

## **Interstate Identity Claims under the Territorial Integrity Norm**

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Scholars have suggested that nation-states have developed a norm of territorial integrity, under which state borders are considered final and should not be challenged. If states are restricted from challenging borders, though, what does this mean for their support of their ethnic kinsmen abroad? We suggest that states should be less likely to make demands for the separation of their co-ethnics from a neighboring state as the norm strengthens, but that they should be more likely to make demands for better treatment of the co-ethnics within the state. We test this expectation with very preliminary data from the ICOW Identity Claims data set, and find support using multiple measures of the strength of the supposed norm.

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## **Interstate Identity Claims under the Territorial Integrity Norm**

Recent research suggests that a norm of territorial integrity has come to shape contemporary international relations. Anstis and Zacher (2010) have argued that "The establishment of a strong territorial integrity norm was one of the most important developments of the international security order in the twentieth century." Western leaders proclaimed the importance of this norm in response to Russia's 2014 annexation of the Crimean Peninsula from Ukraine: "In addition to its impact on the unity, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine, the annexation of Crimea could have grave implications for the legal order that protects the unity and sovereignty of all states." (BBC 3/12/2014)

If states are restricted from challenging borders, though, what does this mean for their support of their ethnic kinsmen abroad? Many international borders separate members of ethnic groups, and leaders on both sides of the border may disagree vehemently with the way their ethnic kin are treated in the other state. Russian President Vladimir Putin justified the Crimean annexation in terms of protecting the interests of ethnic Russians: "Millions of Russians and Russian-speaking people live in Ukraine and will continue to do so. Russia will always defend their interests using political, diplomatic and legal means." (Washington Post 3/18/2014) Beyond Crimea -- which had a clear ethnic Russian majority and had been part of Russia until 1954 -- Russia has not sought to annex any other Russian-populated areas in former Soviet republics such as Estonia, Latvia, or Moldova, but it has made threatening statements. (BBC 3/26/2014)

We investigate the impact of the supposed territorial integrity norm on the outbreak of disagreements between states that share members of an ethnic group. We suggest that states should be less likely to make demands for the separation of their co-ethnics from a neighboring state as the norm strengthens, but that they should also be more likely to make demands for better treatment of the co-ethnics within the state. Analysis using a very preliminary version of a new data set on identity claims generally supports these expectations. Using six different measures of the strength of the territorial integrity norm, states are much less likely to begin new identity claims with separatist demands when the norm is stronger, and somewhat more likely to begin new identity claims with demands for domestic change.

## **Theoretical Development**

Zacher (2001) drew scholarly attention to an international norm favoring territorial integrity. This norm emerged out of the concepts of nationalism and self-determination, and limited states' ability to transfer territory without respect to the will of the inhabitants. Zacher (2001) and Anstis and Zacher (2010) explain the development of the norm in detail, and suggest that it has helped to reduce the incidence of successful challenges to the territorial status quo in recent decades. Hensel et al. (2009) investigated the impact of this norm quantitatively, finding mixed support.

As noted above, many leaders seem to consider this norm to be an important part of modern international security. Assuming that they are correct (and not just using this argument opportunistically to oppose Russia's actions in Ukraine while being willing to tolerate similar actions by other states elsewhere), though, more attention needs to be paid to the unintended consequences of the norm. Specifically, we are interested in the impact of the territorial integrity norm on relations between states that share an ethnic group.

Some of the same philosophical arguments that helped develop the territorial integrity norm (as described by Zacher) suggest a possible weakness in this norm. Zacher (2001: 217), for example, notes that the concepts of nationalism and self-determination suggested that it would be wrong for states to take territory populated by one nation and give it to a state dominated by a different nation. He notes in the same paragraph, though, that these same concepts also suggested that members of the same nation could seek to unify with their kin abroad, and that nationalism "had a more disruptive than pacifying effect on international relations in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries" as Italy and Germany unified and the Hapsburg, Hohenzollern, and Ottoman empires were broken up. Zacher (2001: 219) also notes the tension between Woodrow Wilson's arguments about self-determination and about territorial integrity, although noting that Wilson himself "came out fundamentally on the side of respect for territorial integrity" and that self-determination for ethnic nations was only used for some of the territories address by the post-WWI Versailles conference. More recently, Zacher (2001: 242) notes, many

developing states -- especially in Africa -- have emphasized that self-determination should only apply to existing colonial territories and not to individual ethnic groups.<sup>1</sup>

It seems, then, that there may be limits or challenges to the territorial integrity norm. As Zacher (2001) and Anstis and Zacher (2010) describe it, the norm's impact depends at least in part on international pressure -- if a state like Iraq can invade Kuwait in clear defiance of the norm, the international community should generally respond in defense of the norm to prevent Iraq from successfully achieving its goal of annexing Kuwait. If the international community is expected to react to prevent any attempt to annex territory where one's ethnic kin live, though, how should a state react when its ethnic kin are threatened in another state?

We suggest that a consequence of the territorial integrity norm may be an increase in non-irredentist demands by states over their ethnic kin abroad. Although the norm may reduce their incentive to demand annexation of the territories where their kin live (or to demand that their kin be granted independence from their current state), this does not mean that states no longer care about the treatment or status of their ethnic kin beyond their borders. Zacher's original description of the norm suggests that it is related to the concepts of nationalism and self-determination, and there is little reason to expect that supporting the territorial integrity norm also means ignoring the plight of one's kin beyond one's own borders. If irredentist claims to annexation of the affected kin are no longer on the table, we suggest that states should be more likely to press demands for better treatment of their kin within their current states. This leads to the following two hypotheses:

**Hypothesis 1:** *As the strength of the territorial integrity norm increases, states will be less likely to begin identity claims that demand separation of the group from its current state.*

**Hypothesis 2:** *As the strength of the territorial integrity norm increases, states will be more likely to begin identity claims that involve the treatment or status of the group within its current state.*

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<sup>1</sup> It is also worth noting that Fazal and Griffiths (2014) suggest that international support for the territorial integrity norm may have the unintended consequence of encouraging separatist movements. Such movements within existing states do not seem to violate the typical interpretation of the territorial integrity norm in the same way that military conquest of a neighboring state would, and the notion that major states and IGOs would seek to defend the territorial integrity of a new state after a successful separatist movement is argued to embolden would-be separatists.

## **Research Design**

Because this study's hypotheses concern the outbreak of identity claims between states over a shared ethnic group, our analyses require a data set of states sharing such groups. This is created from the related Ethnic Power Relations (EPR) and Transborder Ethnic Kin (TEK) data sets (Cederman et al. 2013, Vogt et al. 2015), which include information about each politically organized ethnic group in the world and about the connections between groups across international borders. Using these data sets, we create directed dyad-year observations composed of each pair of countries that share a group in a given year, with one observation for Russia as a potential challenger and Estonia as a potential target state over ethnic Russians in a given year, and another observation for the opposite. This setup allows us to study the possibility that either state could begin an identity claim over the group that year.

## **Identity Claims**

The Issue Correlates of War (ICOW) project has already collected data on territorial claims, river claims, and maritime claims between countries in the modern interstate system, and we have adapted the same basic research strategy to begin collecting data on identity claims. As with the other three issue types, an identity claim requires explicit contention between official government representatives of two or more states. To qualify as an identity claim, this contention has to involve the treatment or status of an ethnic group that is shared by both the challenger state (the one making the demand) and the target state (the one where the group members covered by this demand currently live) in the dyad.

For the purposes of this paper, we distinguish between two categories of demands that might be made. "Domestic" demands address the status or treatment of the group within the target state, and range from allowing group members to speak their native language or observe their native religion to giving the group full economic or political rights, or even granting the group regional autonomy in the area where they live. "Separatist" demands call for the group members to leave the target state, whether by creating an independent state of their own or by joining the challenger state.

The TEK data set identifies 157 ethnic groups that have been shared by at least two states between 1946-2013, which combine to produce a total of 1218 dyadic shared groups, such as Russia and Estonia sharing ethnic Russians. Each such dyadic shared group is currently being investigated to determine whether or not the two governments in the dyad had an explicit disagreement over the treatment or status of the group in one or both states that would qualify as an identity claim under the definition provided above. We have received a research grant from the Department of Defense's Minerva Initiative to collect this information for the post-WWII era -- but unfortunately for this 2016 ISA conference, the arrival of the grant money has been delayed. When this paper was proposed to ISA, the grant was expected to start in September 2015, allowing six full months for data collection by five research assistants at four universities before the conference (thereby offering complete data on identity claims in several regions or sub-regions of the world that could be analyzed in this paper). As it turns out, though, the first portion of the grant money was not actually distributed to all four universities until late February 2016, meaning that the needed data has not been completed for any regions of the world.

Instead of the complete data that was expected, we have been forced to limit ourselves to a very preliminary and incomplete effort to collect identity claims around the world. Our research strategy was to begin by collecting basic information about each of the EPR/TEK shared ethnic groups using a number of general ethnic reference books, before moving on to intensive examination of academic and news sources to construct detailed chronologies of each group and to code qualifying claims. Given the lengthy delay in receipt of the first funds from the grant, though, we have been forced to rely only on those general reference sources, which are listed at the bottom of Table 1.

[Table 1 about here]

As Table 1 reveals, these reference sources have allowed us to identify a total of 105 identity claims, including 26 where the demand was domestic in nature and 79 where the demand was separatist in nature.<sup>2</sup> This is likely only a small fraction of the number of claims that will ultimately be identified now that the grant funds have started to arrive and can finally be used to

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<sup>2</sup>An additional 36 identity claims that were identified using these sources can not be included in this paper's analyses because the EPR data set does not code the group as being present in sufficient numbers (or politically organized) in the challenger and/or target state. Another 16 can not be included because the target is a colonial power (which are not coded for ethnic groups in their empires by the EPR data set) rather than an independent state.

hire research assistants. For example, the Minorities at Risk data set identifies another 69 minority groups (beyond the groups included in these 105 current claims) that are coded as receiving support from an external state or IGO during the years 2004-2006 alone, many of which are likely to be involved in identity claims that prompted this support; 18 of those groups sought secession during those years, and the remainder sought some level of domestic change ranging from political, economic, or cultural changes to regional autonomy. We expect that the number of domestic claims, in particular, will end up being at least three to four times larger than it is now once our research assistants are able to undertake the full news search. The number of separatist claims in this preliminary data set is likely to be closer to the eventual number, both because the reference sources are more likely to mention external involvement when an outside actor seeks to separate the group from its current state, and because we have consulted with the ICOW territorial claims data set to identify territorial claims that are believed to have an ethnic component for the challenger state.

[Figure 1 about here]

Figure 1 shows the distribution of new identity claims during each decade since 1946. Claims that began before 1946 are left out, to ensure that the figure is not distorted by an apparently large number of claims in the first year covered by the data set. With that caveat in mind, there has generally been a downward trend in new separatist claims, with the first decade (1946-55) seeing the most such claims and generally fewer in later decades, despite a rapid increase in the number of states in the interstate system over this time. Identity claims demanding domestic change have generally increased over time, with 1976-85 and then 1986-95 each seeing the outbreak of more claims than any previous decade, before seeing a dropoff for the two most recent decades being studied. Particularly for identity claims, though, it is worth bearing in mind that the current preliminary version of this data set is likely to be missing a large number of claims. More data collection is needed before we can be confident in these trends.

[Figure 2 about here]

Figure 2 follows up on Figure 1 by showing the number of identity claims underway during each year, and the results are generally consistent with the patterns seen in Figure 1. There has been a general downward trend in separatist claims, with the peak reached in 1971 and

the years since 2010 showing the fewest claims underway at any time during this period. Similarly, and keeping in mind the likely shortcomings of the data, there has generally been an upward trend in the number of domestic claims underway, with a major decrease since the peak in the first half of the 1990s.

### **Measuring the Territorial Integrity Norm**

The main independent variable is the strength of the territorial integrity norm, which is said to be one of four fundamental norms influencing the international territorial order (Anstis and Zacher 2010). Norms are notoriously difficult to measure empirically, though, as they generally refer to beliefs about behaviors that are (or are not) appropriate and do not always leave an observable trace. We seek to minimize these difficulties in measuring norms by using a variety of different measures of the strength of the territorial integrity norm.

We begin with the development of the norm according to Zacher (2001: 236-237). His description had the norm entering the emergence stage in 1919 and the acceptance stage in 1945, followed by the institutionalization or strengthening stage in 1976. Because our analysis is limited to the post-WWII era, we measure Zacher's stages with a post-1975 dummy variable to distinguish this most advanced stage from earlier times when the norm was still developing rather than strengthening. Our second measure supplements this with a simple year counter, under the expectation that the norm has been strengthening with each passing year.

The remaining four measures involve measures of the treaty obligations that states have accepted, as described by Hensel et al. (2009). The Multilateral Treaties of Pacific Settlement (MTOPS) data set includes all treaties that have at least five members and include explicit territorial integrity obligations. Hensel et al. (2009) used this to measure global support for the territorial integrity norm based on the average number of treaties with such provisions that states in the international system had accepted in each year. The average level of global support for this norm is shown in Figure 3, with a substantial increase from 1.48 in 1946 to 3.76 in 2015.

[Figure 3 about here]

Beyond this global average, three more focused measures are also used. We take the average number of territorial integrity obligations in each geographic region (Western



Hemisphere, Europe, Africa, Middle East, and Asia/Oceania), in case certain regions have stronger or weaker support for the norm than would be expected based on the global totals. We subdivide this into fifteen geographic subregions (e.g. splitting the Western Hemisphere into North America, Central America/Caribbean, and South America), to see whether this provides an even more accurate measure of the norm in a given dyad's geographic neighborhood.<sup>3</sup> Finally, we use a dyadic total, indicating the number of MTOPS territorial integrity treaties that are shared by the two members of a dyad in a given year, which should be the most accurate measure of territorial integrity obligations for that dyad.<sup>4</sup>

### **Additional Variables in Model**

It is not enough to measure the territorial integrity norm itself, though. Meaningful analyses of this norm must also consider other factors that could be expected to lead to identity claims of either or both types. Without including such factors, the absence of identity claims could easily be attributed to the norm, when there would have been little reason to expect a claim to begin. We thus adapt a model from a paper presented at the 2015 ISA conference in New Orleans (Hensel and Macaulay 2015), which sought to account for the origin of territorial claims over shared ethnic groups.

One central element in this model is the position of the shared ethnic group in the potential challenger state that might make a new demand over its co-ethnics. An identity claim should be expected to be much more likely when the shared group makes up a larger proportion of the potential challenger's population, as well as when the group makes up at least a share of the ruling coalition in the state's political system. Both variables are taken from the EPR data, with the proportion of population measured in a continuous variable and a share of political power measured by a dummy variable that indicates whether the group in question made up a monopoly of political power, was dominant, or was either a senior or junior partner in the ruling

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<sup>3</sup> For dyads that share an ethnic group but cover two different subregions, we use the global average as the relevant subregion score.

<sup>4</sup> It should be noted that Hensel et al. (2009) found that the global average had a much stronger effect on armed conflict over territory than the dyadic count of shared treaties, which led the authors to conclude that global pressure is more important in influencing respect for the norm than the simple number of treaties that a given state/dyad has accepted.

coalition. Similar results were obtained if this political variable was replaced with separate dummy variables indicating absolute or shared political power.

Another important portion of this model is the status of the shared ethnic group in the potential target state, with the expectation that a new identity claim is more likely to begin when the group is experiencing more difficult conditions in the target. This is measured by a series of dummy variables to indicate whether or not the group is not included in the state's ruling coalition, experiencing political discrimination, or has "self-excluded" (referring to cases where the group is essentially beyond the state's control and refuses to participate in the state's institutions; examples include Kosovo Albanians from the end of Serbian rule over Kosovo to the independence of Kosovo, or Abkhazians or South Ossetians since Georgia's independence). For both discrimination and exclusion from political power, separate variables are used to indicate the first year that the condition exists as well as subsequent years when the condition has not yet been reversed, in order to see whether new identity claims are more likely to begin soon after an unfavorable change in status.<sup>5</sup> Each of the variables is taken from the EPR data. One final group status variable is the existence of armed conflict involving the group in the target state during either the year of observation or the previous year, which might be expected to attract the attention of co-ethnics in the challenger state who would seek to protect their kin. The EPR measures this by coding Armed Conflict Data conflicts for their ethnic participants.

We also consider the age of both the challenger and target states, measured as the natural log of the number of years since independence using the ICOW Colonial History data set. This is important to consider, because so many states joined the international system during the period covered by this study. The general expectation for these two variables is that new identity claims should be most likely to begin soon after the independence of each state, when a newly independent challenger state may still be seeking to unify its people under its rule, and a newly independent target state may be seen by its neighbors as weak and less able to defend against their efforts to incorporate their ethnic kin.

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<sup>5</sup> This distinction between the first and subsequent years could not be used for self-exclusion, because no identity claims began in the first year that this situation applied (so the variable indicating the first year of self-exclusion perfectly predicts the absence of new claims and is automatically dropped from the statistical model).

Finally, we control for several other factors that are considered in many quantitative analyses of international relations. One control variable is the relative capabilities of the challenger state vis-a-vis the target state, measured using the Composite Index of National Capabilities (CINC) score from the Correlates of War (COW) project's National Material Capabilities data set. This CINC score measures the proportion of the entire international system's power capabilities held by a given state in a given year; we measure the challenger state's CINC score as a proportion of the total capabilities of the challenger and target state that year, producing a range from near zero (where all capabilities are held by the target state) to near one (where all capabilities are held by the challenger).

A second control variable is for joint democracy, following the widely shared expectation that political democracies rarely fight each other, and even manage to remove many of the most contentious issues from their political agenda (e.g. Mitchell and Prins 1999). This is measured by whether or not both the challenger and target states attain a score of seven or higher on the Polity scale, which ranges from -10 (most autocratic) to +10 (most democratic) and comes from the Polity IV data set. We also include the presence of a military alliance between the challenger and target state, under the expectation that formal allies will be less likely to raise identity claims against each other; this is taken from the COW project's Formal Interstate Alliance data set.

Several of the variables used in this study -- the preliminary list of identity claims and the MTOPS treaty data used to measure the strength of the territorial integrity norm -- run through 2015. The Polity data used for the democracy control variable run through 2014, the EPR data on the size and political status of groups currently run through 2013, and the COW alliance data run through 2012. The biggest temporal constraint for this study lies in the COW capabilities data used for the relative capabilities control, which currently runs through 2007, so our analyses cover the years 1946-2007.

### **Analyses**

We begin by analyzing the likelihood that a potential challenger state will begin a new identity claim that demands the separation of the shared ethnic group from its current state, whether this is via independence or via annexation to the challenger. Such demands run directly

counter to the territorial integrity norm, which argues that state borders should be accepted in their current form. As such, we have hypothesized that potential challengers should be less likely to make such demands as international support for the territorial integrity norm increases over time.

[Table 2 about here]

Table 2 reports the results of six different logistic regression models, each of which seeks to account for the outbreak of a new separatist demand. The models differ in the use of six different measures of the territorial integrity norm, in order to give us a more complete picture of the impact of this norm than is possible with any single measure. All six measures are consistent, with a stronger territorial integrity norm reducing the likelihood of new identity claims involving separatist demands, and even the weakest of these six effects -- Zacher's 1976-present stage of the norm -- is still statistically significant ( $p < .02$ ). This consistent result across six different measures clearly supports our hypothesis that separatist demands should be less likely when the territorial integrity norm is stronger, regardless of whether this norm is measured dyadically, regionally, or globally.<sup>6</sup> It could be argued that the treaty-based measures are flawed measures of the territorial integrity norm, because signing treaties with territorial integrity obligations is done for another reason (perhaps that territorial threat in the region has already ended, as Hensel et al. (2009) suggest, or that the signing states seek protection against an imminent threat). Yet the consistent results that are obtained from both treaty-based and other measures, all of which strongly suggest that separatist claim onset is less likely when the norm appears to be stronger, suggesting that there may be something meaningful to this notion of a territorial integrity norm.

The remaining portions of the model do a reasonably good job of accounting for the onset of separatist-based identity claims, as well. The size of the group in the challenger state's population significantly increases the likelihood of a new claim ( $p < .01$ ) in every model, as do self-excluded status of the group in the target state ( $p < .01$ ) and contiguity ( $p < .01$ ).<sup>7</sup> State age

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<sup>6</sup> Consistent with Hensel et al. (2009), if the global territorial integrity norm is split into separate measures of general and violent territorial integrity obligations, the general obligations significantly reduce claim onset while the violent obligations have nothing even close to a statistically significant impact.

<sup>7</sup> Note that contiguity includes both direct land contiguity and contiguity by up to 400 miles of sea. If these are separated, both land and sea contiguity have significant positive effects on claim onset. It is also worth noting that

natters, too, as claims become less likely as both the challenger ( $p < .01$ ) and target ( $p < .01$ ) have been independent longer. Joint democracy also has a strong effect, although it is so strong -- not a single separatist claim begins between two democracies -- that the variable is automatically removed from the model.

We now turn to our more novel hypothesis, which addresses the likelihood that a potential challenger will begin a new identity claim that only demands changes in the domestic treatment of the shared ethnic group. Examples of such demands include the granting of political autonomy, the improvement of the group's political or economic status, or cultural changes such as improved linguistic or religious rights for group members. These demands do not violate the territorial integrity norm, so we do not expect them to be less likely as the territorial integrity norm has been said to strengthen over time. Indeed, we suggest that such demands may even become more likely as the norm strengthens, as the potential challenger remains concerned about the plight of its co-ethnics but supporting independence or making irredentist demands is discouraged by the rest of the international system.

[Table 3 about here]

As with the earlier analysis of separatist demands, Table 3 reports the results of six different logistic regression models, each using a different measure of the strength of the territorial integrity norm to account for the outbreak of a new domestic demand. When interpreting these results we need to bear in mind that this is likely a very incomplete subset of all domestic-based identity claims, as noted earlier; these general reference sources are more likely to mention major events such as separatism and less likely to mention less headline-worthy events like seeking better treatment of one's ethnic kin abroad. With that said, the results for the onset of identity claims over domestic demands are much weaker than they were for separatist demands. There is a significant increase in claim onset under the Zacher measure ( $p < .01$ ) and the global treaty measure ( $p < .05$ ), but only borderline-significant results for the year counter ( $p < .11$ ) and the regional measure ( $p < .10$ ), and no systematic impact under the subregional measure

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between separatist and domestic demands, five identity claims involve sea contiguity (such as India-Sri Lanka over the Tamils) and five involve non-contiguous adversaries (such as Russia and Moldova over the ethnic Russians in Transnistria), so limiting analysis to only land borders would miss out on a substantial number of cases.

( $p < .64$ ) and the dyadic measure ( $p < .57$ ). We can thus conclude only mixed support for the hypothesis, although each of these effects is in the direction of increasing claim onset.

Turning to the other variables in the model, the group's status in the challenger has little impact on new claims involving domestic demands, but the status in the target state has a much stronger impact on such claims than it did for claims involving separatist demands. New claims are significantly more likely in each model when the group is excluded from the ruling coalition ( $p < .05$ ), when it begins experiencing systematic discrimination ( $p < .01$ ), when it continues experiencing discrimination ( $p < .02$ ), and to a lesser extent when it is self-excluded from power ( $p < .10$  to  $p < .05$  depending on the model). Contiguity continues to increase the risk of claims, as do the age of both the challenger and target states -- although the effect is reversed for challenger age, with new domestic-based demands becoming more likely ( $p < .01$ ) when the challenger has been independent longer but less likely ( $p < .01$ ) when the target has. This suggests that separatist claims may be more important earlier in the challenger's history, as the new leaders may seek to unify their kin (Greater Somalia comes to mind), but that domestic-based claims involving the treatment of the kin become more important later in the challenger's history.

### **Discussion**

This paper has been a very preliminary effort to study the impact of the supposed territorial integrity norm on identity claims in the post-WWII era. There have been important data limitations that will be overcome in future versions of this paper as data collection proceeds, but several findings stand out. When the territorial integrity norm is stronger, using any of six different measures, new separatist-based identity claims are much less likely, although the evidence is more mixed about whether or not domestic-based identity claims are becoming more likely as a consequence. The status of the group in the target state strongly affects the likelihood of a domestic-claim, with new claims being much more likely when the group is excluded from power or undergoing systematic discrimination, and self-excluded groups that do not participate in the political system are much more likely to become the subject of separatist claims. State age also plays a very important role, with recently independent target states being more likely to be subjected to both types of identity claims; recently independent challengers are more likely to

begin separatist claims, but domestic-based identity claims are much more likely to be started by challengers that have been independent for a longer time.

Beyond improving the accuracy and completeness of the basic data set under the current Minerva grant, there are other promising directions for future research related to this project. One involves the grant's collection of data on the management of each identity claim through bilateral negotiations, third-party assistance, or militarized conflict. The ICOW project has already collected data on the management of territorial, river, and maritime claims, so we can study how identity claims differ from these other types of issues. For example, territorial claims have been significantly more likely to become militarized than river or maritime claims, and an analysis of territorial claims found that such claims were more likely to become militarized when the claimed territory has high intangible salience (Hensel and Mitchell 2005, Hensel et al. 2008). Identity claims are considered primarily intangible in nature, because they are typically related to the treatment of one's co-ethnics rather than to any specific tangible gain that might accrue to the challenger state, whereas river and maritime claims are primarily tangible. This suggests that identity claims should be more conflict-prone than river and maritime claims, likely approaching the danger levels of territorial claims.

On the other hand, identity claims can be seen as a primarily domestic matter under the sovereignty of the target state, rather than a clearly interstate issue such as a territorial border or a disagreement over the usage of a shared river. States are often willing to negotiate over such clearly interstate issues, but the treatment of an ethnic group within the state would seem to be very different. We expect that states will be less likely to negotiate, and particularly less likely to turn to third parties for binding arbitral or adjudicated decisions, over identity claims because of the sense that external action infringes on the state's sovereignty and ability to make its own internal political, economic, or cultural decisions.

Finally, future research should address the possible connections between territorial and identity claims. While a territorial claim is underway, it may be that one or both states are more likely to begin identity claims as a way to divide and weaken the territorial opponent. Perhaps more likely, identity claims may be more likely to be pursued after the end of a territorial claim. A state that lost territory in the ultimate settlement of the claim might begin a new territorial

claim to regain the lost land, as happened with Bolivia seeking to recover its seacoast from Chile or France seeking to recover Alsace-Lorraine from Germany. Renewing a territorial claim might be less likely after a decisive military defeat or in a context where global norms support territorial integrity, though, in which case the losing side may instead decide to pursue an identity claim to guarantee the status of its ethnic kin in the lost territory -- as Austria has done with Italy over the ethnic Germans in its former province of South Tyrol.

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**Table 1: Very Preliminary Summary of Identity Claims, 1946-2015**

Type of challenger demand in claim:

<u>Region</u>	<u>Domestic</u>	<u>Separatist</u>	<u>Total</u>
Western Hemisphere	0	0	0
Europe	15	23	38
Africa	2	16	18
Middle East	5	12	17
Asia	4	18	32
<b>Global Total</b>	<b>26</b>	<b>79</b>	<b>105</b>


*Notes*

- Source: Preliminary research on ICOW Identity Claims data set, supported by Minerva grant from Office of Naval Research.
- Please note that this is a very preliminary and incomplete list of identity claims, based on several general reference works on ethnicity and nationalism. Much more detailed research is currently underway, which will substantially increase the number of codable claims (particularly in the "domestic change" category, as these tend to be less visible than irredentist claims in reference sources that can only devote brief attention to events over each group in each state).


Reference Sources Consulted:

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
**Figure 1: New Identity Claims by Decade, 1946-2015**



**Figure 2: Identity Claims Underway, 1946-2015**



**Figure 3: Global Territorial Integrity Obligations, 1946-2015**



**Table 2: Accounting for Onset of Identity Claims - Separatist Demands**

	Model 1: Zacher	Model 2: Year	Model 3: Global TI
Variable	Coeff. (SE)	Coeff. (SE)	Coeff. (SE)
<b>Territorial Integrity norm:</b>			
<b>Zacher norm (1976+)</b>	<b>- 0.83 (0.35)**</b>	--	--
<b>Year</b>	--	<b>- 0.04 (0.01)***</b>	--
<b>Global norm</b>	--	--	<b>- 0.79 (0.27)***</b>
Group status in challenger:			
Part of ruling coalition	0.21 (0.33)	0.19 (0.33)	0.19 (0.33)
Percent of population	3.15 (0.45)***	3.23 (0.45)***	3.20 (0.45)***
Group status in target:			
Newly out of power	- 0.04 (0.49)	0.07 (0.49)	0.00 (0.49)
Ongoing out of power	- 0.20 (0.50)	- 0.04 (0.50)	- 0.15 (0.50)
New discrimination	0.56 (0.46)	0.48 (0.46)	0.51 (0.46)
Ongoing discrimination	- 0.08 (0.75)	- 0.26 (0.75)	- 0.19 (0.75)
Self-excluded	2.19 (0.64)***	2.65 (0.65)***	2.39 (0.64)***
Armed conflict	0.49 (0.54)	0.33 (0.54)	0.39 (0.54)
State age:			
Challenger	- 0.31 (0.11)***	- 0.32 (0.10)***	- 0.31 (0.10)***
Target	- 0.90 (0.13)***	- 0.82 (0.12)***	- 0.84 (0.13)***
Controls:			
Challenger cap.s	- 0.86 (0.57)	- 0.86 (0.56)	- 0.86 (0.56)
Joint democracy	Perfect†	Perfect†	Perfect†
Contiguity	3.16 (0.72)***	3.13 (0.73)***	3.14 (0.72)***
Constant	- 7.32 (0.85)***	72.24 (22.04)***	- 5.98 (0.97)***
N:	95,804	95,804	95,804
LL:	-290.14	-285.89	-288.49
X <sup>2</sup> :	290.60 (p<.001)	299.10 (p<.001)	293.89 (p<.001)

\*p<.10, \*\*p<.05, \*\*\*p<.01

† Joint democracy perfectly predicts the avoidance of separatist demands.

(Table 2, continued)

	Model 4: Regional (5)	Model 5: Subregional (15)	Model 6: Dyadic TI
Variable	Coeff. (SE)	Coeff. (SE)	Coeff. (SE)
<b>Territorial Integrity norm:</b>			
<b>Regional norm</b>	<b>- 0.51 (0.19)***</b>	--	--
<b>Subregional norm</b>	--	<b>- 0.52 (0.15)***</b>	--
<b>Dyadic norm</b>	--	--	<b>- 0.51 (0.14)***</b>
Group status in challenger:			
Part of ruling coalition	0.22 (0.33)	0.27 (0.33)	0.36 (0.32)
Percent of population	3.18 (0.45)***	3.22 (0.45)***	3.15 (0.44)***
Group status in target:			
Newly out of power	- 0.02 (0.49)	- 0.12 (0.49)	- 0.19 (0.49)
Ongoing out of power	- 0.18 (0.50)	- 0.34 (0.49)	- 0.39 (0.49)
New discrimination	0.57 (0.45)	0.57 (0.45)	0.49 (0.46)
Ongoing discrimination	- 0.08 (0.75)	- 0.15 (0.75)	- 0.19 (0.75)
Self-excluded	2.25 (0.65)***	2.33 (0.65)***	2.14 (0.64)***
Armed conflict	0.45 (0.54)	0.27 (0.55)	0.32 (0.54)
State age:			
Challenger	- 0.32 (0.10)***	- 0.31 (0.10)***	- 0.31 (0.10)***
Target	- 0.90 (0.57)***	- 0.84 (0.12)***	- 0.85 (0.12)***
Controls:			
Challenger cap.s	- 0.88 (0.57)	- 0.94 (0.56)*	- 0.95 (0.56)*
Joint democracy	Perfect†	Perfect†	Perfect†
Contiguity	2.98 (0.73)***	3.05 (0.73)***	3.23 (0.72)***
Constant	- 6.58 (0.89)***	- 6.62 (0.87)***	- 6.96 (0.85)***
N:	95,804	95,804	95,804
LL:	-288.83	-286.62	-285.58
X <sup>2</sup> :	293.21 (p<.001)	297.63 (p<.001)	299.70 (p<.001)

\*p<.10, \*\*p<.05, \*\*\*p<.01

† Joint democracy perfectly predicts the avoidance of separatist demands.

**Table 3: Accounting for Onset of Identity Claims - Domestic Demands**

	Model 1: Zacher	Model 2: Year	Model 3: Global TI
Variable	Coeff. (SE)	Coeff. (SE)	Coeff. (SE)
<b>Territorial Integrity norm:</b>			
<b>Zacher norm (1976+)</b>	<b>1.70 (0.65)***</b>	--	--
<b>Year</b>	--	<b>0.02 (0.01)</b>	--
<b>Global norm</b>	--	--	<b>0.88 (0.43)**</b>
Group status in challenger:			
Part of ruling coalition	0.93 (0.59)	0.95 (0.59)	0.93 (0.59)
Percent of population	1.07 (0.76)	0.94 (0.76)	1.00 (0.75)
Group status in target:			
Newly out of power	0.63 (0.72)	0.70 (0.72)	0.67 (0.72)
Ongoing out of power	1.20 (0.57)**	1.30 (0.57)**	1.25 (0.57)**
New discrimination	1.85 (0.64)***	1.81 (0.64)***	1.83 (0.64)***
Ongoing discrimination	1.87 (0.73)**	1.85 (0.74)**	1.87 (0.73)**
Self-excluded	1.62 (0.97)*	1.74 (0.96)*	1.67 (0.97)*
Armed conflict	0.55 (0.70)	0.57 (0.69)	0.57 (0.70)
State age:			
Challenger	0.49 (0.17)***	0.50 (0.17)***	0.51 (0.17)***
Target	- 0.99 (0.17)***	- 0.96 (0.17)***	- 1.00 (0.17)***
Controls:			
Challenger cap.s	- 0.26 (0.87)	- 0.27 (0.87)	- 0.28 (0.87)
Joint democracy	0.10 (0.64)	0.11 (0.64)	0.10 (0.64)
Contiguity	2.11 (0.63)***	2.11 (0.63)***	2.12 (0.63)***
Constant	-11.75 (1.22)***	-56.83 (28.31)***	-12.90 (1.56)***
N:	91,934	91,934	91,934
LL:	-165.73	-169.05	-168.01
X <sup>2</sup> :	96.02 (p<.001)	89.39 (p<.001)	91.48 (p<.001)

\*p<.10, \*\*p<.05, \*\*\*p<.01



(Table 3, continued)

	Model 4: Regional (5)	Model 5: Subregional (15)	Model 6: Dyadic TI
Variable	Coeff. (SE)	Coeff. (SE)	Coeff. (SE)
<b>Territorial Integrity norm:</b>			
<b>Regional norm</b>	<b>0.39 (0.23)*</b>	--	--
<b>Subregional norm</b>	--	<b>0.10 (0.20)</b>	--
<b>Dyadic norm</b>	--	--	<b>0.11 (0.19)</b>
Group status in challenger:			
Part of ruling coalition	0.94 (0.59)	0.99 (0.60)*	0.99 (0.59)*
Percent of population	0.93 (0.75)	0.80 (0.76)	0.80 (0.76)
Group status in target:			
Newly out of power	0.74 (0.72)	0.80 (0.72)	0.83 (0.72)
Ongoing out of power	1.35 (0.56)**	1.46 (0.56)***	1.49 (0.56)***
New discrimination	1.79 (0.65)***	1.76 (0.64)***	1.80 (0.65)***
Ongoing discrimination	1.79 (0.73)**	1.73 (0.73)**	1.77 (0.74)**
Self-excluded	1.80 (0.94)*	1.90 (0.94)**	1.92 (0.94)**
Armed conflict	0.53 (0.69)	0.54 (0.69)	0.57 (0.69)
State age:			
Challenger	0.50 (0.17)***	0.52 (0.17)***	0.54 (0.17)***
Target	-0.92 (0.16)***	-0.92 (0.17)***	-0.92 (0.17)***
Controls:			
Challenger cap.s	-0.24 (0.87)	-0.23 (0.86)	-0.23 (0.86)
Joint democracy	0.16 (0.64)	0.26 (0.64)	0.27 (0.64)
Contiguity	2.19 (0.63)***	2.10 (0.63)***	2.08 (0.63)***
Constant	-11.68 (1.24)***	-11.07 (1.22)***	-11.12 (1.23)***
N:	91,934	91,934	91,934
LL:	-169.04	-170.35	-170.30
X <sup>2</sup> :	89.41 (p<.001)	86.78 (p<.001)	86.89 (p<.001)

\*p<.10, \*\*p<.05, \*\*\*p<.01