

# INR 5007: Core Seminar in International Relations

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**Fall 2001**

Mondays, 3:30-6:00 PM

511 Bellamy Bldg.

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## Description

The purpose of this course is to familiarize you with some of the broad themes in the study of international relations, in preparation for advanced training, research, or qualifying examinations in this area. The course is organized around points of common interest to scholars of international relations, such as the underlying nature of the international system, sources of militarized conflict between states, and the prospects for cooperation. The focus is on scholarly research, not current events or policy formulation.

No single unified theory of international relations will be developed or emphasized in this course. As the readings and class discussions will make clear, there are numerous theoretical, methodological, and policy issues in the study of international relations. One of the goals of the class is to offer students the opportunity to develop their own positions on these key disciplinary issues. This syllabus attempts to assist in this process by including the key pathbreaking books or articles wherever possible, supplemented by articles or chapters making recent developments; literature reviews are generally avoided.

It should be noted that this course is meant to prepare students to take more advanced seminars in the political science department at FSU, rather than to replace these other seminars. As a result, this course will not spend much time on topics that are covered extensively in subsequent courses such as INR 5036 (International Political Economy), INR 5088 (International Conflict), INR 5090 (Rational Choice in International Relations), or regular "special topics" courses such as Will Moore's "Violent Political Conflict" or Paul Hensel's "Contexts and International Relations." Interested students are urged to contact the relevant instructors for syllabi or more information to help with further reading on the topics, and to take these courses when offered.

**Assigned Readings (available locally at the FSU bookstore, or online at such locations as [amazon.com](http://amazon.com), [barnesandnoble.com](http://barnesandnoble.com), [borders.com](http://borders.com), or [half.com](http://half.com))**

### Required:

- David A. Baldwin (1993). *Neorealism and Neoliberalism: The Contemporary Debate*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye (2001). *Power and Interdependence*, third edition. New York: Longman.
- John A. Vasquez (1993). *The War Puzzle*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Kenneth Waltz (1979). *Theory of International Politics*. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley.

### Optional:

- Paul R. Viotti and Mark V. Kauppi (1999). *International Relations Theory: Realism, Pluralism, Globalism, and Beyond*, third edition. Boston: Allyn and Bacon
- James E. Dougherty and Robert L. Pfaltzgraff Jr. (2001). *Contending Theories of International Relations*, fifth edition. New York: Longman.

All other readings may be borrowed for copying from the instructor's office (550 Bellamy) and will be available at least one week before the readings are due. The optional texts are provided for students who are not sufficiently confident in their previous international relations background, or who desire additional background material. Interested students are encouraged to read one or both before the course begins, or before we cover each individual topic. It should be noted, though, that neither optional book can serve as a substitute for the assigned readings on this syllabus.

## Course Requirements

### (1) Attendance and Participation

Because this is a graduate seminar, the instructor will not run class meetings as a lecture; all students are expected to come to each class meeting prepared to discuss the readings. This will involve spending the time to read each book or article on the reading list, and thinking about what each reading contributes to the weekly topic. Class discussion every week will focus on such issues as the theoretical arguments being made (both explicitly and implicitly), the empirical evidence that is marshaled to test these arguments (where relevant), weaknesses or shortcomings of the work so far, and potential directions for future research. Class participation will count for 30% of the overall course grade, with penalties being assessed for students who miss class or who show up unprepared.

### (2) Short Papers / In-Class Presentations

Beyond regular attendance and active participation in class discussion, each student is expected to make four brief (10 minutes or so) in-class presentations on the weekly topics, based on a short (5-page) paper to be handed in at the start of class; a signup sheet will be provided during the second week of class, with presentations beginning in the third week. These papers and presentations must address specific discussion topics related to the week's readings, which are provided as part of this syllabus; the student must choose one of the two topics that are provided for each week of the course.

These presentations are meant to help focus the class discussion on important topics related to the week's readings. As a result, each presentation will be followed by a period of general class reaction and discussion (with the presenter being given a chance for rebuttal). Each short paper / presentation will count for 10% of the overall course grade, for a total of 40%.

The following general grading scale will be used for participation and presentations:

- A to A-: The student made a very strong contribution to the course. Class discussion, comments, and/or presentations reflected a great deal of thought about the material, and were constructive (for example, not only identifying current weaknesses and showing how these weaknesses limit the current literature, but suggesting useful future directions that could help to overcome these weaknesses or to extend the literature in important ways).
- B+ to B-: The student contributed meaningfully to the course. Class participation and/or presentations went beyond repeating the assigned material, perhaps identifying weaknesses in the current literature, but did not make many constructive suggestions about how these weaknesses might be overcome or how the literature might usefully be extended in the future.
- C+ or lower: The student did not contribute meaningfully. Class participation and/or presentations were limited to repeating the assigned material rather than making connections or extensions, or was filled with mistakes and inaccuracies.
- F: The student was a net drain on the course, rarely if ever speaking in class or failing to make the required number of presentations.

### (3) Final Paper

The final course requirement is a longer paper (20-25 pages). This paper is meant to supplement the relatively brief coverage that the syllabus gives to a variety of large topics by requiring students to go through the intellectual history and development of a more focused topic. This final paper must be turned in to the instructor's office by the course's scheduled exam time (**10:00 AM on Thursday, December 13**), and will count for 30% of the overall course grade. To help students get an early enough start on this paper, topics must be turned in and approved by the instructor by the **end of September**. Examples of published review articles accomplishing similar tasks can be found in many issues of such journals as *World Politics* and *International Studies Review*, as well as in special issues of other journals such as the Autumn 1998 issue of *International Organization* (several articles from which are included in this syllabus).

The fourteen weekly topics in this syllabus generally address very important topics that are relevant to much or all of the field of international relations, but must be addressed with a relatively

small number of readings (generally ten or less). While these few readings can give students a good feel for the key works in the field or for some of the most important recent developments, they do not help students develop an appreciation of the intellectual history of the topics or of their development over time. For this final paper, each student must pick a focused topic from the international relations literature, such as the relationship between alliances or international system structure and war, the democratic peace, the use and effectiveness of economic sanctions, or the role of international trade in economic development. Once the topic has been approved, the student must trace the development of the topic over time; this will involve identifying the early work that led to the topic originally, placing the topic in the context of the larger issues and approaches covered in this course, and discussing the key works in the development of the topic (including discussion of theoretical arguments, research design and methodology, and key findings). The paper should conclude by assessing the current state of knowledge on this topic, the extent to which knowledge in this area has cumulated and progressed over time rather than stagnating or regressing (reflecting the materials covered in the second meeting), and the most important directions for future research.

### **Class Schedule**

#### **1. Monday, August 27: Overview of Course**

*As we meet for the first time, it is vital that we all have some common background in studying international relations. While there are no required readings for this class meeting, all students in the course -- particularly those who do not feel confident in their background in this area -- are encouraged to obtain and skim through one of the optional texts for the course (Viotti and Kauppi or Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff). While we will not devote class discussion time to this basic background material, it should help students develop a sense for where the field of international relations has been in the past, and where it appears to be going in the future.*

- No papers or assigned readings (first meeting)

#### **2. Monday, September 3: No class (Labor Day)**

- No papers or assigned readings (holiday)

#### **3. Monday, September 10: IR Theory and How to Get There**

*The semester begins with a discussion of what it is we're trying to accomplish in this field and of how best we can get there. Waltz' chapter gives an overview of terminology and one man's perspective on how to get there, while Singer's 1961 article discuss different "levels of analysis" at which one can develop theories. Bull and Singer's debate is a famous exchange from the days when the scientific approach to IR was in its infancy and had not been widely accepted at most leading political science programs. Nearly two decades later, an exchange between Bueno de Mesquita, Krasner, and Jervis reveals how far the field had come in the acceptance of a scientific approach, while still leaving ample room for debate on specific methodological approaches. The pieces by Most and Starr and by Dessler offer additional perspectives on the quest for theory, focusing on the need to build bridges between isolated "islands" of theory and on the relative merit of various approaches to theory building. Finally, the Gaddis piece offers a negative evaluation of the current state of theory in the field based on the failure to predict the end of the Cold War.*

*Today's meeting should begin with a clear understanding of what "theory" is and why we would want to produce such a monster, drawing from the 1979 Waltz chapter as well as the other readings that cover the topic more implicitly. Much of the discussion will focus on an evaluation of the strengths and weaknesses of different paths to theory, including the relative importance of inductive versus deductive approaches and of different methodologies (such as large-N quantitative methods, small-N case studies, and formal modeling). We will also spend some time on the Gaddis critique, debating whether his charges are correct (e.g., did all of our theories fail to predict the end of the Cold War?) and whether they are meaningful (e.g., did these specific*

*theories even try to predict the end of the Cold War?), as well as considering solutions to the problems that he raises with the current state of international relations theory.*

### **Paper Topics**

- No papers (sign up for paper topics in class today)

### **Assigned Readings**

- Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*: chapter 1 ("Laws and Theories")
- J. David Singer (1961). "The Level-of-Analysis Problem in International Relations." *World Politics* 14, 1 (October): 77-92.
- Hedley Bull (1966) "International Theory: The Case for the Classical Approach." *World Politics* 18: 361-377.
- J. David Singer (1968). "The Incomplete Theorist: Insight Without Evidence." In Klaus Knorr and James Rosenau, eds., *Contending Approaches to International Politics*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Bruce Bueno de Mesquita (1985). "Toward A Scientific Understanding of International Conflict." *International Studies Quarterly* 29: 121-136. Also responses by Krasner and Jervis, and reply by Bueno de Mesquita (pp. 137-154).
- Benjamin A. Most and Harvey Starr (1989). *Inquiry, Logic, and International Politics*. Columbia, SC: University of South Carolina Press, chapter 7 ("Conclusion: Closure, Cumulation, and International Relations Theory").
- David Dessler (1991). "Beyond Correlations: Toward a Causal Theory of War." *International Studies Quarterly* 35: 337-355.
- John Lewis Gaddis (1992/93). "International Relations Theory and the End of the Cold War." *International Security* 17: 5-58.

## **4. Monday, September 17: Classical Realism**

*Realpolitik, or political realism, has been the dominant approach to world politics among both scholars and policymakers for much of recorded history. The excerpts from Thucydides and Hobbes demonstrate early realist principles in action, while Morgenthau's book Politics Among Nations (printed in at least five editions since 1948) has been accepted as the most influential modern work on realism. The remaining readings, by Milner and Wendt, offer prominent critiques of realism or of its key concept of anarchy.*

*Today's meeting should begin with an understanding of realpolitik and of its key assumptions, running from Thucydides to Morgenthau; most of the discussion in class will focus on evaluations and critiques of realism, rather than on summarizing its key elements. Students should be prepared to discuss the critiques by Milner and by Wendt, evaluating both the critique and its relevance to realism. Students should also be prepared to evaluate realism and its key components on their own merits, beyond Milner's and Wendt's critiques.*

### **Paper Topics**

- *Topic #1:* Critics such as Wendt argue that states' behavior in anarchy is not shaped by objective circumstances, as argued by realists, but by intersubjectively held conceptions. Which view do you find more convincing and why? Why -- if at all -- is this alternative view of anarchy important? How could these two views be tested against each other in a scientific study?
- *Topic #2:* Many critics of realism point to globalization and the rise of internal challenges to the state (e.g., "ethnic conflict" or other anti-state rebellions) as evidence that the state-centered world envisioned by realism is inaccurate. Yet the number of states has increased greatly over time, with many of these challengers apparently desiring nothing more than *their own* state; as some states have dissolved, multiple states have emerged in their place. Based on this dimension (statehood and its challengers), is realism as relevant as ever, more relevant, or less relevant? Why?

### **Assigned Readings**

- Thucydides (1954). *The History of the Peloponnesian War*, translated by Rex Warner. Harmondsworth: Penguin Classics, pp. 400-408 ("The Melian Dialogue").
- Thomas Hobbes (1996). "Of the Natural Condition of Mankind as Concerning Their Felicity and Misery." In John A. Vasquez, ed., *Classics of International Relations*. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall, pp. 219-221.
- Hans J. Morgenthau (1967). *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace*. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, chapters 1 ("A Realist Theory of International Politics"), 11 ("The Balance of Power"), and 12 ("Different Methods of the Balance of Power").
- Baldwin, *Neorealism and Neoliberalism*: chapter 6 (Milner, "The Assumption of Anarchy in International Relations Theory: A Critique"; originally published in 1991 *Review of International Studies*)
- Alexander Wendt (1992). "Anarchy is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics." *International Organization* 46: 391-425.

### **5. Monday, September 24: Neorealism**

*Neorealism, or structural realism, has generally replaced classical realism in recent academic writings. Kenneth Waltz' 1979 book Theory of International Politics is widely seen as the key work in this new genre; we will read most of this book. Waltz' 1995 chapter offers his personal views on neorealism vis-a-vis classical realism, while Gilpin and Mearsheimer apply neorealist principles in analyses of important topics. Keohane and Schroeder offer critiques of the neorealist endeavor from several different perspectives.*

*Today's meeting should begin with an understanding of neorealism and of its key components, focusing especially on Waltz' book as well as on Gilpin's and Mearsheimer's applications. Students should be prepared to discuss the differences (and the relative advantages or disadvantages) between neorealism and classical realism. We will also discuss the critiques of neorealism by Keohane and Schroeder (as well as by Milner and Wendt from last week's readings), and we will evaluate neorealism and its key components on their own merits.*

### **Paper Topics**

- *Topic #1: What makes neorealism (as espoused by Waltz) "neo," or different from classical realism (as espoused by Morgenthau)? Which approach appears to be more useful (and for which purposes)? Why? (note that while Waltz addresses a similar question in one of this week's readings, I expect you to do your own original analysis of the similarities or differences and of the consequences of these differences, rather than relying on what Waltz discusses)*
- *Topic #2: Although Waltz' book and other neorealist theory is intuitively appealing because of its parsimony, some have criticized this approach for lacking sufficient variation in key variables. That is, the international system has always been anarchic in the modern era, it has changed between bipolarity and multipolarity only rarely in recent memory, and the bipolar period generally coincides with the advent of nuclear weapons (potentially masking independent effects of bipolarity and of nuclear weapons). Given these difficulties, is it possible to develop a fair test of neorealist arguments? Identify key variables from Waltz that might be observed or measured, and discuss how neorealist hypotheses on these variables might best be tested.*

### **Assigned Readings**

- Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*: chapters 4-9
- Kenneth N. Waltz (1995). "Realist Thought and Neorealist Theory." In Charles W. Kegley, ed., *Controversies in International Relations Theory*. New York: St. Martin's Press, pp. 67-82.
- Robert Gilpin (1988). "The Theory of Hegemonic War." *Journal of Interdisciplinary History* 18, 4 (Spring): 591-613.
- John J. Mearsheimer (1990). "Back to the Future: Instability in Europe After the Cold War." *International Security* 15, 1 (Summer):5-56.

- Robert O. Keohane (1983). "Theory of World Politics: Structural Realism and Beyond." In Ada W. Finifter, ed., *Political Science: The State of the Discipline*. Washington, D.C.: American Political Science Association.
- Paul Schroeder (1994). "Historical Reality vs Neo-Realist Theory," *International Security* 19, 2 (Summer): 108-148.

## 6. Monday, October 1: Idealism, Liberalism, and Neoliberal Institutionalism

*While realism (in its classical and/or neorealist forms) has typically been the dominant approach, it has often faced important challengers. These alternative approaches oppose realism on grounds ranging from the inaccuracy of its assumptions to the risk of self-fulfilling prophecies from policies based on realist arguments that conflict is pervasive and meaningful cooperation is impossible. After World War I idealists such as Woodrow Wilson attempted to prevent realist principles and practices from leading to a second world war; more recent scholarship has generated liberal and neoliberal institutionalist approaches to rival realism or neorealism. Keohane and Nye's pathbreaking work in the 1970s was central in the development of these critiques; their book Power and Interdependence (now in its third edition due to the addition of several new chapters) is a classic in the field. The Zacher and Matthew chapter attempts to tie together the numerous pieces of liberal theory, and Moravcsik attempts to develop a systematic theory based on liberal principles. The Baldwin and Grieco chapters assess the competition between neoliberalism and neorealism, a debate which has come to dominate both scholarship and teaching in the field of international relations in recent years.*

*Today's meeting should begin with an understanding of the different versions of liberalism and neoliberal institutionalism. As with the past few weeks, class discussion will focus on the debates and challenges addressed by Baldwin and Grieco, as well as on our own evaluation of liberal and institutionalist approaches on their own merits.*

### **Paper Topics**

- *Topic #1:* Some scholars have argued that the assumptions of neoliberal institutionalism are actually closer to neorealism than to classical idealism. Compare neoliberal institutionalism and neorealism: what do they share in common, and do these commonalities outweigh the differences between the two approaches?
- *Topic #2:* Realism and neorealism could be criticized for excessive parsimony, focusing on a small number of variables that generally exhibit little variation over time. An opposite charge could be raised against liberalism, though, arguing that this school of thought requires too many variables that are difficult or impossible to measure reliably over time or across space. Drawing from this week's readings, is this charge reasonable -- does liberalism make the opposite mistake of excessive complexity? Can a liberal approach be developed that would be manageable in its scope but that would still contribute meaningfully to our understanding of international relations? What might such an approach look like?

### **Assigned Readings**

- Keohane and Nye, *Power and Interdependence*: all
- Mark W. Zacher and Richard A. Matthew (1995). "Liberal International Theory: Common Threads, Divergent Strands." In Charles W. Kegley, ed., *Controversies in International Relations Theory*. New York: St. Martin's Press, pp. 107-150.
- Andrew Moravcsik (1997). "Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of International Politics." *International Organization* 51, 4 (Autumn): 513-553.
- Baldwin, *Neorealism and Neoliberalism*: chapter 1 (Baldwin, "Neoliberalism, Neorealism, and World Politics")
- Baldwin, *Neorealism and Neoliberalism*: chapter 5 (Grieco, "Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation: A Realist Critique of the Newest Liberal Institutionalism"; originally published in 1988 *International Organization*)

- Baldwin, *Neorealism and Neoliberalism*: chapter 12 (Grieco, “Understanding the Problem of International Cooperation: The Limits of Neoliberal Institutionalism and the Future of Realist Theory”; originally published in this 1993 volume)

## 7. Monday, October 8: Extensions, Evaluations, and Challenges

*Having addressed classical realism, neorealism, liberalism, and institutionalism over the past few weeks, this week we examine scholars’ attempts to evaluate, challenge, or extend these different approaches through empirical analysis. Gowa and Mansfield address patterns of international trade with an eye to the expectations of realism. The Wayman and Diehl book attempts to evaluate realism as a whole on the basis of a number of individual chapters examining topics related to international conflict; two of these chapters (by Goertz and Diehl and by Leng) are assigned, along with Diehl and Wayman’s concluding chapter. Finally, Huth attempts to develop a “modified realist model” that incorporates both realist principles and more liberal concepts such as the impact of domestic politics.*

*Today’s meeting should consider both small and large questions. First, consider the individual extensions and evaluations that were assigned. Does each article provide an accurate characterization of the school(s) being examined, or does it appear to set up a “straw man” that will be easy to support or knock down (depending on the author’s personal preferences)? Does each article provide a meaningful test of the school(s) being examined, and does this test appear to help us evaluate the school(s) in question? Second, and perhaps more important, is the issue of what a single test can hope to accomplish. Can a single article or book chapter really “support,” “prove,” “cast doubt on,” or “disprove” an entire school of thought like realism or neoliberal institutionalism? If not, what can and should we try to do instead?*

### **Paper Topics**

- *Topic #1:* Huth’s book presents a “modified realist” framework that incorporates the influence of domestic politics as well as traditional realist concerns. What would both Morgenthau and Waltz have to say about Huth’s approach? Do you consider it a legitimate extension of realism or something totally different, and why?

- *Topic #2:* To a greater or lesser degree, three of this week’s readings (Gowa and Mansfield, Goertz and Diehl, and Leng) all claim to be evaluating realism or realist propositions about the world. Are these three readings really presenting fair evaluations of realism, or are they examining “straw man” simplifications? If the latter, what might a fair test or evaluation look like? Do these studies’ findings really offer support for / cast doubt on realism as a whole, and why or why not?

### **Assigned Readings**

- Joanne Gowa and Edward D. Mansfield (1993). "Power Politics and International Trade." *American Political Science Review* 87:408-420.
- Frank Wayman and Paul F. Diehl (1994). *Reconstructing Realpolitik*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. Three chapters: Goertz and Diehl, “International Norms and Power Politics”; Leng, “Influence Techniques in Militarized Crises: Realism versus Reciprocity”; Diehl and Wayman, “Realpolitik: Dead End, Detour, or Road Map?”
- Paul K. Huth (1996). *Standing Your Ground*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, chapters 3 (“A Modified Realist Model”) and 5 (“Political and Military Conflict over Disputed Territory”).

## 8. Monday, October 15: International Cooperation I: Problems of Cooperation

*Having addressed the most prominent general approaches to international relations, we will spend the remainder of the semester on substantive topics related to international conflict and cooperation. The first such topic involves the possibility of international cooperation, a source of considerable disagreement and controversy between realists and liberals or institutionalists. The readings for this week address general issues in the study of cooperation, including the nature of cooperation and the issues that must be addressed before meaningful cooperation can occur. A*

number of readings (Snidal, Powell, Mastanduno and the Grieco-Powell-Snidal debate in the APSR) also address the specific question of relative versus absolute gains, perhaps the most prominent element in the scholarly debate over cooperation in the past decade.

Today's meeting should begin with an understanding of the meaning of cooperation and the ways that it is commonly studied, including the elementary game theoretic demonstrations that are used in many of these articles. We will evaluate each of the suggested obstacles to cooperation, ranging from distributional and informational issues (as discussed by Morrow) to the nature of the specific game being played (Jervis, Lipson, Oye, Axelrod & Keohane). We will also spend considerable time on the relative-absolute gains debate, evaluating each side's argument and considering the potential impact of each view on the prospects for cooperation.

### **Paper Topics**

- *Topic #1:* The debate over absolute versus relative gains has received a great deal of scholarly attention over the past decade. Has this attention been warranted? Is the field of international relations better off as a result of this debate, and why or why not?

- *Topic #2:* This week's readings address a number of different obstacles to cooperation in international relations. Which of these obstacles pose the greatest problems for cooperation from a realist / neorealist perspective? Which pose the greatest problems for cooperation from a liberal / institutionalist perspective? Which, if any, do both perspectives agree by recognizing as serious problems for cooperation? For each obstacle that is not agreed by both perspectives, how does the other perspective (the one that does not see it as a serious obstacle) respond to the claimed obstacle (i.e., why does it not see it as a serious problem)?

### **Assigned Readings**

*Overview: The Nature of the Problem*

- Robert Jervis (1978). "Cooperation under the Security Dilemma." *World Politics* 30 (January): 167.
- Baldwin, *Neorealism and Neoliberalism*: chapter 3 (Lipson, "International Cooperation in Economic and Security Affairs"; originally published in 1984 *World Politics*)
- Baldwin, *Neorealism and Neoliberalism*: chapter 4 (Axelrod & Keohane, "Achieving Cooperation under Anarchy: Strategies and Institutions"; originally published in 1985 *World Politics*)
- Kenneth Oye (1986). "Explaining Cooperation Under Anarchy: Hypotheses and Strategies." In Oye, ed., *Cooperation Under Anarchy*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, pp. 1-24.
- James D. Morrow (1994). "Modeling the Forms of International Cooperation: Distribution versus Information." *International Organization* 48, 3 (Summer): 387-423.

### *Absolute and Relative Gains*

- Baldwin, *Neorealism and Neoliberalism*: chapter 7 (Snidal, "Relative Gains and the Pattern of International Cooperation"; originally published in 1991 *APSR*)
- Baldwin, *Neorealism and Neoliberalism*: chapter 8 (Powell, "Absolute and Relative Gains in International Relations Theory"; originally published in 1991 *APSR*)
- Baldwin, *Neorealism and Neoliberalism*: chapter 10 (Mastanduno, "Do Relative Gains Matter? America's Response to Japanese Industrial Policy"; originally published in 1991 *International Security*)
- Joseph M. Grieco, Robert Powell, and Duncan Snidal (1993). "Controversies: The Relative-Gains Problem for International Cooperation." *American Political Science Review* 87: 729-743.

## **9. Monday, October 22: Cooperation II: Realist/Hegemonic Solutions**

Now that we have considered general problems of cooperation, the next two weeks address solutions that have been offered by both realists and institutionalists to explain cooperation in certain situations. This week's readings cover realist solutions to cooperation, and generally focus on the role of hegemony. While the number of assigned readings is small, it is important to



put this week in the context of recent weeks, so students should also re-read relevant pieces from the weeks on neorealism, realist challenges to institutionalism, and general perspectives on cooperation.

Today's meeting should focus on the prospects for cooperation from a realist perspective. Drawing from this week's readings as well as relevant pieces from recent week, is cooperation ever likely under realism, under hegemony or otherwise? Can realist approaches overcome the obstacles to cooperation discussed two weeks ago, and how convincing are these arguments?

### **Paper Topics**

- **Topic #1:** Looking back to Morrow's discussion of obstacles to cooperation from last week's readings, how would a realist respond? That is, which of those obstacles are seen as serious problems for cooperation from a realist perspective, and how would a realist respond that these problems can be resolved (if at all)?
- **Topic #2:** Several of today's readings attempt to test hegemonic stability theory (or some variant) empirically. Which, if any, of these tests offer fair evaluations of the general realist suggestion that some form of hegemony is important for cooperation to occur? For those that you do not consider to have offered a fair evaluation, what seems to be unfair, and how could the test be modified to produce a fair evaluation of this realist perspective?

### **Assigned Readings**

- Robert O. Keohane (1984). *After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, chapter 3 ("Hegemony in the World Political Economy").
- Robert Gilpin (1986). *Political Economy of International Relations*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, pp. 65-117. (chapter three: "The Dynamics of the International Political Economy"; focus on the role of hegemonic stability)
- Joanne Gowa (1989). "Rational Hegemons, Excludable Goods, and Small Groups: An Epitaph for Hegemonic Stability Theory." *World Politics* 41, 3 (April): 307-324.
- Terry Boswell and Mike Sweat (1991). "Hegemony, Long Waves, and Major Wars: A Time Series Analysis of Systemic Dynamics, 1496-1967." *International Studies Quarterly* 35: 123-149.
- Timothy McKeown (1983). "Hegemonic Stability Theory and 19th Century Tariff Levels in Europe." *International Organization* 37: 73-92.
- David A. Lake (1993). "Leadership, Hegemony, and the International Economy: Naked Imperialism or Tattered Monarch with Potential?" *International Studies Quarterly* 37:459-489.

## **10. Monday, October 29: Cooperation III: Regimes and Institutionalist Solutions**

This week concludes the examination of cooperation issues by examining solutions based on international regimes or institutions. The early literature on this topic is often misleadingly labeled "regime theory" because of its focus on regimes (although there exist numerous different theories explaining the formation and effectiveness of regimes, so it is unclear which is the true "regime theory"), while more recent work has been labeled "institutional" in nature. These readings include some important early works on regimes by Stein, Krasner, and Keohane, with a critique by Strange and an analysis by Haas. There are also more recent overviews on institutions by Keohane and by Martin and Simmons, as well as a prominent debate between Mearsheimer and Keohane and Martin.

Today's meeting should focus on the prospects for cooperation from an institutionalist perspective. Drawing from this week's readings as well as relevant pieces from recent week, is cooperation ever likely, under specific types of regimes/institutions or otherwise? Can institutionalist approaches overcome the obstacles to cooperation discussed two weeks ago, and how convincing are these arguments? Do these institutionalist arguments appear to be more or less convincing than the realist approaches covered last week (overall or for certain situations),

and why or why not?

### **Paper Topics**

- *Topic #1*: In this week's readings, John Mearsheimer engages in a debate with Robert Keohane and Lisa Martin over the value of international institutions. Which argument is more convincing, and why?
- *Topic #2*: Looking back to Morrow's discussion of obstacles to cooperation from last week's readings, how would an institutionalist respond? That is, which of those obstacles are seen as serious problems for cooperation from an institutionalist perspective, and how would an institutionalist respond that these problems can be resolved (if at all)?

### **Assigned Readings**

- Baldwin, *Neorealism and Neoliberalism*: chapter 2 (Stein, "Coordination and Collaboration: Regimes in an Anarchic World"; originally published in 1982 *International Organization*)
- Susan Strange (1982), "Cave! Hic Dragones!: A Critique of Regime Analysis." *International Organization* 36, 2 (Spring).
- Stephen D. Krasner (1983). "Structural Causes and Regime Consequences: Regimes as Intervening Variables." In Krasner, ed., *International Regimes*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, pp. 1-21.
- Robert O. Keohane (1984). *After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy*. Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, chapter 4 ("Cooperation & International Regimes")
- Peter Haas (1989). "Do Regimes Matter? Epistemic Communities and Mediterranean Pollution Control." *International Organization* 43, 3: 377-403.
- Baldwin, *Neorealism and Neoliberalism*: chapter 11 (Keohane, "Institutional Theory and the Realist Challenge after the Cold War"; originally published in this 1993 volume)
- Lisa L. Martin and Beth A. Simmons (1998). "Theories and Empirical Studies of International Institutions." *International Organization* 52, 4 (Autumn): 729-757.
- John Mearsheimer (1994/1995). "The False Promise of Institutions." *International Security* 19, 3: 5-49.
- Robert O. Keohane and Lisa L. Martin (1995). "The Promise of Institutional Theory." *International Security* 20, 1 (Summer): 39-51.

## **11. Monday, November 5: Decision-Making I: Rational Choice and Psychology**

*The next two weeks address the formulation and implementation of foreign policy, which is central to any theory of international relations (somebody must make the decision to trade, fight, cooperate, etc.) We begin by examining approaches based on rational choice, which is often assumed in many theories (even if it is not stated explicitly); Bruce Bueno de Mesquita is one of the most prominent advocates and practitioners of this approach. We then consider a recent exchange over the value of rational choice approaches in security studies, before examining several psychologically-based alternatives that suggest leaders do not usually behave rationally.*

*Today's meeting should begin with a general understanding of the meaning of rational choice and of the claimed value of rational choice in studying international relations. We will consider this approach on its own merits before addressing the specific critiques raised in the Walt, et al. exchange and the literature on political psychology and prospect theory.*

### **Paper Topics**

- *Topic #1*: Rational choice theorists claim to be able to use their approach to explain any situation involving human choice. Because of its much more intensive (and often unobtainable) information requirements, psychological theory has been criticized for being unable to develop a meaningful general model, and for being useful primarily for explaining individual weaknesses of rational choice approaches. Is this a valid criticism -- is psychological theory unable to develop a general model of decision making? If such a model can be developed, what would it look like? If not, why

not, and what is the closest that the psychological approach can come to a general theory?

- *Topic #2:* Rational choice and psychological approaches offer very different perspectives of the human decision making process, and often very different predictions about human behavior. In principle, these differences should be amenable to empirical analysis, to help judge between the two approaches. What differences between these approaches might be compared or tested in original empirical analyses? How might these tests be conducted, and what might be the possible theoretical payoff from such analyses?

- *Topic #3:* The various psychological critiques all point to apparent flaws in rational choice models of human decision making. Is it possible to build a model that incorporates the fundamental insights of these psychological critiques as well as the proven track record of rational choice, and if so, what would such a model look like? Is such an integrated model desirable?

### ***Assigned Readings***

#### *Rational Choice*

- Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and David Lalman (1992). *War and Reason*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. (Chapter 1: "Reason and War")
- Bruce Bueno de Mesquita (1988). "The Contribution of Expected Utility Theory to the Study of International Conflict." *Journal of Interdisciplinary History* 18, 4 (Spring): 629-652.
- Stephen M. Walt (1999). "Rigor or Rigor Mortis? Rational Choice and Security Studies." *International Security* 23: 5-48. Also responses by Bueno de Mesquita and Morrow, Martin, Niou and Ordeshook, Powell, Zagare, and reply by Walt (pp. 56-130).

#### *Psychological Alternatives*

- Robert Jervis (1985). "Perceiving and Coping with Threat." In Jervis, Lebow, and Stein, eds., *Psychology and Deterrence*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, pp. 13-33.
- Jack Levy (1996). "Loss Aversion, Framing, and Bargaining: Implications of Prospect Theory for International Conflict." *International Political Science Review* 17, 2: 179-195.

## **12. Monday, November 12: Decision-Making II: Other Actors and Processes**

*Most of last week's examination of rational choice and psychological approaches assumed (explicitly or implicitly) that major foreign policy decisions can be studied as if they were made by a single actor. This week we consider the possibility that major decisions actually result from very different processes, which -- if correct -- would greatly weaken the conventional rational actor approach because of its ignorance of these additional actors or processes. We begin with a prominent article (and the basis for a seminal book) by Graham Allison that proposed bureaucratic and organizational alternatives to the rational actor model, along with several critiques and applications of Allison's various models. We then address several recent contributions that concern the role of domestic political actors and processes beyond a unified rational actor, as well as a piece by Gourevitch that turns the tables and looks at the reverse relationship.*

*Today's meeting should begin with an understanding of the different arguments presented in these readings, ranging from Allison's models to Putnam's two-level games. Our discussion will emphasize the differences between these models and the rational and psychological models covered last week. We will also consider the implications of these models for other topics that have been covered previously, such as the prospects for cooperation. Does it -- or could it -- make a difference whether major foreign policy decisions are made by a rational, psychological, or political process?*

### ***Paper Topics***

- *Topic #1:* Rational choice and a variety of domestic politics-oriented approaches offer very different perspectives of the human decision making process, and often very different predictions about human behavior. In principle, these differences should be amenable to empirical analysis, to

help judge between the approaches. Choose one of the domestic approaches covered in today's readings (organizational process, bureaucratic politics, two-level games, etc.). What differences between this approach and rational choice might be compared or tested in original empirical analyses? How might these tests be conducted, and what might be the possible theoretical payoff from such analyses?

- *Topic #2:* Much of the literature on domestic political actors and processes -- such as most of the readings for this week, work on the democratic peace, etc. -- focuses on the impact of domestic political processes on international processes or outcomes. Gourevitch, on the other hand, argues that international forces affect domestic politics (a view that is quite consistent with neorealism). Which perspective best accounts for the relationship (if any) between domestic and international political processes?

- *Topic #3:* Many proponents of hypotheses on domestic politics and international processes argue that the observed impact of democracy and of other domestic factors exposes a great weakness of realist and neorealist approaches, which downplay the potential role of domestic factors. Does evidence of a role for domestic political factors cast doubt on realist/neorealist explanations for international relations phenomena, or even on realist or neorealism more generally? How would a realist or neorealist respond to these claims?

### ***Assigned Readings***

#### *Allison and Extensions*

- Graham T. Allison (1969). "Conceptual Models and the Cuban Missile Crisis." *American Political Science Review* 63: 689-718.
- Jonathan Bendor and Thomas Hammond (1992). "Rethinking Allison's Models" *American Political Science Review* 86: 301-322.
- David A. Welch (1992). "The Organizational Process and Bureaucratic Politics Paradigms: Retrospect and Prospect." *International Security* 17: 112-146.
- Jack S. Levy (1986). "Organizational Routines and the Causes of War." *International Studies Quarterly* 30:193-222.
- Herbert Simon (19xx). *Administrative Behavior*, 3rd edition. Chapters 4-5: "Rationality in Administrative Behavior" and "The Psychology of Administrative Decisions."

#### *Domestic Politics*

- Robert Putnam (1988). "Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games." *International Organization* 42:427-460.
- Joe D. Hagan (1995). "Domestic Political Explanations in the Analysis of Foreign Policy." In Laura Neack, Jeanne A. K. Hey, and Patrick J. Haney, eds., *Foreign Policy Analysis*. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, pp. 117-143.
- Re-read Moravcsik, "Taking Preferences Seriously" (from week #6)
- Peter Gourevitch (1978). "The Second Image Reversed: The International Sources of Domestic Politics." *International Organization* 32:4 (Autumn) 881-912.

### **13. Monday, November 19: International Conflict I: Conceptualization**

*The next two weeks focus on militarized conflict between states. We begin by considering the nature of conflict and the conflict process; we will save specific theoretical approaches to conflict for next week. The Vasquez book ranges between making important conceptual points about the nature of conflict and attempting to integrate past findings into a coherent story about the conflict process; we will see next week how successful this story appears to have been. Bremer makes a number of conceptual points about the conflict process, while Jones et al. and Sarkees describe the most widely used data sets in the field both conceptually and empirically.*

*Today's meeting will focus on the nature of conflict and of the conflict process, and will assume a clear understanding of the conceptual issues raised by Vasquez and by Bremer. Do these scholars appear to have presented a reasonable conceptualization of the conflict process, or*

*has something been left out or mishandled? How do the data sets described by Jones et al. and by Sarkees fit into this conceptualization? Do these data sets appear likely to help answer the most important questions about the conflict process? What other types of data sets (if any) would appear to be important for this task? What types of questions would appear to be most important or most useful in studying conflict?*

### ***Paper Topics***

• *Topic #1:* Focusing only on the conceptual discussion from both the Vasquez book and the Bremer article, rather than the literature review in later chapters of Vasquez, how would both a realist and an institutionalist respond to the conflict process as described by Vasquez and by Bremer? Does this description of the conflict process seem to fit most closely with a realist perspective, an institutional perspective, both, or neither? What would both a realist and an institutionalist suggest would be the best way to manage or prevent militarized conflict within this conflict process?

• *Topic #2:* Two of this week's readings (Jones et al. and Sarkees) describe the two most widely used data sets in the quantitative analysis of militarized conflict. Looking at Vasquez' and Bremer's conceptual discussion of the conflict process, where do these two data sets ("militarized interstate dispute" or MID data, and war data) fit into the conflict process? What do these two data sets allow us to study about this process, and what are they unable to address?

### ***Assigned Readings***

- Vasquez, *The War Puzzle*: all
- Stuart A. Bremer (1993). "Advancing the Scientific Study of War." *International Interactions* 19: 1-26.
- Daniel M. Jones, Stuart A. Bremer, and J. David Singer (1996). "Militarized Interstate Disputes, 1816-1992: Rationale, Coding Rules, and Empirical Patterns." *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 15: 163-213.
- Meredith Reid Sarkees (2000). "The Correlates of War Data on War: An Update to 1997." *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 18, 1 (Fall): 123-144.

## **14. Monday, November 26: International Conflict II: Empirical Analyses**

*Having spent last week examining the nature of the conflict process, this week we will examine a variety of specific theoretical arguments and empirical evidence on different portions of this process. We begin with several recent overviews of the field by Jack Levy and John Vasquez, which give a decent perspective on the state of knowledge on conflict. The remainder of the readings focus on work done by current or recent FSU scholars, as an illustration of the type of work that is done here (and that students in this course might expect to do themselves, either on their own or in collaboration with our current faculty). A more complete coverage of issues in the study of conflict will require an entire course, such as Sara Mitchell's INR 5088 (which is usually taught every other year in our department).*

*Today's meeting should focus on how these analyses -- both those that are specifically assigned today, and those that are discussed by Levy and by Vasquez -- address the conceptual issues discussed last week. Have they helped to answer important issues on the topic of conflict, and have they done so in an appropriate and convincing way? Have they raised new questions for future research? It will also be useful to think about the future study of conflict, drawing from this course's basic introduction to the topic. What has not yet been done in the study of conflict (or what has been done incompletely or inappropriately), and how might you attempt to do better?*

### ***Paper Topics***

• *Topic #1:* Last week, both Vasquez and Bremer discussed the conflict process conceptually. Choose any two of the five empirical studies assigned this week (no more than one of my papers may be selected, since they are so similar in topic). For each one, discuss where it fits in terms of this conflict process, and what it tells us about that portion(s) of the process. How well does the

study in question add to our understanding of how militarized conflict works? What does the study leave unanswered about this portion of the conflict process?

• *Topic #2:* Much of the literature on domestic politics and militarized conflict has focused on political democracies, which are generally argued to be more peaceful (or otherwise different) than other types of political systems. Focusing on democracies, non-democratic systems, or both, are there other important distinctions that can explain differences in foreign policy behavior? That is, are there certain types of democratic (or non-democratic) systems that are more peaceful/conflictual than others (either overall or against other systems of the same type)? Explain the differences between these types of systems, and how/why these differences should be expected to produce such differences in foreign policy.

### **Assigned Readings**

#### *Overviews of Conflict Research*

- Jack S. Levy (1998). "The Causes of War and the Conditions of Peace." *Annual Review of Political Science* 1: 139-165.
- John A. Vasquez (2000). "Reexamining the Steps to War: New Evidence and Theoretical Insights." In Manus I. Midlarsky, ed., *Handbook of War Studies II*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, pp. 371-406.

#### *Selected Recent Studies on Militarized Conflict*

- David R. Davis and Will H. Moore (1997). "Ethnicity Matters: Transnational Ethnic Alliances and Foreign Policy Behavior." *International Studies Quarterly* 41: 171-184.
- Paul R. Hensel (2001). "Contentious Issues and World Politics: The Management of Territorial Claims in the Americas, 1816-1992." *International Studies Quarterly*.
- Paul R. Hensel and Sara McLaughlin Mitchell (2001). "Bones of Contention: The Measurement of Contentious Issues." Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, San Francisco. (*we will read a revised version of the paper that will be submitted to a journal during the fall semester*)
- Brett Ashley Leeds, Sara McLaughlin Mitchell, and Andrew G. Long (2000). "Re-Evaluating Alliance Reliability: Specific Threats, Specific Promises." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 44: 686-699.
- Douglas Lemke and William Reed (2001). "War and Rivalry among Great Powers." *American Journal of Political Science* 45, 2 (April): 457-469.

### **15. Monday, December 3: Course Wrapup: Alternative Approaches / Professionalization**

*In this, the final meeting of the semester, we will try to accomplish three things. First, we will briefly examine several major alternative approaches to the study of international relations that have not been covered in the rest of the syllabus. While the instructor is by no means an expert on any of these approaches, and they will be of little direct value at departments like Florida State, it is worthwhile to become familiar with the basic outlines of such alternative visions. In preparing for class, students should think about the various strengths and weaknesses of each approach relative to the other approaches and methodologies that have been covered in this course. For example, do these alternative approaches have the potential to chart their own theoretical course, or are they primarily useful as critiques of other, better-developed approaches?*

*After that, we will conclude the semester by discussing professional issues in the study of international relations at Florida State or in the larger academic community. No readings are assigned for this topic, and the instructor will not impose any particular structure to the discussion. Instead, this is an opportunity for students -- many of whom are experiencing the first semester of their graduate education -- to ask any questions they might have about graduate study, academic conferences, the publication process, dissertations, teaching, or any other topics related to the profession.*

### ***Paper Topics***

- *Topic #1:* Choose one of the alternative approaches covered in this week's readings. Evaluate the strengths and weaknesses of that approach relative to the other approaches and methodologies that have been covered in this course. Does this alternative approach have the potential to chart its own theoretical course and contribute meaningfully to our understanding of international relations by itself, or is it primarily useful as a critique of other, better-developed approaches?

- *There is no second topic for this week, as the first topic may be applied to any of the alternative approaches covered in the syllabus.*

### ***Assigned Readings***

#### *Constructivism*

- Judith Goldstein and Robert O. Keohane (1993). "Ideas and Foreign Policy: An Analytical Framework." In Goldstein and Keohane, eds., *Ideas and Foreign Policy: Beliefs, Institutions, and Political Change*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, pp. 3-30.
- Ted Hopf (1998). "The Promise of Constructivism in IR Theory." *International Security* 23 (Summer): 171-200.

#### *Feminism*

- J. Ann Tickner (1997). "You Just Don't Understand: Troubled Engagements between Feminists and IR Theorists." *International Studies Quarterly* 41, 4 (December): 611-632.
- *International Studies Quarterly* debate on feminism and IR: volume 42, 1 (March), pp. 193-210 (articles by Robert O. Keohane, Marianne H. Marchand, and J. Ann Tickner)

#### *Post-Modernism*

- Chris Brown (1994). "Critical Theory and Post-Modernism in International Relations." In A.J.R. Groom and Margot Light, eds., *Contemporary International Relations: A Guide to Theory*. London: Pinter, pp. 56-68.
- John Gerard Ruggie (1993). "Territoriality and Beyond: Problematizing Modernity in International Relations." *International Organization* 47: 139-174.

#### *Radical / Marxist / Dependency*

- Theotonio Dos Santos (1970). "The Structure of Dependence." *American Economic Review* 60: 231-236.
- Johan Galtung (1971). "A Structural Theory of Imperialism." *Journal of Peace Research* 8: 81-117.
- Jill Hills (1994). "Dependency Theory and Its Relevance Today: International Institutions in Telecommunications and Structural Power." *Review of International Studies* 20: 169-186.

**Final Paper Due Thursday, December 13, at 10:00 AM (in instructor's office)**