events that took place in the early phase of rivalry remain classified as having occurred in the early phase, although events occurring after the threshold for the intermediate phase has been reached will then be classified as occurring in the intermediate phase.

By using such an evolutionary approach, we can examine any dimensions of conflict behavior that may change over time over the course of a rivalry. If the effects of rivalry are cumulative and result from the accumulation of hostility and grievances through recurrent crises or wars, then we would expect to find that conflict behavior between adversaries should change as they evolve through more advanced phases of rivalry. That is, conflict behavior should differ between the early, intermediate, and advanced phases of rivalry in appreciable ways.

For example, an evolutionary approach suggests that adversaries in the early phase of rivalry do not know whether or not they will continue to engage in recurrent episodes of conflict in the future, or whether or not they will eventually become fundamental, long-term rivals. Similarly, adversaries in the early phase have not yet accumulated a history of past confrontations, and as a result have not yet built up the hostility, grievances, and negative

expectations about the future that are said to drive rivalry. As a result, an evolutionary approach would suggest that conflict occurring in the early phase of a relationship is likely to be less escalatory than conflict in later phases, to involve less coercive bargaining strategies, and to be less likely to spawn recurrent confrontations in its aftermath.

An evolutionary approach leads us to expect such changes in conflict behavior, and allows us to identify any such changes that might occur. The post hoc approach does not recognize the possibility of changing conflict behavior within the rivalry, because of its focus on differences between rivals and non-rivals. As a result, the post hoc approach is likely to produce weaker results if conflict behavior between the same adversaries does indeed change over time, because it would include the entire relationship in the same analyses without allowing any way to include these changes.

Control Variables: Other Factors Influencing Conflict Recurrence

Of course, many factors beyond political democracy would seem to be relevant to the recurrence of militarized conflict. Scholars such as Maoz and Russett (1992) and Bremer (1992, 1993) have examined the impact of other factors on the *outbreak* of militarized conflict, in order to see whether the apparent effects of democracy could instead be attributed to other factors. I now consider some factors that might be expected to affect the *recurrence* of militarized conflict between two adversaries, beyond the political regime type of the adversaries themselves.

Rivalry Phase

An evolutionary perspective suggests that the likelihood of conflict recurrence should increase as a dyad moves further along the path to full-fledged enduring rivalry, or in the words of the old adage, "conflict begets conflict." A history of past conflict between two adversaries in the recent past is expected to lead to the accumulation of grievances, hostility, and unresolved contentious issues between the adversaries, offering numerous potential incentives for subsequent conflict in the future. Additionally, a history of active confrontation can affect each adversary's expectations about the other's likely intentions and future actions or reactions, often increasing the expectation that the adversary holds hostile or threatening intentions and that it will be more conflictual and less cooperative in the future. Conversely, in a relationship that has not previously been marked by the frequent resort to militarized means in the past, the adversaries may not have developed the same level of expectations about each other's likely future behavior.

In an earlier study (Hensel 1995) I examined the likelihood of conflict recurrence in evolving interstate rivalries. That study's analyses showed that the likelihood of conflict recurrence increases in later phases of rivalry, or that adversaries with a longer history of conflict are more likely than other adversaries to become involved in another confrontation at any given point in time. The probability of a seventh confrontation between two adversaries -- given that they have already engaged in six confrontations in the current period of rivalry -- is greater than the probability of a fourth confrontation given the existence of a third, which in turn is greater than the probability of a second given the existence of a single confrontation between the states. With regard to the present study, I expect that these earlier findings will remain important while examining the impact of dyadic democracy. That is, adversaries that have moved further along my evolutionary scale of rivalry -- i.e., adversaries in the intermediate phase or, especially, the advanced phase of rivalry -- will be more likely to engage in future conflict behavior in the near future, because of their accumulation of hostility and grievances through their past history of conflict.

Conflict Outcomes

Scholars such as Jervis (1976) and Levy (1994) have suggested that statesmen "learn" from history, particularly from prominent events like crises or wars, and that the lessons that they learn often help to shape their images of the former adversary and their

interpretation of subsequent events. For example, a past interaction with an adversary can lead to "learning" about that adversary's nature or intentions, which may then affect subsequent relations with the adversary. With regard to interstate conflict and rivalry, one important lesson that may be learned involves the degree of hostility or malevolence on the part of the adversary; the occurrence of a crisis, and particularly its management and outcome, can be seen as important sources of "learning" by policy makers. Lebow (1981) and Rock (1989) suggested that the occurrence or outcomes of international crises can be catalysts for reorientation of state policies toward the former adversaries. This reorientation can be toward rapprochement, as with the effects of Fashoda or the late nineteenth-century confrontations between the United States and Great Britain, or toward greater enmity and probable future conflict, as with the Arab-Israeli wars or the wars between France and Germany.

The empirical analyses of Leng (1983), Maoz (1984), and Hensel (1994) have all suggested that the outcome of a militarized confrontation can be an important source of such learning in the setting of recurrent interstate conflict, exerting a significant impact on relations between the adversaries after the confrontation has ended. Leng (1983) found that the outcomes of crises can lead to more coercive bargaining strategies and increasing severity in subsequent crises. Maoz (1984) and Hensel (1994a) both showed that the manner in which a given confrontation ends affects the likelihood of subsequent conflict between the same adversaries, as well as the timing of any subsequent conflict that does occur. Similarly, it has been suggested by Shimshoni (1988), Lieberman (1992), and Huth (1995) that military defeats in confrontations or wars lead a challenger state to mount less severe military challenges in the immediate aftermath of the confrontation.

Following Maoz (1984) and Hensel (1994a), this study will focus on the effects of militarized dispute outcomes on post-dispute relations between the former adversaries. As will be seen later, a given episode of interstate conflict can be seen as ending in one of three general types of outcomes: decisive outcomes, compromises, and stalemates. A "decisive" outcome represents a victory for one side and a corresponding defeat for the other, in terms of a battlefield victory or one side's acquiescence to the other. A compromise represents the arrangement of a mutually acceptable settlement between the two adversaries. A stalemate, then, is an outcome in which neither of these other conditions applies -- that is, there is no decisive victory or acquiescence, and the two sides are not able to reach a mutually acceptable settlement.

Two particular effects of dispute outcomes on post-dispute stability are expected: stability is expected to be greater following decisive outcomes (in which there is a clear winner and a clear loser in the dispute) and after compromises (in which the two adversaries end the dispute by a negotiated agreement). When neither of these conditions applies -- i.e., after indecisive, stalemated outcomes -- stability is not expected to be as great. In such disputes, neither side was able to produce the desired changes in the status quo, neither was defeated and rendered unable or unwilling to mount another serious challenge, and no mutually satisfactory settlement was reached to resolve the two sides' differences.

Contentious Issues

Another important theoretical perspective that should be helpful in accounting for conflict recurrence involves the specific conflicts of interest, or the issues at stake, separating two potential rivals (e.g., Holsti 1991; Diehl 1992). Beyond characteristics of the last confrontation between two adversaries, characteristics of the general disagreements dividing the adversaries are also important to an evolutionary conception of rivalry. That is, conflict occurs for a reason, and the specific issues or stakes in a given conflict can be seen as an important factor contributing to the course and consequences of that conflict. With regard to recurrent conflict and rivalry, the issues that are at stake in a confrontation between two adversaries are expected to play an important role in shaping the way that the actors relate to each other, learn from their previous interactions with each other, and

develop expectations about the future. Disagreement over stakes that are considered to be highly salient might be expected to lead the relevant policy-makers to adopt a more suspicious or more hostile stance toward their adversary, because the risks or costs of losing the disputed stakes to the enemy might be too great. More minor stakes, in contrast, might more easily be ignored by policymakers, and are less likely to lead policymakers to accept the risks and potential costs of interstate conflict. Holsti (1991), Diehl (1992), Goertz and Diehl (1992), and Vasquez (1993), among others, have all suggested the importance of contentious issues in interstate conflict.

One particular stake that is often seen as possessing a special degree of salience involves territory. Territory can have tangible material consequences for both states, in terms of security and the economic benefits of the territory or any resources that it may contain. Territory has also been described as having a more intangible, psychological importance to states that is quite out of proportion to its intrinsic strategic or economic value, and as being capable of arousing sentiments of national pride and national honor perhaps more rapidly and more intensely than any other type of issue (e.g., Hartshorne 1938; Luard 1970; Goertz and Diehl 1992; Vasquez 1993). For these reasons, territorial disputes often lead to long-standing resentments and desires to recover lost territory, producing more escalatory conflict behavior than non-territorial issues, and being more likely to be the subject of recurrent militarized confrontations (e.g., Diehl 1992; Goertz and Diehl 1992; Vasquez 1993; Hensel 1994a). Several scholars have even gone so far as to suggest that territorial disputes are "conspicuous among the causes of wars" and "perhaps the most important single cause of war between states in the last two or three centuries" (Hill 1945: 3; Luard 1970: 7). I thus expect that recurrence of conflict will be more likely, and will take place after a shorter period of post-dispute stability, when territorial issues were involved in the dispute.

With regard to changes over time with the evolution of rivalry, territorial issues are not expected to change in any meaningful way in response to changes in the rivalry context. Rather, the issues at stake between two adversaries seem most likely to act as a type of selection effect influencing the likelihood of recurrence and the dyads that will tend to become involved in recurrent conflict. Dyads that contend over less salient issues are not expected to be as likely to become involved in recurrent confrontations over these issues. If an early confrontation fails to resolve the issue, the adversaries may be prone to drop the matter entirely without pursuing further conflict over the issue. This expectation is the opposite of what might be expected from highly salient issues such as territory, where the adversaries might be expected to keep pursuing the issue until they have achieved their goals (which may then lead the losing side to continue to achieve its own goals). Vasquez (1993: 151), for example, suggests that unresolved territorial issues are an extremely important factor leading to both rivalry and war, and that few wars or rivalries occur that do not involve territorial issues in one way or another.

Relative Capabilities

Relative capabilities in the static sense refer to the balance of the two sides' potential capabilities for warfare. There is evidence that the balance of two states' relative capabilities -- often defined as some function of military, industrial, demographic, and perhaps economic indicators -- exerts an important influence on the likelihood of militarized conflict between them. This balance could be relatively even, a situation often termed "parity," or it could be much more uneven, which is often termed "preponderance." Empirical analysis has offered plentiful evidence that dyads characterized by preponderance or "overwhelming preponderance" (an especially uneven balance of relative capabilities) are less conflict-prone than more evenly matched pairs of adversaries (Weede 1976; Garnham 1976; Organski and Kugler 1980; Geller 1993).

For the present purposes, I expect a greater disparity in relative capabilities to be inhibit the initiation of militarized conflict between two adversaries. More preponderant dyads should be less conflictual than more evenly matched pairs of adversaries, as

suggested by the majority of the empirical literature on military capabilities. In such situations, the weaker side should be less likely to initiate militarized conflict and more likely to give in to the stronger side's demands to avoid conflict, and the stronger side should be less likely to push its demands by force because of the weaker side's tendency to give in. In situations characterized by greater parity, in contrast, the two sides are roughly even in relative capabilities, each side may expect a reasonable likelihood of winning a confrontation, and neither is likely to be deterred from initiating conflict by the perception that the other side is substantially stronger militarily.

Capability Shifts

A series of recent studies have suggested that the competition between rival adversaries leaves them particularly vulnerable to militarized conflict in situations marked by a "power transition," "capability shift," or "rapid approach" in relative capabilities. Such situations occur when the weaker side in a relationship approaches the stronger in capabilities or actually passes the formerly stronger state. Power transitions, capability shifts, and rapid approaches are argued to lead to militarized conflict in a number of ways. For example, they may create confusion between the two adversaries as to their relative capabilities they may increase the capabilities of the rising state enough that it feels sufficiently confident to launch an attack on its declining adversary, and they may threaten the declining state enough to launch a preventive attack (e.g., Organski and Kugler 1980; Wayman 1989; Geller 1993).

The notion of power transitions or capability shifts seems especially applicable to states involved in an ongoing rivalry relationship (Wayman 1989; Vasquez 1993). When a particular pair of adversaries has engaged in a longstanding competition over some stakes, and when they have repeatedly turned to militarized means to resolve their differences in the past, they are expected to pay close attention to their own national capabilities as well as those of their rival. Furthermore, the involvement of rivals in a long-term, hostile and competitive relationship means that their attention is likely to be focused on the future and on changes in their relative capabilities. For these reasons, I expect that when there is a greater shift in relative capabilities between two states, they will be more likely to be involved in militarized conflict -- both because the gaining side considers itself better able to achieve its objectives, and because the declining side considers its opponent's gains to be threatening.

Research Design

Spatial-Temporal Domain

This study's analyses are conducted on the population of militarized disputes and rivalries from all geographic regions of the world, over the time span of 1816-1992, using data from the Correlates of War (COW) Project. Militarized conflict in this study is operationalized in terms of militarized interstate disputes, as defined and collected by the Correlates of War Project. Gochman and Maoz (1984: 587) described militarized disputes as "a set of interactions between or among states involving threats to use military force, displays of military force, or actual uses of military force... these acts must be explicit, overt, nonaccidental, and government sanctioned." Each militarized dispute is broken down into its dyadic component parts, to allow dyadic-level analyses of conflict and rivalry; multiparty disputes are thus treated here as separate cases for each dyad that took part in the dispute. Each dyad is included from the conclusion of its first militarized dispute, with the purpose of studying the recurrence of militarized conflict and thus the possible evolution of interstate rivalry.

I am further limiting the analyses to disputes and rivalries involving dyads in which the two adversaries are contiguous by a direct land or river border, or in which at least one of them is a major power (as defined by Small and Singer 1982). This limitation is similar to the notion of "political-military relevance" (Weede 1989; Maoz and Russett 1992). Like their notions of "relevance," this restriction is meant to avoid the potential problem of

studying cases with great differences in interaction opportunities or conflict propensity, such as might be the case with non-major power dyads involving actors separated by great geographic distances. For example, a number of militarized disputes occurred during the Iran-Iraq War of 1980-1988 when the belligerents attacked neutral shipping in the Persian Gulf. The adversaries involved in such disputes, though, are typically unable to respond militarily, and we would not expect the adversaries to become involved in recurrent conflict or rivalry in the same sense as contiguous or major power dyads. Including all of these different cases in the same aggregated analyses, then, would be likely to distort or weaken the results by including non-comparable cases.

Restricting the analysis to "relevant" cases allows greater confidence in the comparability of cases. Bordering states typically have much more frequent interaction than those separated by great distances, and major powers have historically shown the ability to interact and project their forces across great distances. Furthermore, both contiguous states and major powers have been shown to be more likely than non-contiguous states to engage in militarized conflict, and their confrontations tend to be more war-prone (see, e.g., Gochman and Maoz 1984; Diehl 1985; Bremer 1992). Both groups of cases are thus similar, in that they may reasonably be seen as experiencing greater interaction and showing a greater propensity for militarized conflict than other dyads.

Methodology

The analyses to be run employ logistic regression models to study the effects of political democracy and the hypothesized control variables on conflict recurrence. Logistic regression allows us to study discrete dependent variables such as the occurrence (or recurrence) of militarized conflict, which are problematic for more traditional forms of regression analysis. Logistic regression on a dyad-year-level dataset (as in the present study) allows us to study these discrete variables using continuous predictor variables that can change in value over time, such as democracy and military capabilities (e.g., Aldrich and Nelson 1984; DeMaris 1992; Liao 1994).

Operationalization of Variables

Dyadic Democracy

The term "democracy" has been used to describe a wide variety of political systems. Collier and Levitsky (1994), for example, identified hundreds of examples of subtypes of "democracy" that have been employed in the recent comparative politics literature, ranging from presidential and parliamentary democracy to authoritarian democracy, pseudodemocracy, and economic democracy. Nonetheless, a number of scholars have described what they consider to be a "procedural minimum" of widely recognized necessary elements for political democracy. Linz (1978: 5) defined democracy as requiring free and honest elections at regular intervals, the freedom to create political parties, and direct or indirect electoral accountability for all effective political offices. O'Donnell and Schmitter's (1986: 8) minimal definition included the elements of secret balloting, universal adult suffrage, regular elections, partisan competition, associational recognition and access, and executive accountability. Mainwaring (1992: 297-298) offered a similar conception of procedural criteria for democracy, including competitive elections as the route to forming governments, broad adult citizenship, protection of minority rights, and respect for basic civil liberties.

O'Donnell and Schmitter (1986: 8) also recognized that many other democratic institutions or practices might be viewed as extensions of democracy in more advanced or more "complete" democracies, although they did not consider these extensions to be essential to the concept of democracy itself. Their examples of such extensions included administrative accountability, judicial review, public financing for parties, unrestricted access to information, term limitations, provisions for permanent voter registration and absentee balloting, and compulsory voting. Overall, though, they argued (1986: 8) that "No single set of specific institutions or rules by itself defines democracy, not even such

prominent ones as majoritarianism, territorial representation, legislative sovereignty, or popularly elected executives.”

Even from the few sources mentioned above, it is clear that there is little consensus on which characteristics are absolutely necessary for a state to be classified as democratic. The problem would be compounded if we were to begin considering some of other hundreds of subtypes of democracy identified by Collier and Levitsky. For my present purposes, then, I focus on several measures of a given state’s level of democracy. Each of these measures employs several criteria, without requiring the presence of a specific set of political characteristics (note the contrasting attempts to lay out a single “procedural minimum,” discussed above).

This study’s analyses focus on the definition of democracy used by Maoz and Russett (1992), although I also examined several alternative measures of dyadic democracy to test the robustness of the results. Each of these measures of democracy draws from the Polity II dataset (Gurr, Jagers, and Moore 1989), with particular attention to two Polity II indicators: the indices of a state’s institutionalized democracy and institutionalized autocracy. The Polity II democracy index ranges from 0-10 and measures the openness and competitiveness of political participation, competitiveness of executive recruitment, and constraints on the chief executive. The autocracy index also ranges from 0-10 and measures restrictions on or suppression of the competitiveness of political participation, regulation of participation, competitiveness of executive recruitment, and constraints on the chief executive.¹

Maoz and Russett’s (1992) dichotomous measure of democracy subtracts a state’s Polity II autocracy index from the democracy index, and multiplies the result by an index of the concentration of political power in the state. This indicator can range between -100 and +100, and values of 30 or greater are treated as democratic. Dixon’s (1994) dichotomous measure is simpler, being based solely on the Polity II democracy index. The original index ranges in value from 0-10, and values of 6 or greater are treated as democratic. For each of these dichotomous indicators, dyadic democracy is determined dichotomously from the state-level democracy values for each state in the dyad. A value of one indicates that both states in the dyad qualified as democratic under the measure in question, and a value of zero indicates that one or both states in the dyad did not qualify as democracies that year.

In order to ensure that this study’s results are robust and do not depend on a particular measurement of democracy, two other indicators of democracy were also tested. The first continuous indicator, suggested by Ray (1995), subtracts each state’s Polity II autocracy index from the democracy index. Rather than adding the two states’ scores, the lowest score was taken to represent the entire dyad. Because the democratic peace hypothesis typically rests on the requirement that both states be democratic, examining the regime type of the less democratic state in the dyad allows us a simple measure of the dyadic regime type. The second continuous indicator of democracy, suggested by Dixon (1994), is based solely on the two states’ Polity II indices of democratic characteristics, rather than on the combination of their democratic and authoritarian characteristics. This indicator is produced by taking the lower of the two states’ democratic indices, as described above, because the effect of democracy may depend on both states being democratic and may not function unless even the less democratic state has a democratic political system. Overall, these alternative indicators of democracy did not produce substantially different results from the Maoz and Russett indicator reported in this paper’s tables.

¹ At first glance it would appear that these two Polity II indices overlap by including a number of the same dimensions. The indices cover different elements of the topics on which they overlap, though (Gurr, Jagers, and Moore 1989), so it is not uncommon for states to have low or high values on both indices at the same time.

Recurrent Conflict and Interstate Rivalry and Evolution

My operational definition of rivalry is based primarily on the occurrence of militarized confrontations between the same adversaries, which will allow us to capture the major theoretical dimensions of rivalry identified in the scholarly literature (see Hensel 1995). The occurrence of one or more militarized confrontations between the adversaries demonstrates an important degree of both interaction and competition between them; the two states took the risks of becoming involved in a confrontation because of a disagreement over *something*. Militarized confrontations almost by definition reflect hostility and the perception of threat between the adversaries, especially as they become involved in multiple disputes over a relatively short period of time. Furthermore, we can see the entrance of the temporal dimension of relations between adversaries as more confrontations occur over time -- or, alternatively, the absence of this dimension if no later confrontations follow the conclusion of the first. Scholars such as Thompson (1995) have called for a more detailed measure of rivalry, possibly incorporating some measure of each side's perceptions of the other as a primary security threat or a rival. Nonetheless, such a measure would make the study of more than a few rivalries an unmanageable task, and an operational measure based on dispute involvement is sufficient for my present purposes.

I will identify the beginning of each phase of rivalry with reference to the onset of a sufficient number of militarized interstate disputes (with the actual number depending on the specific phase of rivalry). Even if two adversaries feel strong antagonism before the onset of enough disputes, they need explicit confrontations to serve as the concrete evidence of their antagonism, or in effect to serve as the baptism or christening of their rivalry. As mentioned earlier, Vasquez (1993) considers the first crisis between two adversaries to be the "baptism" of rivalry, crystallizing the underlying processes of issue disagreement and competition that compose rivalry. Until two adversaries resort to militarized means at least once, they cannot be considered true militarized rivals, however strongly they may disagree over certain contentious issues.

Once two adversaries have engaged in at least one militarized dispute and the "early" phase of rivalry has begun, further militarized disputes between the same adversaries extend the period of rivalry as they occur, and may perhaps advance the dyad to the next phase of rivalry. Rivalry is often described as a long-term adversarial relationship that develops over time, as the adversaries accumulate hostility and grievances. To Vasquez (1993), rivalry reflects the inability of both adversaries to produce a definitive resolution of the issues under contention. This inability to resolve their differences allows the two adversaries' hostility and disagreements to fester and lead to ever-greater frustration, eventually pushing them into a conflict spiral and a series of crises. Similarly, Bennett (1993) argued that the history of past challenges and confrontations in rivalry leads each rival to consider the other a primary threat to its own security and policy goals. This perception of threat tends to begin in the long-term sense of rivalry when two states' issue disagreements become drawn out and each state realizes that the other is unlikely to give in or compromise, and when one or both have shown the willingness to turn to militarized means for resolving their disagreements. The outbreak of multiple confrontations between rivals is a manifestation of this long-term rivalry relationship, reflecting the seriousness and high salience of their policy disagreements. Both Vasquez' and Bennett's conceptions of rivalry are based on learning over time, with feelings of rivalry developing over the long run because of the adversaries' multiple uses of military force.

Just as the occurrence of further conflict between the same adversaries acts to extend the period of rivalry or to advance a dyad to the next stage of rivalry, the failure to engage in further militarized conflict within a certain amount of time can be considered to end a period of rivalry and return the adversaries to non-militarized relations (although these relations need not be amicable). If militarized conflict recurs within a fairly short amount of time after the conclusion of the previous confrontation -- especially if the conflict involves the same contentious issue(s) that were fought over earlier -- then the rivalry can

certainly not be said to have ended, even if distrust, tensions, and antagonism remain long after the last explicit confrontation.

At some point after a militarized confrontation has ended, though, the lack of a subsequent dispute can be taken as evidence that the militarized portion of that phase of the adversaries' rivalry has ended. A sufficiently long temporal gap without any further militarized confrontations signals a time of peaceful relations (even if not cooperative or friendly relations) and the ending of a *militarized* period of rivalry, and any subsequent conflict can be seen as the beginning of a new period of rivalry. It should be noted that this method of identifying the end of a period of rivalry is not post hoc in nature, because it never involves reclassification of an earlier event on the basis of later events or non-events. Thus, the period following the end of the final dispute is treated as part of the rivalry; it is only after a sufficiently long period of time has elapsed without the recurrence of conflict that the rivalry is considered to have ended and subsequent relations between the adversaries are treated as occurring outside of the context of rivalry.

The evolutionary classification of rivalry that I employ in this paper is based on the specific rivalry context between the adversaries at the time that a militarized dispute occurs. The period from the outbreak of the first dispute between two adversaries to the outbreak of their third dispute (if the dyad eventually engages in as many as three disputes) is classified as the "early phase" of a rivalry relationship. The period from the outbreak of the third dispute in a dyad to the outbreak of the sixth (if there is a sixth) is classified as the "intermediate phase" of a rivalry relationship, and any confrontations after the fifth are classified as occurring in the "advanced phase" of a rivalry. Each of these stages of rivalry is subject to a fifteen-year temporal limitation on the gaps between disputes; that is, the stage of rivalry is considered to have ended after a span of at least fifteen years since the previous dispute, at which point the dyad returns to its original status of "non-militarized interaction" and any subsequent confrontations signal the beginning of a new period of rivalry.

For the aggregated analyses to be presented in Tables 1 and 2, dummy variables are used to represent the rivalry context of relations in the dyad. Dummy variables are included for both the intermediate and advanced phase of rivalry, each taking on a value of one when the year in question took place in that particular phase of rivalry and a value of zero otherwise. The early phase is left out of this equation as a reference group against which to compare the effects of the intermediate and advanced phases.

This evolutionary conception of early, intermediate, and advanced phases of rivalry is roughly analogous to Goertz and Diehl's contexts of isolated conflict, proto-rivalry, and enduring rivalry, except that my evolutionary approach focuses on changes of context within a given rivalry as the adversaries' relationship evolves over time. A relationship that Goertz and Diehl would classify as "isolated conflict" never advances past the early stage of rivalry in my evolutionary classification, but more severe forms of rivalry must pass through several phases. What Goertz and Diehl classify as a "proto-rivalry" thus begins in the early stage of a rivalry relationship, where it remains for the adversaries' first two confrontations, after which point their subsequent relations are classified as occurring in the intermediate phase of rivalry relations. Similarly, a Goertz and Diehl "enduring rivalry" must spend time in both the early and intermediate phases of the rivalry relationship before the adversaries engage in a sixth militarized confrontation and their subsequent relations are classified as occurring in the advanced phase.

Recurrent Conflict

The dependent variable in this study, the recurrence of militarized conflict, refers to the outbreak of multiple confrontations between the same adversaries. When another militarized dispute occurs shortly after the conclusion of an earlier dispute between the same adversaries, it can be regarded as an episode of recurrent conflict. If no further militarized conflict occurs within the required time frame, which (as noted earlier) is fifteen years in the present study, then the militarized rivalry is considered to have ended. This

study's dyad-year-level analyses thus include a separate data point for up to fifteen years after the conclusion of the previous dispute between the adversaries, until the outbreak of the next dispute between them or the end of the study (the end of 1992).

Conflict Outcomes

Conflict outcomes in the COW militarized dispute data set are coded based upon the relationship between the pre- and post-dispute status quo. A "decisive" outcome refers to a dispute with a clear winner, whether by a battlefield victory, or by the loser backing down or granting concessions without the large-scale use of military force.² An example is the 1870 Franco-Prussian War, which ended with a decisive military victory for the Prussian forces and a one-sided peace settlement. Compromise outcomes involve mutually satisfactory agreements between the adversaries. Stalemated outcomes reflect the absence of these types of settlement -- i.e., stalemates lack both a clear winner and a mutually satisfactory compromise between the antagonists. Each of these outcome types is represented in the present study by a dichotomous variable, with a value of one reflecting that the dispute in question ended with that particular form of outcome, and a value of zero reflecting any other type of outcome. The variable representing decisive outcomes, then, takes on a value of one for militarized disputes that end with decisive outcomes, and a value of zero for disputes ending in compromises, stalemates, or unclear outcome types.

Contentious Issues

The territorial issue variable is coded dichotomously, with a value of one reflecting contention over some territorial issue(s) in the dispute, and a value of zero reflecting the absence of explicit contention over such issues. Contentious issues are treated in this paper in the sense used by Holsti (1991: 18), as "the stakes over which two or more parties contend," which might include (for example) specific pieces of territory, governmental policies, or the independence or leadership of a nation-state. It should be noted that each dispute is not necessarily limited to one type of issue. Thus, the same dispute could involve elements of contention over both a piece of territory and a governmental policy, as long as both elements were clearly and explicitly under contention in the dispute.

As with Hensel (1994a), I am primarily interested in whether or not the issues or stakes that are involved in a given dispute involve territory, rather than with the specific type of territory that they involve. Thus, Holsti's territorial issue categories -- "territory," "territory (boundary)," and "strategic territory" -- would each be treated as equivalent in the present analyses, along with any of his other categories that included a territorial component. Examples would include any dispute in which the adversaries explicitly clashed over the disposition of a piece of territory or the demarcation of a common border, such as the numerous crises between Bolivia and Paraguay over the Chaco Boreal or between Argentina and Great Britain over the Falkland (Malvinas) Islands. Disputes not involving such an explicit territorial dimension are all treated equally, as non-territorial issues. Examples of non-territorial issues include disputes over human rights, the treatment of ethnic minorities, treaty compliance, or economic matters.

Relative Capabilities

The relative capability indicator used in this paper's analyses is based on the two adversaries' military capabilities, derived from the Correlates of War (COW) Project's National Material Capabilities data set (see, e.g., Singer, Bremer, and Stuckey 1972). The composite measure used in this study is determined as the evenly weighted average of the two states' military personnel and military expenditures. The composite measure reflects the percentage of total capabilities in the dyad held by the stronger state, with a value of .50

² My "decisive" outcome type includes both the "victory" and "yield" categories from the data set, because I find no good theoretical reason to separate these two similar categories given the purpose of the present study.

reflecting absolute equality between the two states on that indicator and values approaching 1.0 reflecting greater concentration of that particular capability indicator in the hands of one state. The indicator used in the analyses reported later is a dichotomous variable reflecting the presence or absence of military preponderance between the states in the dyad, with preponderance defined as a three-to-one or greater advantage for the stronger state. The original composite measure and a ten-to-one overwhelming preponderance dummy variable were also employed in further analyses to examine the robustness of the results, without producing any substantial differences.

Capability Shifts

Capability shifts are treated for the present purposes as the percentage change in composite military capabilities in the dyad from one year to the next. The capability shift indicator reported in this paper's results reflects shifts in dyadic military capabilities over three-year periods, in order to identify medium-term changes. Shorter and longer periods were also examined (one- and five-year periods, respectively), without producing any substantial change in the results. An interaction effect was also tested to see whether capability shifts were only important under conditions of parity in relative capabilities, because in situations marked by greater disparities the effects of capability shifts might seem less threatening, but none of the results changed appreciably.

Empirical Analyses

Democracy and Militarized Conflict Recurrence

Aggregated Analyses

Tables 1 and 2 present the results of several logistic regression analyses of militarized dispute recurrence. The first model included in these tables was run for the set of all evolving rivalries from 1816-1992 involving contiguous dyads or dyads with one or more major powers. The second model is limited to contiguous dyads, in order to identify any differences in conflict behavior between different dyad types. This second model also offers a more direct link to many of the prominent cases in today's world where democracy is being suggested as a path to peace, such as cases in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. Regardless of the results for the first set of analyses, which may be distorted by differences between contiguous and major power dyads, the analyses for contiguous dyads should help us to evaluate the likely impact of democracy on cases such as these.

[Tables 1 and 2 about here]

The overall model fit is evaluated by means of the model's likelihood ratio X^2 statistic at the bottom of Table 1. This statistic is derived from a comparison of the likelihood ratios for the full model as tested and for a null model including only the intercept (Aldrich and Nelson 1984; Liao 1994). For both models presented in Table 1, the result is significant at the .001 level (model 1: $X^2 = 358.8$; model 2: $X^2 = 241.60$), indicating that the model with this set of variables fits the data significantly better than the null model with only an intercept (Liao 1994).

The effect of each variable in the model is presented in Table 1, including the parameter estimate and standard error, the Wald X^2 test statistic, and the significance level of the X^2 statistic. The odds ratio for each effect in the model offers one way to interpret the effects of each variable. The odds ratio represents the effect of each variable on the odds that a dispute will occur in a given year, as opposed to no dispute occurring -- i.e., the probability of a dispute divided by the probability of no dispute. Odds ratios of greater than 1.0 reflect an increase in the odds of the event occurring, while odds ratios lower than 1.0 reflect a decrease. The odds ratio of 1.615 for the territorial issues variable means that the odds of dispute recurrence in a given year are 1.615 times as great when territorial issues are under contention between the adversaries. Similarly, the odds ratio of 0.434 for dyadic democracy means that the odds are .434 -- or under half as likely -- that a dispute

will occur in any given year between two adversaries that both qualify as democracies under Maoz and Russett's (1992) definition.

Table 2 presents another way to help interpret the effects of each variable. For each variable, this table presents the probability of dispute recurrence at several values of that variable, while holding the values of all other variables in the model at their mean values. Table 2 also lists the change in probability of dispute recurrence for the second value listed. The variable reflecting dyadic democracy, for example, decreases the probability of dispute recurrence from .127 to .059 when the previous dispute between the adversaries ended in a decisive outcome, for a total change in probability of -.067 (the numbers may not match exactly due to rounding). Similarly, the presence of territorial issues at stake between two adversaries increases the probability of dispute recurrence by .057, from .112 to .170.

The results presented in Tables 1 and 2 support many of this paper's hypotheses on the recurrence of militarized conflict between former adversaries. The results for dispute outcomes, contentious issues, and rivalry phases are all highly significant and in the hypothesized direction. That is, dispute recurrence is much less likely after a decisive or compromise outcome in the previous dispute between the same adversaries, and much more likely when territorial issues are under contention between the adversaries or when their relations have already reached the intermediate or -- especially -- advanced phases of rivalry. Military preponderance in the dyad decreases the likelihood of dispute recurrence in both models, and this effect is significant at the .03 level for the full data set and .06 for the contiguous dyads only. The occurrence of greater capability shifts also significantly increases the likelihood of dispute recurrence in both models.

Unlike the first seven variables, the effect of dyadic democracy differs greatly between the two models. In the model using the full data set, dyadic democracy produces a significant decrease in the likelihood of dispute recurrence ($X^2 = 16.91$, $p < .001$). In the contiguous dyad model, though, the effect of dyadic democracy -- while still decreasing the likelihood of conflict recurrence -- is far from statistically significant ($X^2 = 0.25$, $p < .62$). This result is disturbing, because (as mentioned earlier) many of the contemporary dyads where academics or policymakers are hoping that democracy will produce peace are contiguous. Even if democracy produces significant effects overall, that result derives mostly from the major power dyads in the data set, and it is difficult to find any meaningful support for the democratic peace proposition from the contiguous dyads in this study.

It should be borne in mind, though, that the present study is examining the recurrence of militarized conflict between former adversaries, rather than the initial outbreak of militarized conflict between any two states. Each dyad in this study, then, has already experienced at least one militarized confrontation in the recent past before the period being studied. These results should not necessarily be seen as casting doubt on the notion that democracies rarely fight against one another, because an abundance of evidence has shown convincingly that joint-democratic dyads overall are less conflict-prone in their relationships than are other types of dyads. Instead, these results suggest that democracy may not be as potent a cure for militarized conflict as some would hope, at least for contiguous dyads with a history of one or more confrontations in the recent past. The next section of this study examines the impact of this legacy of past conflict, in order to see whether or not the relationship between democracy and conflict changes over time as the adversaries accumulate a longer string of previous confrontations.

Individual Phase Analyses

Tables 3, 4, and 5 present the results of logistic regression equations for each of the three rivalry phases identified by Hensel (1995). Rather than examine each table in excessive detail, I will report on their results together, identifying and discussing the differences or variations between these different models. Each model tested in Tables 3-5 produces a significantly better fit to the data than the null model, usually at the .001 level (with model #2 in Table 3 significant at the .04 level).

[Tables 3 through 5 about here]

Decisive dispute outcomes always produced a significant decrease in the likelihood of dispute recurrence, while territorial issues always produced a significant increase in the likelihood of recurrence. Compromise outcomes always produced a decrease in the likelihood of recurrence, although the effects of compromises in the early phase of rivalry only attained borderline levels of significance (.06 and .11 for models 1 and 2). The effect of military preponderance became stronger in later phases of rivalry, changing from a positive but insignificant effect in the early phase ($p < .53$ and $.78$) to a negative effect of borderline significance in the intermediate phase ($p < .13$ and $.15$), and becoming significant and negative in the advanced phase ($p < .001$ and $.01$). Capability shifts always produced a positive effect, but this effect only reached meaningful levels of significance for the full data set (contiguous and major power dyads) in the early rivalry phase ($X^2 = 6.41$, $p < .01$). As a whole, then, the control variables in this study tended to produce stronger results in the later phases of rivalry than in the early phase, particularly for the cases of compromise outcomes and military preponderance.

The effects of democracy, on the other hand, varied along with both the rivalry phase and the type of dyad being studied. The aggregated analyses presented in Tables 1 and 2 have already suggested that dyadic democracy does not exert a significant impact on dispute recurrence for the contiguous adversaries included in this study. The disaggregated analyses in Tables 3-5 support this conclusion, with dyadic democracy generally decreasing the likelihood of recurrence slightly but never attaining statistical significance beyond the .39 level ($p < .97$ early phase, $p < .39$ intermediate, $p < .56$ advanced). The results in the full analyses incorporating both contiguous and major power dyads were much stronger in each phase and always negative, decreasing the likelihood of recurrence significantly in the early phase ($X^2 = 11.34$, $p < .001$) and reaching borderline significance in the later phases ($X^2 = 3.48$, $p < .07$ intermediate; $X^2 = 2.95$, $p < .09$ advanced).

The results from the disaggregated analyses presented in Tables 3-5 generally support the results from the aggregated analyses presented earlier. As before, dyadic democracy does not make much of a difference in conflict behavior between contiguous adversaries with a history of previous conflict. In the analyses run with the larger dataset, the impact of democracy is strongest in the early phase of rivalry, before the adversaries have accumulated extensive grievances or hostility toward each other through repeated confrontations. In the intermediate and advanced phases of rivalry, though, this effect weakens considerably, and other factors such as dispute outcomes and relative military capabilities become more important. Democracy's pacifying effect thus seems to weaken for longer-term adversaries, with dispute recurrence becoming increasingly likely in later phases of rivalry (Hensel 1995) and with the effects of other factors such as past dispute outcomes becoming increasingly important as the impact of democracy weakens.

Even if the effects of democracy on conflict recurrence seem to weaken as a rivalry relationship evolves, joint democracy may continue to have other important effects later in rivalry. Much of the existing literature on the democratic peace has focused less on the outbreak of conflict than on its management or escalation, emphasizing the ability of democracies to avoid escalation to war (e.g., Russett 1993). I now turn to such issues, to examine whether dyadic democracy continues to produce some type of pacifying effect within the context of evolving interstate rivalries.

Democracy and Militarized Dispute Severity

Table 6 presents the results of a series of analyses of variance (ANOVAs), examining the effect of dyadic democracy on militarized dispute severity. The two columns in this table include ANOVAs based on two distinct measures of democracy (those proposed by Maoz and Russett 1992 and by Dixon 1994) because of the somewhat different results produced by each measure. It should be noted that the results in Table 6 reflect the full dataset, including both contiguous and major power dyads. A separate set of

analyses including only contiguous dyads produced nearly identical results for both measures of democracy in terms of the direction and strength of the observed relationship.

[Table 6 about here]

In general, militarized disputes occurring between two democracies were less escalatory than disputes involving other types of dyads. Even where the differences are not significantly different, the direction of the relationship remains the same. Nonetheless, there is some variation in the strength of this relationship, involving both the rivalry context in which a given dispute takes place and the measure of democracy that is used. Using Maoz and Russett's measure, for example, the difference between democratic and other dyads is significant in aggregated analyses and in both the early and advanced rivalry phases, but the difference disappears for disputes occurring in the intermediate rivalry phase.³ Dixon's measure identifies fairly strong differences in the aggregated analyses and in the early rivalry phase ($p < .06$ for both analyses), but much less significant results for the intermediate ($F = 0.22$, $p < .64$) and advanced ($F = 0.14$, $p < .72$) rivalry phases.

Overall, these results support the mainstream interpretation that democracies are less escalatory than non-democratic adversaries, but several disturbing points should be borne in mind. First, even the Maoz and Russett measure produces highly insignificant results for the intermediate phase of rivalry. Maoz and Russett's democratic adversaries reached a mean severity level of 6.25 in that phase after 5.32 in the early phase, and then dropped down to 4.86 in the advanced phase; nondemocratic adversaries never varied beyond the 6.40-6.44 range. This finding is difficult to interpret, suggesting that the pacifying effect of democracy tends to weaken over time at first, but that once the adversaries reach the advanced phase of rivalry they are less escalatory once again.

Additionally, there are important differences in conflict escalation between the different measures of democracy that were used. Whereas Maoz and Russett's democracies range from mean escalation levels of 4.86-6.25, Dixon's democracies show hardly any variation in escalation patterns, only ranging from 5.98-6.27 mean levels. The differences between these two democracy measures are especially striking when we consider the differences in escalation patterns in the early and advanced phase, where the differences between the two measures of democracy were much greater than the differences between Dixon's democracy measure and either set of non-democratic adversaries. Maoz and Russett's democracies reach their lowest escalation level in the advanced phase, with a mean of 4.86, but that is also the time that Dixon's democracies reach their highest level with a mean of 6.27 (compared to 6.39 and 6.40 for the nondemocratic adversaries identified by the two democracy measures).

We must thus exercise caution in interpreting some of these results, although it does seem that democratic adversaries generally remain less escalatory than other adversaries. Even if democracy becomes less successful at preventing the recurrence of militarized conflict in later rivalry phases, democratic adversaries that become embroiled in disputes tend to minimize their escalation when compared to other adversaries (at least using the Maoz and Russett measure of democracy). Also, as with previous studies of democracy and escalation, none of the democratic dyads identified by either measure of democracy ever escalated a single dispute to war while both sides were democratic.

Conclusions and Implications

This paper has attempted to expand our understanding of the democratic peace by introducing the element of history. Beyond looking at whether or not democratic dyads are more or less conflict-prone overall than other dyads, I have looked at whether militarized conflict recurs in a set of dyads that have already been involved in one or more confrontation in the recent past. If dyadic democracy is a useful path to more peaceful

³ Care should be taken in interpreting some of these results, because of the great disparity in sample size between democratic and other adversary types, and because of the small N of disputes involving two democracies in later rivalry phases (particularly for the Maoz and Russett measure).

relations in currently unstable situations, then we would expect to find that introducing democracy into conflictual dyads historically has led to improved relations between the former adversaries and has decreased the likelihood of recurrent conflict arising between them. Alternatively, if the effect of democracy can be outweighed by the inflammatory effects of historical rivalry, then we would expect to find that the effect of democracy is weaker in more advanced phases of rivalry, and that other factors related to the legacy of past conflict might be more important influences on the likelihood of conflict recurrence.

The results have suggested that democracy has less of an effect on conflict recurrence than some would have been expected. Dyadic democracy has been shown previously to be a powerful force for peace with regard to the initiation of militarized conflict or the escalation of disputes or crises to full-scale war. The strength of democracy's pacifying effect weakens noticeably, though, when the domain of cases is reduced from all possible dyads to only those dyads that have engaged in recent conflict and the dependent variable is changed from conflict initiation to conflict recurrence. Particularly for contiguous dyads, democracy alone does not have much of an impact on the likelihood of recurrence. The other factors that were examined, particularly the effects of dispute outcomes and contentious issues, tended to have much stronger effects on recurrence than did democracy.

Implications for Policymakers

These results have some important implications that should be considered by policymakers before they use the democratic peace proposition as a basis for formulating foreign policy. As noted above, dyadic democracy did not substantially reduce the likelihood of conflict recurrence for contiguous dyads. Even among major power dyads, the significant effects of democracy in the aggregated analyses weakened greatly between the early phase of rivalry and the more advanced phases. For contiguous dyads and for dyads with length histories of past conflict, then, this preliminary evidence suggests that the democratic peace proposition is much shakier as a basis for foreign policymaking.

The many academics and policymakers who have recently argued that political democracy needs to be promoted throughout the world to extend the democratic peace may be correct in several ways. Dyadic democracies have been shown previously to be less likely than other potential adversaries to become involved in disputes or crises. Furthermore, confrontations between democracies have been shown previously to be less escalatory than confrontations between other adversaries. The present paper has added some additional evidence to support this lower escalation level in confrontations among democracies, although this evidence is much weaker for the intermediate rivalry phase and for Dixon's measure of democracy than for the other phases or for Maoz and Russett's measure. Yet there are important reasons to exercise caution in extrapolating from the democratic peace to foreign policymaking.

The overall weakness of the results of democracy for conflict recurrence in contiguous dyads raises questions about the applicability of the democratic peace proposition in much of the world. Van Evera (1990/91), for example, argues that the West needs to help promote democracy and dampen nationalism in Eastern Europe to help ensure future European stability in the face of numerous actual or potential border disputes in the area. This paper's analyses reveal, though, that dyadic democracy does not substantially reduce the likelihood of conflict recurrence between contiguous adversaries. Once a given dyad has turned to militarized conflict, then, even dyadic democracy may not be a sufficient obstacle to renewed conflict between the same adversaries. For today's current adversaries in the former Yugoslavia or the former Soviet republics, it may be too late for the democratic peace to take full effect. Many of the potential future adversaries in the area that Van Evera listed are not yet democratic, and if they should become involved in militarized conflict before democratizing, they may fall victim to the pressures, grievances, and hostility that characterize rivalry despite possible future movement toward dyadic democracy. This is not to say that the democratic peace proposition must be abandoned or

that it is a wholly inadequate basis for formulating state policy, but academics and policymakers must be aware of some of its possible caveats or limitations before using it to make momentous foreign policy decisions.

Implications for Future Research

This paper's results also have some important implications for future studies of the democratic peace, rivalry, and interstate conflict more generally. In particular, the results suggest that we need to learn more about the impact of democratization on interstate conflict behavior or on foreign policy more generally. Dyadic democracy did not always have a significant pacifying effect on relations between former adversaries in these analyses, which contrasts with the consistently strong impact that democracy has been found to exert on overall conflict behavior. There thus seems to be an important difference between the overall initiation of interstate conflict, and the recurrence of conflict between former adversaries; future research should attempt to explore this difference.

These results also suggested that some conflict patterns -- particularly the effects of democracy and several other variables included in the model -- change across rivalry phases. These changing conflict patterns lend support to an evolutionary perspective on interstate conflict and rivalry, because the evolving context of relations between two adversaries (or their history of recent conflict) seems to be accompanied by changing conflict behavior. The aggregated analyses presented in Tables 1 and 2 might have led to misleading conclusions if not accompanied by the disaggregated analyses from Tables 3-5, which identified several variables whose effects changed over time (with some becoming more important in later rivalry phases, and others becoming less important). Further research could benefit from considering this changing context and the accompanying changes in conflict patterns, in order to avoid the risk of misleading conclusions.

Overall, then, this paper has allowed us to examine an important element of the democratic peace proposition. Dyadic democracy may still be a useful path to peace, but it is not without limitations -- such as being less effective at preventing the recurrence of conflict than the initial outbreak of conflict, and being less effective for contiguous adversaries than for other types of adversaries. These limitations suggest important paths for future research, and they raise important issues that should be considered by national policymakers.

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Table 1: Logistic Regression Analysis of Militarized Dispute Recurrence (Aggregated Analysis -- includes all rivalry phases)

| Variable | Model 1: Contiguous and Major Power Dyads | | | Model 2: Contiguous Dyads Only | | |
|------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------|------------|-------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------|------------|
| | Est. (S.E.) | X ² (p) | Odds Ratio | Est. (S.E.) | X ² (p) | Odds Ratio |
| Intercept | - 1.97 (0.07) | 793.38 (.001) | 0.140 | - 1.88 (0.09) | 393.32 (.001) | 0.153 |
| Decisive Outcome | - 0.55 (0.09) | 41.67 (.001) | 0.576 | - 0.64 (0.13) | 25.82 (.001) | 0.525 |
| Compromise Outcome | - 0.57 (0.12) | 22.83 (.001) | 0.566 | - 0.62 (0.16) | 15.79 (.001) | 0.538 |
| Territorial Issues | 0.48 (0.07) | 41.17 (.001) | 1.615 | 0.55 (0.09) | 33.560 (.001) | 1.729 |
| Intermediate Phase | 0.30 (0.08) | 14.09 (.001) | 1.345 | 0.30 (0.11) | 7.35 (.001) | 1.348 |
| Advanced Phase | 1.05 (0.08) | 185.17 (.001) | 2.853 | 1.14 (0.10) | 126.96 (.001) | 3.119 |
| Military Preponderance | - 0.15 (0.07) | 5.22 (.03) | 0.859 | - 0.17 (0.09) | 3.76 (.06) | 0.843 |
| Capability Shift | 0.03 (0.01) | 8.53 (.01) | 1.034 | 0.06 (0.03) | 4.17 (.05) | 1.066 |
| Dyadic Democracy | - .083 (0.20) | 16.91 (.001) | 0.434 | - .152 (0.30) | 0.25 (.62) | 0.859 |
| | X ² = 358.86 p < .001 (8 d.f.) N = 9209 | | | X ² = 241.60 p < .001 (8 d.f.) N = 4021 | | |

Table 2: Predicted Effects of Each Variable on Dispute Recurrence

| Variable | Model 1: Contiguous and Major Power Dyads | | | Model 2: Contiguous Dyads Only | |
|----------------------------|-------------------------------------------|---------------------|-----------------------|--------------------------------|-----------------------|
| | Value | Prob. of Recurrence | Change in Probability | Prob. of Recurrence | Change in Probability |
| Decisive Outcome | 0 | .136 | | .173 | |
| | 1 | .083 | - .052 | .099 | - .007 |
| Compromise Outcome | 0 | .128 | | .166 | |
| | 1 | .077 | - .051 | .097 | - .007 |
| Territorial Issues | 0 | .112 | | .138 | |
| | 1 | .170 | + .057 | .216 | .008 |
| Intermediate Rivalry Phase | 0 | .115 | | .146 | |
| | 1 | .149 | + .033 | .187 | .041 |
| Advanced Rivalry Phase | 0 | .106 | | .126 | |
| | 1 | .253 | + .147 | .310 | .184 |
| Military Preponderance | 0 (< 3:1) | .133 | | .169 | |
| | 1 (≥ 3:1) | .117 | - .017 | .147 | - 0.02 |
| Capability Shift | 0.00 (NC) | .121 | | .154 | |
| | 1.00 (100%) | .125 | + .004 | .163 | .009 |
| Dyadic Democracy | 0 | .127 | | .156 | |
| | 1 | .059 | - .067 | .137 | - 0.02 |

Table 3: Militarized Dispute Recurrence in the Early Phase of Rivalry

| Variable | Model 1: Contiguous and Major Power Dyads | | | Model 2: Contiguous Dyads Only | | |
|------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------|------------|-----------------------------------------------------------|--------------------|------------|
| | Est. (S.E.) | X ² (p) | Odds Ratio | Est. (S.E.) | X ² (p) | Odds Ratio |
| Intercept | - 2.15 (0.09) | 534.70 (.001) | 0.116 | - 2.03 (0.13) | 254.38 (.001) | 0.131 |
| Decisive Outcome | - 0.40 (0.11) | 13.08 (.001) | 0.671 | - 0.46 (0.18) | 6.59 (.01) | 0.628 |
| Compromise Outcome | - 0.31 (0.16) | 3.66 (.06) | 0.735 | - 0.36 (0.22) | 2.61 (.11) | 0.697 |
| Territorial Issues | 0.39 (0.11) | 12.34 (.001) | 1.473 | 0.31 (0.15) | 4.05 (.05) | 1.357 |
| Military Preponderance | 0.06 (0.10) | 0.39 (.53) | 1.064 | 0.13 (0.14) | 0.78 (.38) | 1.134 |
| Capability Shift | 0.03 (0.01) | 6.41 (.01) | 1.031 | 0.06 (0.04) | 1.76 (.19) | 1.060 |
| Dyadic Democracy | - .83 (0.25) | 11.34 (.001) | 0.437 | 0.02 (0.44) | 0.00 (.97) | 1.016 |
| | X ² = 44.90 p < .001 (6 d.f.) N = 5826 | | | X ² = 13.30 p < .04 (6 d.f.) N = 2044 | | |

Table 4: Militarized Dispute Recurrence in the Intermediate Phase

| Variable | Model 1: Contiguous and Major Power Dyads | | | Model 2: Contiguous Dyads Only | | |
|------------------------|--------------------------------------------------|--------------------|------------|---------------------------------------|--------------------|------------|
| | Est. (S.E.) | X ² (p) | Odds Ratio | Est. (S.E.) | X ² (p) | Odds Ratio |
| Intercept | - 1.56 (0.12) | 166.48 (.001) | 0.211 | - 1.52 (0.15) | 103.52 (.001) | 0.219 |
| Decisive Outcome | - 0.95 (0.20) | 23.44 (.001) | 0.387 | - 0.82 (0.27) | 9.51 (.001) | 0.440 |
| Compromise Outcome | - 0.56 (0.22) | 6.29 (.02) | 0.574 | - 0.67 (0.27) | 6.14 (.02) | 0.514 |
| Territorial Issues | 0.41 (0.16) | 6.49 (.01) | 1.500 | 0.64 (0.20) | 10.40 (.001) | 1.904 |
| Military Preponderance | - 0.21 (0.14) | 2.29 (.13) | 0.814 | - 0.25 (0.18) | 2.08 (.15) | 0.776 |
| Capability Shift | 0.03 (0.03) | 0.91 (.34) | 1.033 | 0.06 (0.06) | 1.09 (.30) | 1.059 |
| Dyadic Democracy | - 1.36 (0.73) | 3.48 (.07) | 0.257 | - .089 (1.04) | 0.73 (.39) | 0.412 |

X² = 41.37
p < .001
(6 d.f.)
N = 2009

X² = 28.64
p < .001
(6 d.f.)
N = 1091

Table 5: Militarized Dispute Recurrence in the Advanced Phase

| Variable | Model 1: Contiguous and Major Power Dyads | | | Model 2: Contiguous Dyads Only | | |
|------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------|------------|-----------------------------------------------------------|--------------------|------------|
| | Est. (S.E.) | X ² (p) | Odds Ratio | Est. (S.E.) | X ² (p) | Odds Ratio |
| Intercept | - 0.79 (0.11) | 55.93 (.001) | 0.455 | - 0.66 (0.12) | 29.27 (.001) | 0.518 |
| Decisive Outcome | - 0.61 (0.20) | 9.75 (.01) | 0.542 | - 0.85 (0.25) | 11.91 (.001) | 0.428 |
| Compromise Outcome | - 1.30 (0.29) | 19.68 (.001) | 0.273 | - 1.17 (0.37) | 10.14 (.001) | 0.313 |
| Territorial Issues | 0.65 (0.14) | 21.84 (.001) | 1.920 | 0.76 (0.16) | 22.28 (.001) | 2.141 |
| Military Preponderance | - 0.45 (0.13) | 12.47 (.001) | 0.638 | - 0.43 (0.15) | 7.96 (.01) | 0.650 |
| Capability Shift | 0.07 (0.06) | 1.23 (.27) | 1.072 | 0.07 (0.08) | 0.72 (.40) | 1.068 |
| Dyadic Democracy | - 0.73 (0.42) | 2.95 (.09) | 0.483 | - 0.27 (0.47) | 0.33 (.56) | 0.762 |
| | X ² = 62.77 p < .001 (6 d.f.) N = 1374 | | | X ² = 45.40 p < .001 (6 d.f.) N = 886 | | |

**Table 6: Dyadic Democracy and Dispute Severity
(Contiguous and Major Power Dyads)**

Aggregated Results (All Rivalry Phases):

| | Maoz & Russett measure: | | | Dixon measure: | | |
|-----------------|-------------------------|----------|--|--------------------|----------|--|
| | <u>Mean (S.D.)</u> | <u>N</u> | | <u>Mean (S.D.)</u> | <u>N</u> | |
| Democratic Dyad | 5.33 (1.30) | 42 | | 6.08 (1.83) | 154 | |
| Other Dyad | 6.42 (2.02) | 2746 | | 6.40 (2.01) | 2892 | |
| | F = 12.04 (p < .001) | | | F = 3.57 (p < .06) | | |

Early Rivalry Phase Only:

| | Maoz & Russett measure: | | | Dixon measure: | | |
|-----------------|-------------------------|----------|--|--------------------|----------|--|
| | <u>Mean (S.D.)</u> | <u>N</u> | | <u>Mean (S.D.)</u> | <u>N</u> | |
| Democratic Dyad | 5.32 (1.25) | 31 | | 5.98 (1.87) | 91 | |
| Other Dyad | 6.44 (2.13) | 1491 | | 6.41 (2.11) | 1583 | |
| | F = 8.50 (p < .01) | | | F = 3.63 (p < .06) | | |

Intermediate Rivalry Phase Only:

| | Maoz & Russett measure: | | | Dixon measure: | | |
|-----------------|-------------------------|----------|--|--------------------|----------|--|
| | <u>Mean (S.D.)</u> | <u>N</u> | | <u>Mean (S.D.)</u> | <u>N</u> | |
| Democratic Dyad | 6.25 (2.06) | 4 | | 6.20 (1.81) | 30 | |
| Other Dyad | 6.40 (1.94) | 572 | | 6.37 (1.93) | 598 | |
| | F = 0.02 (p < .89) | | | F = 0.22 (p < .64) | | |

Advanced Rivalry Phase Only:

| | Maoz & Russett measure: | | | Dixon measure: | | |
|-----------------|-------------------------|----------|--|--------------------|----------|--|
| | <u>Mean (S.D.)</u> | <u>N</u> | | <u>Mean (S.D.)</u> | <u>N</u> | |
| Democratic Dyad | 4.86 (0.90) | 7 | | 6.27 (1.75) | 33 | |
| Other Dyad | 6.40 (1.85) | 683 | | 6.39 (1.85) | 711 | |
| | F = 4.81 (p < .03) | | | F = 0.14 (p < .72) | | |