July - September 2019: Case Summaries
This page includes the detailed summaries of each individual territorial, river, maritime, or identity claim that has been active during this quarter. For more details on the purpose of this quarterly review and for the summary of events during the quarter, see the Overview page.
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This search interface allows you to search through these quarterly reviews for such terms as names of territories, countries, or leaders. (For now, this is limited to ICOW's quarterly reviews of news over territorial, river, maritime, or identity claims, covering events since the beginning of 2019. In the future, we plan to expand this search to include access to summary web pages for each of the more than 1200 claims identified by the ICOW project, which will be created as part of the next external grant that the ICOW project receives.)
Case Summaries: New Claims
Territorial Claims
- Denmark/USA over Greenland (Territory #39):
- The Wall Street Journal reported on August 15 that U.S. President Trump had repeatedly expressed interest in purchasing Greenland from Denmark -- possibly for its mineral resources (coal, zinc, copper, iron ore, and fishing) and/or its strategic value (home to a major radar base, more access to the Arctic). This interest reportedly came in conversations with aides, some of whom encouraged the idea. Politicians in Denmark and Greenland dismissed the idea as a joke, with Greenland's foreign ministry responding "We're open for business, not for sale" and Prime Minister Frederiksen calling the idea "absurd." When this story first became public, even assuming that the reporting was accurate and Trump's interest was serious, demand for sovereignty over Greenland had not become official U.S. foreign policy, so this did not qualify as a territorial claim -- but that changed on August 20 when Trump canceled a planned visit to Denmark because Frederiksen had stated that she "would have no interest in discussing the purchase of Greenland."
- Trump's cancellation of his planned trip to Denmark clearly indicates that acquiring Greenland had become official U.S. policy at that point, which is what is needed to code the existence of a territorial claim. Some individuals have argued that this should not be coded as a "real" territorial claim because it was an attempted real estate transaction, Trump did not use the word "sovereignty" in his request/demand, it was not serious, it was an attempt to divert attention from domestic problems, or it was not backed up by the threat of military force if the claim was not granted. As long as the official government policy is to seek the transfer of the territory, though, the claim is codable. Many other territorial claims have been settled for payment as real estate transactions (such as Alaska); even if the word "sovereignty" was not used, acquiring the territory from Denmark would clearly involve the transfer of sovereignty; it is not clear how critics would operationalize "serious" or "diversionary" for purposes of ruling out potential claims systematically; and less than half of all territorial claims in the data set ever lead to even a single threat to use military force. While the claim became public in August, it is not yet clear whether Trump was willing to consider prolonging the effort after a strong Danish response indicating no willingness even to discuss a sale, or if he dropped the claim at that point. It appears that the claim was probably dropped, although further events later may reveal otherwise.
River Claims
- No new claims began during this quarter.
Maritime Claims
- No new claims began during this quarter.
Identity Claims
- No new claims began during this quarter.
Case Summaries: Claim Escalation and Provocations
Claim numbers that end in "xx" indicate claims that have begun since the end of the publicly available data set in question and have not yet been assigned a number; this document will be updated in the future when these numbers have been determined.
Territorial Claims
Western Hemisphere
- Belize/Guatemala over Belize (Territory #66): Action vs. civilians
- On July 23, a Belizean civilian boat (with members of the Belize Territorial Volunteers and the Sarstoon Temash Institute for Indigenous Management) went to investigate reports of illegal timber logging around Black Creek, escorted by a boat from the Belize Defense Forces. They were intercepted in the Sarstoon River by two Guatemalan Armed Forces boats, which claimed that they were in Guatemalan territory and demanded that they turn back. They refused, with the BDF boat pointing out that it was escorting the civilian boat. The BDF boat later developed mechanical difficulties and had to turn back to base, at which point the Guatemalan boats again told the civilian boat to turn back and it complied. The Belizean government protested to Guatemala over the incident.
Europe
- Bosnia/Croatia over Neum-Klek-Peljesac bridge (Territory #348 / Maritime #2390): Non-military activity
- The Bosnian and Croatian members of the tripartite presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina decided in July to launch legal action against Croatia over construction of the Peljesac bridge, which Bosnians feared would block sea access from the Bosnian port of Neum. They argued the bridge construction should not be undertaken unilaterally, and should wait until the conclusion of a treaty over the land and maritime borders in the area; a 1999 border treaty had never been ratified by either side. Construction of the bridge had stopped more than a decade earlier, but planning began in 2017 for construction to be completed by 2022 with European Union funding, and the final pillar for the bridge was installed in the bay in May 2019. The Serbian member of the presidency vetoed this threat of legal action, fearing that it would impede construction of a bridge across the Sava River that had just been agreed, and fearing additional complications from a legal challenge against the EU.
- Croatia/Slovenia over land border and Adriatic Sea (Territory #352 / Maritime #2386): Other provocation
- New Croatian Foreign Minister Radman commented on the dispute on August 13, calling on Croatia and Slovenia to handle it bilaterally to set an example for EU states in settling bilateral issues. Croatia continued to insist that the matter had not been settled yet and that a bilateral agreement was needed, as the 2015 arbitral tribunal that had ruled on it had been irreversibly compromised. The Slovenian foreign ministry responded on August 16 by rejecting "non-truths" that Radman had stated; Slovenia considers the arbitral award to be the final answer to the question, with bilateral talks being possible only to finalize details in the implementation of the award.
- On September 25, Slovenian Foreign Minister Cerar told reporters at the UN General Assembly session that his country was in favor of extending the Schengen passport-free travel zone to include Croatia -- but only if Croatia respected the rule of law, which is "one of the key standards that must be respected by countries that are about to join the Schengen area." This was a clear reference to Croatia's unwillingness to accept the tribunal ruling over the border issue, as he described respect for the rule of law as including "respect for and implementation of international agreements and decisions of international courts." Croatian Prime Minister Plenkovic responded the next day by minimizing the impact of the tribunal ruling for his country's Schengen admission, "Those are political issues that will be raised at the Council level. This is a technical matter for the Commission. The criteria are equal for all and Croatia has met all the criteria."
- Greece/Turkey over Aegean Sea (Territory #364 / Maritime #2352): Other provocation
- Turkish President Erdogan, giving a talk at National Defense University in Istanbul, was pictured in front of a map showing at least half of the Aegean Sea (including numerous Greek islands) as Turkish.
- Russia/Ukraine over Crimea (Territory #386): Action vs. civilians / Other provocation
- On July 6, the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly's Committee on Political Affairs and Security passed a resolution calling for the end of Russian occupation of Crimea. A member of the Russian delegation responded by rejecting the use of the term "occupation" and arguing that Crimea had been occupied by Ukraine upon the breakup of the Soviet Union, but had now returned permanently to Russia.
- On July 28, Russian Prime Minister Medvedev led a government delegation to Crimea for Navy Day festivities. The Ukrainian government, which continues to claim Crimea as Ukrainian territory, protested.
- On July 29, the Ukrainian government announced that it was planning to create a Russian-language TV network to broadcast into Crimea and the separatist regions in eastern Ukraine, seeking to counter what it called propaganda spread by Russian state TV in those areas. The Russian Foreign Ministry criticized the plan as hypocritical in light of the new Ukrainian language law, which restricted the public use of the Russian language within Ukraine.
- On August 10, Russian President Putin attended a bikers' festival in Crimea. The Ukrainian government protested the visit as a blatant violation of its sovereignty.
- In August, Ukraine seized the Russian oil tanker Mriya (formerly known as the Vilga) for violating Ukrainian rules on entering and leaving Crimea by delivering oil to Sevastopol, Crimea, as well as for delivering oil to the Russian Black Sea Fleet in Sevastopol in June 2015.
- Russia held local elections in Crimea on September 8. The Ukrainian government protested the voting as "illegal" and argued that it "won’t be recognized by Ukraine and the international community."
- Ukrainian President Zelensky declared on September 13 that his government "will fight to bring Crimea back. And not only with words."
Africa
- Benin/Nigeria over border (Territory #416): Other provocation
- Prince Abiodum, governor of Nigeria's state of Ogun, vowed in July that his administration would never let Benin take Tongeji Island from Nigeria. The island is located close to Benin, and is home to a fishing community of around 1000 residents, but it is also believed to be rich in oil. Benin was accused of trying to "lure the people and take over the island."
- Kenya/Uganda over Migingo/Lake Victoria Islands (Territory #534): Action vs. civilians
- Three Kenyan fishermen were arrested by Ugandan officials on Lake Victoria in mid-July, and released after paying a fine. Ten Kenyan fishing boats and at least 30 fishermen were seized by Ugandan officials on Lake Victoria on July 27 for trespassing and using illegal fishing equipment; they were released on July 28 after paying fines. Six Kenyan fishermen were arrested on August 16, with their boats and equipment being confiscated by Ugandan authorities.
- South Sudan/Sudan over Abyei (Territory #576): Fatal conflict (perpetrators unidentified)
- Unknown gunmen attacked a routine patrol by the UNISFA peacekeeping force in northern Abyei on July 16, killing five civilians and a UN peacekeeper and wounding another peacekeeper.
Middle East
- Israel/Lebanon border (Territory #740): Non-military activity
- Lebanon protested on September 25 that Israel had installed a security camera on the Lebanese side of the Blue Line, at the northern entrance of an unused railway tunnel in Ras Al Naqoura. When the protests did not lead to immediate UN peacekeeper action to remove the camera, Lebanese soldiers tried to shift the camera so it did not show Lebanese territory, and it emitted some sort of noxious gas that made eight of the soldiers sick. Israel removed the camera on September 26.
Asia and Oceania
- China/Taiwan over Taiwan (Territory #809): Action vs. civilians / Non-military activity / Other provocation
- The United States announced a $2.2 billion arms sale to Taiwan in early July, including 108 M1A2 Abrams tanks and 250 Stinger surface-to-air missiles. China protested, called on the U.S. to cancel the sale and cut its military ties with Taiwan, and warned of sanctions against the U.S. companies involved in the sale. Another arms sale was approved on August 20, including 66 F-16 fighter jets as well as additional parts and accessories; China protested this as undermining its sovereignty and security, and threatened to impose sanctions against the companies involved.
- Taiwanese President Tsai Ing-wen traveled to the United States for four days in July. China protested, and cautioned the U.S. to avoid interfering in what it described as internal Chinese politics.
- China released a new defense white paper that emphasized the Taiwan question as a matter of critical importance to China. Announcing the white paper, a Defense Ministry spokesman stressed that China would never allow separatism or Taiwanese independence; while China would strive for peaceful reunification "with utmost sincerity and greatest efforts," it would never renounce the use of force, and would take up arms to safeguard national sovereignty and territorial integrity if anyone attempted to split Taiwan from China.
- The American warship U.S.S. Antietam traveled through the Taiwan Strait on July 24, and the U.S.S. Green Bay did the same on August 23. A U.S. Navy spokesman indicated each time that the passage was meant to demonstrate "the U.S. commitment to a free and open Indo-Pacific," but it was widely interpreted as a show of support for Taiwan.
- On July 31, a Chinese warship collided with the Taiwanese container ship Yutai Number One in the Taiwan Strait. The collision occurred in a recognized shipping lane, 20 miles from the Taiwanese island of Quemoy (Kinmen). After the collision the Chinese ship asked the Taiwanese ship to accompany it to the nearby Chinese port of Xiamen for an investigation of the incident, but it summoned two Taiwanese patrol ships to escort it safely to a Taiwanese port instead. One of the Taiwanese patrol ships then located the damaged Chinese warship -- an unidentified People's Liberation Army Navy vessel -- and asked it to allow an inspection, but it refused the request, ceased communication, and continued on its way to the Chinese port. No injuries were reported on either ship.
- The government of the Solomon Islands announced on September 16 that it was switching its diplomatic recognition from Taiwan to China, and Kiribati did the same on September 20 -- leaving only fifteen states that still recognize Taiwan. China had offered the Solomons $8.5 million in development funds if it would switch recognition; Taiwan had recently declined a request by Kiribati to donate money to purchase commercial airplanes (offering a loan instead), leading to reports that China had offered the desired funds for purchasing commercial airplanes and ferries.
- China/Japan over Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands (Territory #820 / Maritime #2714): Military activity / Other provocation
- Chinese Coast Guard vessels entered Japanese waters around the islands on July 10 and July 15, leading Japanese officials to warn them to leave; the vessels left within several hours each time. Japanese officials reported in August that Chinese Coast Guard or "maritime militia" vessels had entered these waters 64 consecutive days between April and July.
- On July 23, Chinese and Russian aircraft approached the islands, but stayed out of Japanese airspace after Japanese fighters were scrambled to intercept them.
- It was reported in early August that a new high school history textbook, which would be used beginning in fall of 2019, would stress government arguments that the Senkaku (Diaoyu) Islands, Taiwan, Tibet, Xinjiang, and the South China Sea had historically been Chinese since ancient times.
- At the beginning of September, the Japanese government established a special police force that would be based in Okinawa and would be responsible for the security of the islands.
- In mid-September, Japanese and U.S. forces held a military exercise in southern Japan where they simulated a response to a seaborne invasion of Japanese territory. China was not specifically mentioned during the exercise and the Chinese government did not respond, but analysts noted that there was a clear implication that the weapons and techniques used in this exercise could be used to defend the Diaoyu/Senkaku islands.
- North Korea/South Korea over Korea (Territory #826): Other (potential military activity - not protested)
- South Korean officials acknowledged reports in early September that North Korea had deployed a platoon of soldiers to Hambak Island, which is a disputed island located near the Northern Limit Line (the maritime border). The troops had reportedly been deployed to the island in 2017, following deployment to two other nearby islands beginning in 2015, perhaps to monitor defecting North Koreans or foreign fishing vessels in the area. The South Korean military indicated that it had been monitoring the deployment, but that it was not considered to be a violation of a 2018 military agreement because the deployment had begun in 2017.
- Japan/Russia over Kuril Islands/Northern Territories (Territory #828 / Maritime #2744): Military activity / Other provocation
- Japan protested on July 25 after Russian media reported that Russian Prime Minister Medvedev was planning to visit Etorofu (Iturup), one of the four islands involved in this claim, in early August. Medvedev's press secretary refused to comment on the report, but responded that the prime minister is free to visit any Russian territory if he thinks it necessary. Medvedev visited the island on August 2, leading Japan to protest the visit as "extremely regrettable." The Russian government dismissed the protest as an attempt to "interfere in Russia's domestic affairs" because it considers the islands to be Russian territory, and issued its own protest over Japanese violations of a program for visa-free travel by Japanese citizens to visit the islands.
- Russia notified Japan of planned shooting exercises near Kunashir Island from August 5-10; the Japanese government lodged a diplomatic protest against the plans.
- Russia protested on August 9 after Japan included the islands in a map of Japan on the official web site for the 2020 Tokyo Summer Olympics.
- A Japanese newspaper reported in early September that Russia was about to install coastal missile and radar systems on several islands in the northern Kurils -- not any of the four islands being claimed by Japan as the Northern Territories, but close enough to keep those islands and the waters of northern Japan in range. A Russian spokesman responded to the outcry by indicating that the systems had already been installed and were currently being prepared for operation.
- Russia opened a seafood processing factory on Shikotan Island on September 5, with a congratulatory video message from Russian President Putin being played at the opening ceremony. Japanese diplomats responded by making a "representation" to their Russian counterparts, and by noting the Japan's legal position over the islands had not changed. The Russian embassy in Tokyo responded that it considered this representation unacceptable, arguing that the islands belong to Russia on a lawful basis since the conclusion of World War II and that Russia has the right to take any desired measures for the development of its territories.
- Japan/South Korea over Dokdo/Takeshima (Territory #830 / Maritime #2736): Military activity / Other provocation
- Japan protested to both South Korea and Russia on July 23 after a Russian warplane approached the (Japan-claimed) islands and was intercepted by South Korean fighter jets. Japan also reportedly scrambled fighter jets in response to the incursion, but the main confrontation in this incident involved the South Korean jets firing 360 machine gun warning rounds at the Russian plane. South Korea rejected the protest, insisting that it would continue to respond sternly to any outside intrusion near the islands by any foreign power.
- South Korea protested after Japan's web site for the 2020 Summer Olympics showed the islands as a part of Japan and listed them with the Japanese name Takeshima rather than the Korean name Dokdo. Japan rejected the protest, arguing that the islands (which are administered by South Korea) are Japanese. The Korean Sport and Olympic Committee also sent protest letters to the International Olympic Committee and the Japanese Olympic Committee.
- South Korea's defense minister stated in early August that his government was considering transferring responsibility for the islands from the coast guard to the military, and announced that the military would hold a military exercise near the islands later in the month. This exercise -- usually held twice each year -- was originally planned for June, but had been postponed to avoid worsening tense relations with Japan; the exercise was then held on August 25-26 because tensions had continued to increase anyway over economic and historical issues. Japan protested on August 25, with a foreign ministry spokesman declaring that the islands are "obviously an inherent part of the territory of Japan." The U.S. State Department issued a statement warning that the exercises were "not productive toward resolving ongoing issues," but a spokesperson also indicated that the U.S. does not take a position on the issue and hopes that South Korea and Japan can resolve it peacefully.
- Yonhap reported on August 12 that marine scientists from the Korea Institute of Ocean Science and Technology were about to begin a four-day voyage to collect and compare seabed samples from Dokdo/Takeshima and from the nearby South Korean island of Ulleung.
- Six South Korean legislators visited the islands on Aug. 31, meeting with the police force stationed there. Japan protested the visit as "extremely regrettable" and reiterated its claim that the islands are "Japan’s inherent territory in light of historical facts and international laws."
- Hodaka Maruyama, a Japanese legislator who made headlines earlier in the year by appearing to advocate for a military solution to Japan's territorial claim against Russia over the Kuril Islands/Northern Territories, made a similar argument for Dokdo/Takeshima on Twitter on August 31: "Can Takeshima be returned (to Japan) through negotiations? (...) The only way to take them back appears to be through war."
- On September 27, the Japanese government published its annual defense white paper, which for the fifteenth consecutive year reiterated the Japanese claim to the islands -- and for the first time included the suggestion that Japan could scramble aircraft in the event of incidents around the islands. South Korea summoned the Japanese defense attache the same day to protest, and to demand that the claim be removed from the white paper.
- Azerbaijan/Georgia over border/Davit Gareja Monastery (Territory #856): Military activity
- In mid-July, Azeri border guards removed some icons from the Udabno Monastery in the monastery complex and handed them to Georgian border guards, ostensibly because the icons were being damaged by wind and rain and the Azeri guards did not want to be blamed for their deterioration. Georgian activists organized a protest on July 14, warning that Azerbaijan's actions showed that it did not consider the territory Georgian and demanding that the icons be returned to their previous locations, and reportedly chased the Azeri guards away from the area. In response, Azerbaijan closed access to the area "for a few days" (it remained closed as of July 30) until the situation calmed down, summoned the Georgian ambassador to demand an explanation, and both sides increased the number of border guards in the area. On July 15, the Georgian Interior Ministry described the incident as "small" and called on the public to allow the bilateral border demarcation commission to complete its work and settle the issue. On July 17, the Special Representative of the President of Azerbaijan for Border Issues and the Caspian Sea stated that he "presumed" the Georgian government was not behind the incident, but warned that Georgian border guards were responsible for allowing "provocateurs and criminal elements" into Azerbaijani territory for the protests.
- Kyrgyzstan/Tajikistan over Batken-Isfara (Territory #874): Fatal conflict / Military activity
- Dozens of ethnic Kyrgyz and Tajik residents of villages in or near the disputed territory engaged in clashes on July 22 after Tajik villagers from Vorukh installed a Tajik flag in or near disputed territory and Kyrgyz villagers posted a controversial sign that the Tajik villagers destroyed, just days before a meeting between leaders was scheduled to occur in the area to address the territorial issue. One Tajik resident was killed, and thirty people were injured (including at least one soldier and one police officer). The road was then blocked as border guards from both sides tried to restore calm, and more than 600 people were evacuated from the area for safety.
- On August 5, 10-15 Tajik citizens entered a disputed border area and began clearing rubbish. Kyrgyz border guards demanded that they leave the area, because such activities can not be undertaken before the border is finalized. They left briefly, but several dozen Tajiks returned later in the day with Tajik border guards. The two sides' border guards and district governors met to defuse the situation, and the Tajiks eventually left the area with no further incident.
- On September 16, shooting erupted across the border after a disagreement over construction in a disputed area of the border. This occurred along Kyrgyzstan's Leylek district and Tajikistan's Bobojon Ghafurov district, a separate area from the location of the incidents earlier in the year. Three Tajik and one Kyrgyz border guards were killed, and at least a dozen more on each side -- including both border guards and civilians -- were wounded. Kyrgyzstan summoned the Tajik ambassador to protest, claiming that the Tajik forces began the clash, although Tajik sources blamed Kyrgyz forces for starting it.
- Afghanistan/Pakistan over Durand Line (Territory #908): Fatal conflict / Military activity
- On September 13, militants fired from the Afghan side of the border at a Pakistani patrol and a Pakistani military unit building fencing along the border, killing a total of four Pakistani soldiers. Pakistan summoned an Afghan diplomat to protest the incidents and to demand that Afghanistan secure its side of the border. Afghan sources also accused Pakistan of firing heavy artillery into Afghan territory several times in recent weeks, including allegedly firing 200 rockets into Afghan territory on August 19-20. Two other Pakistani soldiers were killed by an improvised explosive device on September 20 while constructing border fencing.
- China/India over Arunachal Pradesh/Southern Tibet (Territory #912): Action vs. civilians / Other (alleged military activity - not protested)
- On July 6, Tibetans in India raised the Tibetan flag near the border with China to honor the birthday of the Dalai Lama. Eleven Chinese soldiers approached the border, made "aggressive gestures," and displayed banners saying "Ban all activities to split Tibet" -- but most accounts say that they remained on their side of the border, and that Indian forces monitored them the whole time.
- In early September, Tapir Gao -- a member of the Indian parliament from Arunachal Pradesh -- claimed that Chinese soldiers had entered Indian territory and built a bridge around Fish Tail, which India considers part of the Anjaw district of Arunachal Pradesh. The Indian army rejected his claim, arguing that the area was disputed by both countries but that there was no permanent Chinese military or civilian presence in the area and that its forces were monitoring the area.
- China/India over Aksai Chin/Ladakh (Territory #922): Military activity
- On August 5, India's government announced a presidential decree to revoke the special autonomous status that had been given to (Indian-administered) Jammu and Kashmir for the past seven decades under Article 370 of the Indian constitution, and a parliamentary bill to split the territory into two parts: Jammu and Kashmir (essentially the portion disputed with Pakistan), and Ladakh (essentially the portion disputed with China). Indian Home Minister Shah insisted to India's parliament that both areas (including Pakistan-administered Kashmir in the new "Jammu and Kashmir" region and China-administered Aksai Chin in the new "Ladakh" region) are integral parts of India, and that "We will give our lives for it" rather than abandoning the claims; Indian officials claimed that the actions were intended to stop terrorism and separatism in the region. On August 6, China protested this action, which it claimed involved Chinese territory and undermined Chinese territorial sovereignty. China also urged India to be cautious on border issues and to avoid taking any actions that might unilaterally change the status quo or further complicate boundary issues. India rejected the protest, arguing that the decision to split a new Union territory of Ladakh out of Jammu and Kashmir was an internal matter. On August 27, Indian Ambassador Misri reiterated his country's argument that this was purely an internal administrative matter and had "no implication for either the external boundaries of India or the Line of Actual Control (LAC) with China."
- On September 11, an Indian patrol on the northern bank of Lake Pangong encountered Chinese troops who objected to their presence. A standoff and what is variously described as a "heated exchange" or "scuffle" ensued, with both sides calling in reinforcements before negotiations between army delegations helped the two sides deescalate and disengage. Some reports suggested that military boats collided on the lake during the incident, injuring several Indian soldiers. Sources afterward minimized the severity of the incident, noting that such incidents often take place due to different perceptions of the location of the Line of Actual Control.
- China raised the questions of Kashmir and Ladakh at the United Nations General Assembly on September 27, stressing that no actions should be taken that would affect the status quo, and calling for the issues to be solved peacefully. In response, the Indian government repeated its position that these are considered internal matters within India, and that it expects other countries to respect India's sovereignty and territorial integrity.
- India/Pakistan over [Indian-administered] Kashmir (Territory #922) and [Pakistani-administered] Kashmir (Territory #922): Fatal conflict / Military activity / Other provocation
- On July 3, Pakistani officials reported that an explosion on the Pakistani side of the border near the Line of Control had killed five soldiers and wounded one. The incident was under investigation, but the Pakistani statement suggested that it was likely to be the result of an Indian violation of the ceasefire along the border. Sputnik reported that heavy firing and shelling occurred across the border beginning on July 6. There were no reports of fatalities, but at least two Indian soldiers and one civilian were wounded. Pakistan protested to India several times in late July over cross-border firing along the Line of Control, including on July 29 and 31 after Indian shelling reportedly killed four civilians and wounded dozens of others. India also protested after Pakistani forces fired at Indian positions on July 27, killing one soldier, and at civilians on July 31, killing one and wounding six. Clashes intensified in early August, with India claiming on August 4 that 5-7 Pakistani soldiers had been killed while trying to cross the Line of Control (Pakistan denied the claim), and Pakistan claiming that Indian shelling had killed two civilians and wounded at least four others.
- The Indian Supreme Court on July 1 dismissed a petition brought by Ram Kudar Yadav, a former Indian intelligence official, seeking to create at least two parliamentary constituencies and 24 local assembly constituencies in Pakistani-occupied Kashmir and Gilgit, and to hold elections there. The Court ruled that the petition was "legally untenable" and fined Yadav 50,000 Rupees (around $800 US).
- On July 30, Pakistani Foreign Minister Qureshi warned India against "any demographic changes in occupied Kashmir." There had been speculation that India might overturn its constitution's restrictions that prevented outsiders from buying properties in Kashmir. Pakistan also expressed concern on July 31 over an Indian plan to bring an additional 20,000 troops to Kashmir, which India had explained as rotating in fresh troops to replace others who had been deployed for a long period of time.
- On August 2, Indian officials asked Hindu pilgrims, tourists, and students to leave Kashmir due to security concerns, following intelligence reports of potential attacks and the discovery of a cache of weapons and explosives. Reported indicated that 25,000 additional troops were sent to Kashmir, and residents were asked to stockpile food and fuel. Local telephone and Internet communications lines were cut on August 4, a security lockdown was imposed, and prominent Kashmiri opposition politicians were placed under house arrest, in preparation for the August 5 announcements of major political changes affecting the region.
- On August 5, India's government announced a presidential decree to revoke the special autonomous status that had been given to (Indian-administered) Jammu and Kashmir for the past seven decades under Article 370 of the Indian constitution, and a parliamentary bill to split the territory into two parts: Jammu and Kashmir (essentially the portion disputed with Pakistan), and Ladakh (essentially the portion disputed with China). Indian Home Minister Shah insisted that both areas (including Pakistan-administered Kashmir in the new "Jammu and Kashmir" region and China-administered Aksai Chin in the new "Ladakh" region) are integral parts of India, and that "We will give our lives for it" rather than abandoning the claims; Indian officials claimed that the actions were intended to stop terrorism and separatism in the region. The Pakistani foreign ministry rejected the action and described it as "illegal" because the territory in question was internationally recognized as disputed between India and Pakistan, so no unilateral action could be taken to change the status quo. Pakistani Prime Minister Khan warned that the Indian action could lead to war, pledging that the Pakistani military would "go to any extent" to defend the people of Kashmir and would retaliate against any attack on Pakistani-administered portions of Kashmir -- although Pakistani Foreign Minister Qureshi stated on August 8 that Pakistan was only looking at political, diplomatic, and legal options, and was not considering a military response to the Indian actions. Pakistani Foreign Minister Qureshi wrote a letter to the United Nations to warn of the critical nature of the situation and to ask the UN to urge India to halt any action that might alter the situation in Kashmir in violation of UN resolutions. Pakistan responded to the Indian actions on August 7 by expelling India's high commissioner (ambassador), recalling its own ambassador, and suspending bilateral trade; both sides then suspended cross-border train service. Pakistani Prime Minister Khan later described the Indian actions as "ethnic cleansing" and "the Hindu Supremacists version of Hitler's Lebensraum," warning the world not to stand idly by.
- On August 12, Pakistan began moving warplanes and other equipment to its Skardu airbase near the Indian border, reportedly to take part in air drills. The same day, Pakistan's ambassador to the U.S. warned that Pakistan may redeploy troops from the Afghan frontier to the border with India. The Indian military monitored the situation very closely, but described the activity as "normal" and indicated that Indian forces were always prepared should things escalate; India placed its military forces in Kashmir on full alert on August 16. Indian army sources also claimed that Pakistan deployed over 100 elite commandos to the border area in late August, and warned that they were monitoring the activities of these commandos.
- On August 14, Pakistani Prime Minister Khan accused India of planning a military strike against Pakistani-administered Kashmir, and said that Pakistan was "fully prepared to respond" to any aggression and would "fight til the end." He also pledged to support the "struggle for self-determination" in Indian-administered Kashmir. Pakistani President Alvi similarly warned on August 23 that "Pakistan would give a befitting response to any Indian aggression."
- On August 15, major clashes erupted along the Kashmir border. Pakistan reported that five Indian and three Pakistani soldiers as well as two Pakistani civilians were killed in the clashes, although India rejected the reports of Indian deaths. Continued firing reportedly killed another Pakistani soldier on August 16, killed an Indian soldier on August 17, killed two Pakistani civilians on August 18, killed one Indian soldier and three Pakistani civilians on August 19 (Pakistan claimed to have killed six Indian soldiers that day), killed one Indian soldier on August 23, and killed one Indian soldier and at least two Pakistani civilians on August 27. Pakistan then accused Indian forces of firing across the border and killing one civilian woman on September 14, India responded the next day by accusing Pakistani forces of firing across the border over 2050 times in the year so far (killing 21 Indians), and Pakistan charged that Indian fire killed two civilians and wounded four on September 29.
- On August 18, Indian Defense Minister Singh declared that India would only hold bilateral talks over Azad Kashmir (Pakistan-administered Kashmir), not Indian-administered Kashmir (which his government had previously made clear is considered an integral part of India). Pakistani Prime Minister Khan in turn declared on August 21 that his government would no longer seek to negotiate with Indian officials, as "there is no point in talking to them." Similarly, Pakistani Foreign Minister Qureshi declared that Pakistan was willing to meet with India either bilaterally or with third party involvement, provided that India agreed to meet certain conditions; Khan had stated in a New York Times editorial the previous day that talks could only go ahead if India reversed its annexation of Kashmir.
- On August 30, Pakistani Prime Minister Khan warned of possible Indian "genocide" in Kashmir, warned of a "befitting response" to any Indian attack on Pakistani-administered Kashmir (although he did pledge on September 2 that Pakistan would not initiate hostilities), and vowed to pressure India over Kashmir until the territory was "liberated."
- The Director General of the Pakistani military's Inter-Services Public Relations, Major General Ghafoor, rejected September news reports speculating that the Pakistani government might reach a deal over Kashmir in coming days: "Kashmir is our jugular vein and we will fight for it until our last bullet, soldier, and breath." He promised that Pakistan would continue to stand by the people of Kashmir, warned that India was "sowing the seeds of a new war," and added, "Any deal over Kashmir will be on our dead bodies."
- On September 9, Pakistan called on the United Nations Human Rights Council to set up an investigation to probe Indian human rights abuses in Kashmir.
- On September 17, Indian Foreign Minister Jaishankar declared that Pakistani-administered Kashmir "is part of India and we expect one day that we will have physical jurisdiction over it." The previous day, a minister from the Indian state of Gujarat made a similar statement, but he is not a national-level political leader like Jaishankar. The Pakistani Foreign Office responded by condemning Jaishankar's "inflammatory and irresponsible remarks" and asking the international community to take note of India's "aggressive posturing."
- On September 18, Pakistani Prime Minister Khan would not hold any talks with India until India reverses its actions over Kashmir. The same day, it was reported that Pakistan would not allow India's prime minister to use Pakistani airspace to fly to and from Germany on September 20 and 28. Khan repeated this warning on September 24, arguing the there was no point in negotiating with India until it ended the curfew over Kashmir. Indian External Affairs Minister Jaishankar later insisted that India would not hold talks with "Terroristan" until it ceased its support of terrorism in Kashnmir and elsewhere.
- On September 25, Pakistani Foreign Minister Qureshi sent a letter to the UN Security Council and Secretary General outlining Pakistan's position over Kashmir in light of recent Indian activities in the region, which he described as "a threat to regional peace and stability.”
- On September 27, Pakistani Prime Minister Khan criticized India in a speech to the UN General Assembly, calling India's actions in Kashmir "stupid" and "cruel," warning of a "bloodbath" in Kashmir once India lifts its curfew over the region, and asking the international community to intervene to prevent escalation in a conflict between two nuclear-armed neighbors. In his speech, Indian Prime Minister Modi did not address Kashmir directly, although he did warn about the dangers posed by terrorism (implicitly blaming Pakistan for any terrorism or other related problems in Kashmir).
- Bangladesh/India over Muhurir Char (Territory #930): Action vs. civilians
- On September 26, 10 Bangladeshi farmers were reportedly injured when Indian border forces opened fire as they were cutting grass near Khanpur, near the Rajshahi border with India.
- Cambodia/Laos over border (Territory #963): Action vs. civilians
- Tensions increased in the border area in mid-August, near the Tonle Rapov River in what is known as the Mom Bei (three angles) area between the Chhep district of Cambodia's Preah Vihear province and Laos' Champasak province. Cambodian sources claimed that Laotian forces had occupied Cambodian territory and destroyed crops being grown there with the intention of annexing the territory; Laotian sources claimed that Cambodian forces tried to force them away from Laotian territory. Officials from both countries described the incident as a misunderstanding over interpretation of maps or about the status of unmarked sections of the border and downplayed reports of tension, but both sides increased their military presence in the area afterward.
- China/Vietnam over Paracel (Hoang Sa) Islands (Territory #946 / Maritime #2810?): Military activity / Non-military activity
- The Chinese navy held military drills near the Paracel Islands and in the Gulf of Tonkin in mid-August, warning that foreign vessels must stay away for the duration of the exercises. News reports indicated that the drills were being held in Chinese waters (although near Vietnamese waters), so analysts doubted that Vietnam would protest or respond.
- On September 5, it was reported that the large Chinese crane ship Lan Jing -- one of the largest crane ships in the world, which had previously been used to deploy several oil rigs in the South China Sea -- had begun to operate 56 miles from the Vietnamese coast, in waters claimed as part of Vietnam's EEZ. These waters lie between the Vietnamese coast and the Paracel Islands, which is why this is currently considered to be a provocation in the Paracels claim rather than a separate Chinese claim over waters immediately offshore from the Vietnamese coast. Vietnam demanded that all Chinese ships leave the area, which it considered to be part of the Vietnamese EEZ, but a Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman declared on September 18 that the area is under Chinese sovereignty.
- It was reported in mid September that China had been attempting to intimidate foreign oil firms working with Vietnam to develop its maritime resources. Most notably, China had reportedly been seeking to convince ExxonMobil to suspend or end its involvement in the Blue Whale natural gas project off Vietnam's central coast. In September, Vietnam condemned Chinese moves to hamper its oil and gas exploitation within Vietnamese claimed waters.
- Malaysia/Philippines over Sabah (Territory #971): Other provocation
- During a congressional budget hearing in early September, Philippines Foreign Affairs Secretary Locsin answered a question about possibly establishing an embassy in Sabah by declaring, "We shall never have an embassy in Sabah. To even think of it is an act of treason (...) We are careful not to make any act that can be interpreted as an abandonment of our Sabah claim." Malaysia's foreign ministry rebuked this statement as "unfriendly and harmful."
- China/Philippines over Spratly Islands (Territory #984 / Maritime #2802): Action vs. civilians / Military activity / Non-military activity
- On July 2, Filipino President Duterte indicated that he wanted a fresh assurance from the Chinese government that Filipino fishermen would remain safe in the South China Sea and West Philippine Sea, following the June 9 Reed/Recto Bank incident where a Chinese ship sank a Filipino fishing boat and fled without rescuing its crew. The Philippine Coast Guard and Maritime Industry Authority released their report on the June 9 incident in early July, concluding that the Chinese boat failed to take appropriate actions to avoid the collision and then failed to render assistance to the crew of the sinking ship. No joint meeting was held to discuss the results before the end of July, though. In late August, the Chinese company that owns that ship apologized for the "accidental collision" and expressed its "deep regret;" the Philippines government accepted this apology.
- In early July, the U.S. reported that China had tested anti-ship missiles from a base in the South China Sea, which the Pentagon described as "disturbing" and contrary to Chinese pledges not to militarize the islands. China denied the report on July 5, noting that standard war games in the area had already been announced for late June through early July and rejecting the claim that anti-ship missiles had been launched from island bases during the games. The Philippines government announced that it would investigate the reports.
- On July 4, the Philippine government announced that the Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources would investigate reports that Chinese fishermen had damaged coral reefs near Panatag (Scarborough) Shoal and other points in the Spratly Islands. This action followed reports from the University of the Philippines’ Marine Science Institute that estimated the Philippines loses about 33.1 billion Philippine pesos (about $735 million USD) every year due to this damage.
- Speaking to journalists on July 8, Philippines President Duterte called on the U.S. military to engage China militarily and "bomb everything" controlled by China in the region if China failed to respect international shipping lanes and comply with Filipino territorial demands, and declared that the Philippines will support the American forces ("We will be behind you"). He made a similar statement on July 17. Most observers interpreted the statements as sarcastic, as Duterte had recently been pressured by the U.S. as well as Filipino politicians to be more assertive in defending Filipino rights in the region; a government spokesman stated on July 18 that the point had been to expose the absurdity of demands for the Philippines to take an aggressive stance against a much more powerful China.
- In his annual State of the Nation address in July, Philippines President Duterte stated that his country had no choice but to accept the Chinese presence and fishing activities in the Spratlys because of China's military dominance, and both Duterte and presidential spokesman Panelo made statements about China being "in possession" of parts of the Philippines EEZ. These remarks were criticized by Duterte's political opponents for essentially giving away Filipino territory. Duterte indicated that the Filipino claims in the West Philippine Sea were undoubtedly their own territory, that the Chinese only had "constructive possession" of the area due to its military buildup there rather than "legal possession," and that his government would seek to reclaim its territories "in due time" but that he would not risk soldiers' lives in a war.
- Reports emerged in late July that at least 113 Chinese boats had swarmed to block Filipino fishermen from accessing the fishing grounds near Thitu Island (Pag-asa/Zhongye) on July 24-25, leading the Philippines Department of Foreign Affairs to protest.
- On August 6, the Philippines government announced that it would begin stamping Chinese passports with a new visa stamp showing a map of the Philippines, including the full extent of Filipino territorial claims in the South China Sea. Visa stamps could previously be stamped on separate sheets of paper that could later be removed, but the new stamp would only be placed on the permanent passport itself, offering a permanent record to the Philippines government (and a permanent statement about Filipino territorial claims).
- On August 22, one Chinese Coast Guard ship was reported to have been in waters around the Philippines-administered Ayungin Shoal, and 27 Chinese fishing boats were reported to be operating in waters near the Philippines-administered Panata (Lankiam) Cay. A September 26 report by the Washington-based think tank Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative further indicated that at least 14 Chinese Coast Guard vessels had been operating in waters around Ayungin Shoal and Panatag (Scarborough) Shoal. In response, a Philippine government spokesman indicated that the Department of National Defense would investigate the report and, if needed, the government would file a diplomatic protest.
- China/Vietnam over Spratly Islands (Territory #984 / Maritime #2802): Military activity / Non-military activity
- Beginning on July 3, the Chinese survey ship Haiyang Dizhi 8 -- accompanied by at least two armed coast guard vessels -- conducted a seismic survey near the Vietnamese-controlled reef Vanguard Bank (Tu Chinh reef / Wan'an Tan), which is claimed as part of Vietnam's EEZ. Four Vietnamese patrol vessels monitored them during the survey (leading to numerous press summaries of the events as "a standoff"), although they did not intervene to stop the activity; later stories raised the number to nine Vietnamese ships. On July 19 the Vietnamese government warned that the area in question was entirely in Vietnamese waters and demanded that China stop its "unlawful activities" there; it continued making similar demands in coming days as the Chinese ships did not leave the area. Chinese vessels were also reported to have been operating "in a threatening manner" near a drilling rig around Vanguard Bank where Vietnam had contracted Rosneft to develop gas fields and near Vietnamese supply ships during July. The U.S. State Department supported Vietnam with a July 20 statement urging China to stop interfering with other countries' oil and gas activities in disputed waters; China dismissed these remarks as "slander" and warned Vietnam to "respect China's sovereign rights and jurisdiction over the relevant waters, and not to take any move that may complicate matters". On August 7, the survey ship left Vietnam's claimed EEZ, although it returned on August 13 with two escorting Chinese Coast Guard vessels. Vietnam protested on August 16 and demanded that the ships leave Vietnamese waters, and the U.S. State Department expressed concern over China's action as an attempt to intimidate Vietnam and other regional states out of developing resources in South China Sea waters. Vietnam again demanded on September 12 that the ships leave Vietnamese waters. The ships left again on September 23.
- On July 25, Vietnam announced that it would extend the operations of a Japanese exploratory rig that had been working in waters claimed by both Vietnam and China. The rig had originally been scheduled to complete its operations by July 30.
- Philippines/Vietnam over Spratly Islands (Territory #984 / Maritime #2802): Non-military activity
- On August 22, several Vietnamese fishing boats were reported to be operating in waters near the Philippines-administered Panata (Lankiam) Cay.
River Claims
Western Hemisphere
- (None during this quarter)
Europe
- (None during this quarter)
Africa
- Egypt/Ethiopia/Sudan over Nile River - Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (River #1500): Other provocation
- Speaking at the UN General Assembly, Egyptian President al-Sisi argued that "The Nile water is a matter of life and an issue of existence for Egypt," calling for international intervention to defend Egypt in the Nile waters dispute. Ethiopian President Sahle-Work Zewde responded in her address to the UNGA by arguing that the Nile should not be a object of conflict and distrust and that the dam project offers an opportunity for cooperation among the riparian states.
Middle East
- (None during this quarter)
Asia and Oceania
- India/Nepal over Gandaki and Kosi River flooding (River #1904-1906): Non-military activity
- The Gandaki and Kosi rivers flooded during the June-September rainy season, inundating large areas of Nepalese territory near the border. The floods in July were among the worst in many years, leading to at least 20 deaths in Nepal and devastating local cropland; Nepalese officials reported that they had tried to contact Indian officials to open the sluice gates in their embankments and reduce the flooding. Nepal protested that roughly ten Indian embankments were blocking the rivers to limit flooding in India, increasing the damage to Nepal; India had previously argued that the structures in question were roads, not dykes. After three days of flooding, India did open two gates beneath one of the embankments to release some of the water, reducing the scope of the problem in Nepal. Even before the embankment gates were opened, the flooding had been affecting both India and Nepal; some 1.9 million Indian residents were displaced by flooding.
- Indian/Pakistani claims over Sutlej River (River #1932): Non-military activity
- On August 19, Pakistan accused India of using water as a weapon in the ongoing controversy over Kashmir by releasing a large amount of water from the Ladakh Dam into the Sutlej River without any prior notification, risking flooding on the Pakistani side of the border. The released water began flooding Pakistani territory on August 20, damaging homes and crops and requiring Pakistani to evacuate 2000 residents to protect them from the rising waters. An Indian government official called the release of water a "routine" occurrence during monsoon season, but blamed the current Indian-Pakistani tensions over Kashmir for the lack of notification, which he said was not required under the Indus Waters Treaty: "It was goodwill on our part that we used to share that information … those days are gone." Pakistan protested that advance notification of water released is required by the Indus Waters Treaty, and India did ultimately release some water discharge data, but Pakistan argued that too little information was released and it came too late. The disagreement over what is required apparently relates to the Advance Flood Information Agreement (AFIA), which both states had signed in 1989 and renewed annually since then; India had declined to renew this agreement in 2018 and 2019.
- China-Laos-Thailand-Cambodia-Vietnam over Mekong River / Chinese dams and Xayaburi Dam (River #19xx): Non-military activity
- Chinese dams on the Mekong River released more water than usual in early July, raising water levels in the river and affecting at least 200 families in Laos villages and 300 families in Thai villages whose livelihood depends on fishing or seaweed cultivation. The governments notified the Mekong River Commission about the issue, and the global environmental group International Rivers announced plans to demand that China compensate the villagers.
- In later July, downstream countries received far less water from the Mekong River than usual, leaving parts of the basin dry and most of the basin suffering from extreme water shortages. U.S. Secretary of State Pompeo complained at the ASEAN summit in Bangkok on August 1 that Chinese dam building on the Mekong had caused decade-low water levels in downstream countries. China eventually admitted that it had reduced the flow of water from its Jinhong dam, although the water level was reduced further by testing on Laos' new Xayaburi dam. After an outcry from downstream states, China later restored the normal water flow "as a show of goodwill," although the Chinese government claimed that Chinese territory in the basin was also vulnerable to drought.
- Laos began preliminary testing of its new Xayaburi Dam on July 15, in preparation for its expected operations in October. This testing worsened the low water levels in the Mekong basin below the dam, leading Thailand to ask Laos to halt its testing until the water levels returned to a more sustainable level.
Maritime Claims
Western Hemisphere
- (None during this quarter)
Europe
- Russia/Ukraine over Black Sea/Sea of Azov/Kerch Strait (Maritime #2362): Action vs. civilians
- The Russian government announced on July 9 that it had completed its investigation of the 24 Ukrainian sailors who had been arrested in 2018, and would soon proceed with the court case against them; on July 17 the court hearing their case ordered their detention extended through late October, and Moscow City Court ruled in August that the detention of all 24 sailors must be extended through November 24. Russia continued to reject the jurisdiction of the International Tribunal of the Law of the Sea, which was hearing a Ukrainian complaint over the matter. Russia also ignored a July 18 vote by the European Parliament calling for the immediate release of all Ukrainian prisoners.
- Ukrainian security forces detained the Russian oil tanker Neyma in late July for its role in the November 2018 incident in which Russia seized three Ukrainian warships and 24 sailors. The Neyma had blocked the Kerch Strait to ensure that the Ukrainian vessels could not reach open waters; it had changed its name to Nika Spirit to try to avoid repercussions, but the Ukrainian authorities seized it when it entered the port of Izmail. The Russian government immediately warned that it was looking into the circumstances of this seizure in order to take "appropriate measures," and that if this amounted to taking Russians hostage, "consequences will not be long in coming." Ukraine released the 10 crew from the ship on July 25 after interrogating them and determining that none of them had been involved in the earlier incident, but retained the ship. The Russian consulate in Odessa lodged a note with the Ukrainian government on July 30, demanding an explanation for the seizure. A Ukrainian court formally ordered the seizure of the ship on July 30; Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Kerasin responded that the ship was owned by a private Russian company, and that the matter would be handled through the courts.
Africa
- Kenya/Somalia over Indian Ocean (Maritime #2xxx): Other provocation
- Kenyan Solicitor General Ogeto filed a petition asking the court to dismiss a lawsuit that had been filed by 20 Kenyan petitioners on June 28 to block the Kenyan government from participating in the ICJ case over the Kenya/Somalia maritime question before hearings begin in September.
- On August 7, leaders from the Kenyan parliament made a bipartisan request to their government asking it to protest the ICJ's decision to hear the maritime case, arguing that it should be settled bilaterally or through regional mechanisms like the AU, IGAD, or EAC rather than through a global institution like the ICJ. They described military action as a last resort, with diplomacy being preferable but a military solution perhaps being inevitable if diplomacy should fail, and called on the government to consider deploying the Kenyan Defense Forces to protect Kenya's sovereignty and territorial integrity along the maritime border. Somalia's government warned that its parliament would vote to remove the Kenyan military from Somalia (where it had been assisting in the fight against Al Shabaab) if Kenya deployed naval forces to the disputed area, while a Kenyan government spokesman replied that do what is needed to defend itself against foreign aggression.
Middle East
- Israel/Lebanon over Eastern Mediterranean (Maritime #2670): Military activity / Other provocation
- According to Lebanese sources, an Israeli warship crossed into Lebanese waters for several minutes on July 14 before returning to Israeli waters. UN peacekeepers detected the violation and notified Lebanese authorities; Israeli officials had no response when contacted by journalists.
- Lebanese Prime Minister Hariri announced plans in July to increase Lebanon's naval capabilities to protect his country's oil and gas resources as well as to stop terrorism, smuggling, and human trafficking. The UN Security Council had requested in 2018 that Lebanon do so, in order to allow the reduction of the 750-person Maritime Task Force that had been part of the UNIFIL peacekeeping operation since 2006.
- Cyprus/Turkey over Eastern Mediterranean (Maritime #2698): Military activity / Non-military activity / Other provocation
- A second Turkish drilling ship, the Yavuz, arrived in waters off Cyprus in early July accompanied by a naval frigate, and began preparations for exploratory drilling. Cyprus protested the presence of the Yavuz on July 8, and said that it would defend its rights with "all diplomatic and legal means." The EU described its presence as an "unacceptable escalation" and warned Turkey to stop the drilling activities or face sanctions, while other countries such as Egypt, Greece, Israel, and the United States expressed concern and warned against increasing tensions. Turkey continued the drilling operations, leading the EU to announce sanctions on July 15: it would suspend talks on an air transport agreement, call for a review of European Investment Bank lending to Turkey, and reduce financial assistance to Turkey in 2020. Turkey ignored the sanctions, and threatened to send additional drilling ships to the area.
- It was announced in early August that a third Turkish ship, the seismic research ship Barbaros, had been sent and would begin drilling by the end of August. A fourth ship, the research ship Oruc Reis, was sent on August 19. On August 20, the United States called on Turkey to cease these "unlawful activities" and withdraw the ships.
- On August 16, Turkey issued a series of navigational communications warning foreign ships away from the waters off Cyprus where the Fatih is drilling, due to live-fire naval exercises in the area.
- On August 22, French President Macron met with Greek Prime Minister Mitsotakis to discuss this among other issues. Macron issued a warning to Turkey that the EU considers its drilling activities illegal and that they will not be tolerated. Turkish President Erdogan brushed off the statement, warning in return that Turkish naval and air forces were on duty to protect the drilling activities.
- Iraq/Kuwait over Khor Abdullah channel (Maritime #2684): Non-military activity
- Iraq protested to the United Nations on August 7 over Kuwaiti construction projects in the Khor Abdullah (Khawr Abd Allah) channel along the maritime border, leading Kuwait to reply to the UN on August 20. As part of its efforts to assist the security of Khor Abdullah navigation, Kuwait built a platform ("land reclamation platform" or "port structure" in some news reports) above Fisht Al-Eij, a land feature above the surface in what it considers Kuwaiti territorial waters -- but Iraq argued that this platform would affect the demarcation of the maritime border in that area (which is currently undemarcated beyond border point 162). Kuwait had notified Iraq of its plans for the platform in February 2017, and Iraq had protested in September 2017 and September 2018; Kuwait had rejected those protests because it considered the area to be in Kuwaiti territorial waters, and urged Iraq to begin negotiations over maritime border demarcation in the area. Iraq appealed to the UN Security Council over the matter on Sept. 5, asking the UNSC to intervene to protect Iraqi sovereignty and navigation rights in the waterway.
Asia and Oceania
- North Korea/Russia over Sea of Japan fishing (Maritime #2xxx): Fatal conflict / Action vs. civilians
- North Korea seized a Russian fishing boat, the Xiang Hai Lin 8, on July 17 and arrested its 17 crew members (15 Russians and 2 South Koreans). The boat -- operating under a South Korean flag -- was accused of violating the "rules of entry and stay in North Korea" while traveling to the Sea of Japan for crab fishing; the ship's Russian owner reported that he had been told the boat was violating a "50 mile zone" but that he was not aware of the existence or meaning of such a zone. The boat and its crew were released on July 28.
- A Russian patrol boat attempted to detain two large North Korean fishing boats and eleven smaller motorboats for poaching within Russia's EEZ near Yamato Bank in the Sea of Japan. The largest boat attempted to flee and then resisted the Russian boarding crew, wounding four of the Russian border police before the boats were seized with 161 crew; six of the North Koreans were wounded in the incident, one of whom later died in Russian custody. Russia summoned the North Korean charge d'affaires over the incident to express "serious concern" and to demand that North Korea act to prevent such incidents in the future.
- Russian forces seized three North Korean vessels, five motorboats, and 262 crew on September 27 for fishing in waters that Russia considers part of its EEZ; the boats contained over 30,000 squid and illegal fishing equipment. Another eleven North Korean vessels with 87 crew were seized on September 28-30 with over 4000 squid and illegal fishing equipment. The Russian government downplayed this as part of a crackdown on poachers, rather than a problem between the governments.
- Japan/North Korea over Sea of Japan/East Sea (Maritime #2736): Military activity
- On August 23-24, Japanese patrol vessels were confronted by a North Korean vessel that threatened to open fire at them. Japan protested, arguing that the North Korean vessel had been in Japanese waters at the time; a North Korean Foreign Ministry spokesman later argued that the Japanese vessels had been intruding in North Korean waters and were chased out.
- North Korea/South Korea over Sea of Japan/East Sea (Maritime #2736): Other (accidental violation)
- A North Korean fishing boat crossed the Northern Limit Line into South Korea waters in the East Sea/Sea of Japan on July 28, and was seized by South Korean vessels. The boat was believed to be operated by the North Korean military because one of the three men on board was wearing a military uniform; the crew reported that they had only entered South Korean waters accidentally due to a "navigation error." The crew were released after South Korean officials concluded that they were not attempting to infiltrate South Korea.
- India/Sri Lanka over Palk Strait fishing (Maritime #2xxx): Action vs. civilians
- Sri Lankan naval forces arrested six Indian fishermen on July 12, four on July 24, seven on July 28, six on August 13, four on August 19, four on August 21, four on September 9, and five on September 19 for fishing illegally across the International Maritime Boundary Line in Sri Lankan waters. Sri Lankan vessels also forced 500 Indian fishermen to leave their fishing grounds near the island of Katchatheevu on July 30.
- An incident was avoided on July 19 when eight Indian fishermen in two fishing boats lost control and drifted to beach on an island on the Sri Lankan side of the International Maritime Boundary Line. The Indian Coast Guard contacted their Sri Lankan counterparts to explain that the fishermen had drifted and were not engaged in illegal fishing, and received permission to return them and their boats to India.
- Indonesia/Vietnam over Natuna Islands fishing rights (Maritime #2816): Military activity
- Indonesia's Maritime Affairs and Fisheries Ministry reported in September that 13 Vietnamese patrol boats had been detected along the border between Indonesian and Vietnamese waters during the current year, alleging that they were maintaining a presence there to assist Vietnamese fishermen who were illegally fishing in Indonesian waters.
Identity Claims
Western Hemisphere
- (None during this quarter)
Europe
- Estonia/Russia over Russians in Estonia (Identity #3296): Other provocation
- On September 26, the date designated by the Council of Europe as the European Day of Languages, Russia's mission to the Council of Europe warned that the Russian-speaking inhabitants of Estonia, Latvia, and Ukraine "are being deprived of the opportunity to learn and freely use their native language and promote their own culture," and called on the Council to "pay more attention to the discrimination against Russian-speaking residents of Ukraine, Latvia and Estonia."
- Latvia/Russia over Russians in Latvia (Identity #3298): Other provocation
- On September 26, the date designated by the Council of Europe as the European Day of Languages, Russia's mission to the Council of Europe warned that the Russian-speaking inhabitants of Estonia, Latvia, and Ukraine "are being deprived of the opportunity to learn and freely use their native language and promote their own culture," and called on the Council to "pay more attention to the discrimination against Russian-speaking residents of Ukraine, Latvia and Estonia."
- The Latvian Russian Union, a domestic Latvian organization representing the ethnic Russian community, announced on September 30 that it would hold a protest rally in Riga on October 5. They planned to protest what they called the destruction of Russian-language education in Latvia, after a September announcement by the Latvian government that all education (beginning with preschool) would be conducted in the Latvian language, with special exceptions for courses related to culture and history; another decision earlier in the year had called for higher education to be conducted in Latvian or in any other official EU language (which notably does not include Russian).
- Russia/Ukraine over Russians in Eastern Ukraine (Identity #3302): Fatal conflict / Other provocations
- There were almost daily incidents of shelling or other cross-border firing throughout this quarter; the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission reports 50,259 ceasefire violations and 214 explosions due to artillery, mortar, rocket, or tank fire during the quarter, and the Wikipedia daily summary reports at least 53 fatalities (30 Ukrainian military, 18 separatist or pro-separatist forces, and 5 civilian).
- On July 6, the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly's Committee on Political Affairs and Security passed a resolution calling for a halt to hostilities in eastern Ukraine. withdrawal of forces from the front lines, and a comprehensive settlement of the conflict. The resolution also accused Russia of not fulfilling its obligations under the Minsk Agreement, and called for the withdrawal of Russian troops from eastern Ukraine and the end of Russian occupation of Crimea. A member of the Russian delegation responded by arguing that no Russian troops were in Ukraine, as had been verified by OSCE monitors.
- On July 16, the new Ukrainian language law that had been passed in April and was signed by outgoing President Poroshenko in May came into effect. Russia's delegation to the Council of Europe asked the organization to react to the law, which declares the Ukrainian language to be the only official language in the country and requires the use of the Ukrainian language in all spheres of life, and to monitor its consequences. The OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities scheduled a visit to Moscow for July 23 to discuss the status of ethnic Russians in Ukraine. Ukrainian President Zelensky, who came into office after the law had been passed and signed, promised that the law would be thoroughly analyzed, and that he hoped for "further measures to safeguard the realization of the rights of minorities."
- On July 17, Russian President Putin expanded his earlier decree simplifying the procedure for obtaining a Russian passport to include any permanent resident of the Donestk and Luhansk regions of Ukraine when the fighting began in 2014, including those living in currently government-held territory; the original decree had only covered those living in separatist-held territory and had later been expanded to include those who had lived in Crimea before it was annexed by Russia. By late July, over 7000 new passports had been issued through this program and another 30,000 applications had been received; a Russian spokesperson indicated in August that up to three million people would be eligible. Ukraine condemned this decree as overt interference in Ukrainian affairs, declared such passports to be illegal and refused to recognize them, and ordered the simplification of procedures for diaspora Ukrainians to receive Ukrainian passports -- as well as potentially "foreigners who are deprived of their rights or liberties" in their home country; the new procedures announced on August 13 specifically mentioned simplifying the Ukrainian citizenship process for "Russian citizens who have been persecuted for political beliefs."
- On July 24, the Russian government revealed that over 300 criminal cases had been filed against at least 73 Ukrainian security personnel for crimes against civilians during the separatist conflict.
- On July 29, the Ukrainian government announced that it was planning to create a Russian-language TV network to broadcast into Crimea and the separatist regions in eastern Ukraine, seeking to counter what it called propaganda spread by Russian state TV in those areas. The Russian Foreign Ministry criticized the plan as hypocritical in light of the new Ukrainian language law, which restricted the public use of the Russian language within Ukraine.
- On August 16, US special peace envoy to Ukraine Kurt Volker accused Russia of denying its involvement in the insurgency in eastern Ukraine, which he argued was making the management and settlement of the conflict more difficult: "It is not a case of some indigenous separatist conflict. It is Russia actually doing this."
- Ukrainian President Zelensky declared on September 13 that holding local elections in the separatist Donbass region, as envisaged in the 2015 Minsk agreements, could only take place after complete disengagement from the area and would need to take place under Ukrainian election law. He also refused to agree to mass amnesty for people from the separatist regions, insisting that amnesty could only be granted on a case-by-case basis and never to people "with blood on their hands," and expressed skepticism about the idea of deploying UN peacekeepers in the Donbass region. These statements were criticized by separatist leaders for departing from the terms of the Minsk agreements, which called for local elections, special status for the Donbass region, and amnesty. Without naming any specific leaders, OSCE Chairperson-in-Office reminded leaders on all sides not to question the underlying terms of the Minsk agreement or the Normandy process, as these had already been agreed by all as the best roadmap to settlement -- although he agreed that peacekeepers could not be deployed without full disengagement by all sides.
- On September 26, the date designated by the Council of Europe as the European Day of Languages, Russia's mission to the Council of Europe warned that the Russian-speaking inhabitants of Estonia, Latvia, and Ukraine "are being deprived of the opportunity to learn and freely use their native language and promote their own culture," and called on the Council to "pay more attention to the discrimination against Russian-speaking residents of Ukraine, Latvia and Estonia."
- Russia/Ukraine over Ukrainians in Crimea and Eastern Ukraine (Identity #3308): Non-military activity
- It was reported in September that virtually all Ukrainian-language schools in separatist-controlled eastern Ukraine and in Crimea, and at least half of all Crimean Tatar schools, had been closed since 2014 as part of a Russification campaign.
- Croatia/Serbia over Serbs in Croatia (Identity #3334): Other provocation
- Croatian officials celebrated the 24th anniversary of Operation Storm, the military operation in the Yugoslavian wars that removed ethnic Serbian control over the area known at the time as the Republic of Serbian Krajina. Serbian President Vucic responded by calling the anniversary "one of the saddest days in [Serbia's] modern history" because it led most of the ethnic Serb residents to flee their homes in Krajina; he referenced ethnic cleansing, noting that Croatia's prewar population of nearly 700,000 Serbs and Yugoslavs had decreased to 184,000 Serbs in the 2011 census, and called for respecting the ethnic Serb victims of the war as well as the ethnic Croats. The leader of the ethnic Serbs in the Croatian Parliament added that normalization and peaceful relations depended on resolving some of the lingering problems affecting the ethnic Serb community, such as the lack of prosecution for war crimes by Croats, the wartime destruction of Serb villages and prevention of Serbs from returning to their previous homes, and the persecution of Serbs in Croatia.
Africa
- (None during this quarter)
Middle East
- Bahrain/Iran over Shiites in Bahrain (Identity #3xxx): Other provocation
- Bahrain executed two Shiite activists for "terrorist crimes," involving killings allegedly organized by Iran.
Asia and Oceania
- Armenia/Azerbaijan over Nagorno-Karabakh (Identity #3842): Fatal conflict / Other provocations
- Almost daily reports alleged firing across the border. At least two fatalities were reported, as fire from the Azerbaijan side of the border line killed an Armenian soldier on July 28, and firing from the Armenian side killed an Azerbaijani soldier on September 23.
- Armenian Prime Minister Pashinian visited Stepanakert, the capital of Nagorno-Karabakh, on August 5. He gave an hour long speech in which he declared that the region is "Armenian, and that's that" and led the crowd in chanting to call for the unification of Nagorno-Karabakh and Armenia. Azerbaijan rejected the speech as "aggressive" and a "major blow" to the international mediation efforts, but Armenia replied that the Azeris had misinterpreted the speech and that its goal had been to promote a "pan-Armenian agenda of unity, solidarity, development, and prosperity" of Armenia, Nagorno-Karabakh, and the Armenian diaspora rather than political unification.
- The Azeri foreign ministry protested on August 28 against recent statements by Armenian leaders, and insisted that Azerbaijan would ultimately restore sovereignty over Nagorno-Karabakh: "This hour will come, and taking into account the development of the situation in the region, it can occur at any time." Similarly, Azerbaijani Foreign Ministry spokesperson Abdullayeva declared on September 4 that "Armenia must realize that currently occupied lands of Azerbaijan will return back under the control of Azerbaijan and joint peaceful coexistence of both communities of the region will be ensured. There’s no other solution to the conflict and mediators, the international community are well aware of this!"
- Georgia/Russia over Ossetians in South Ossetia (Identity #3850): Military activity / Other provocation
- On July 7, the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly's Committee on Political Affairs and Security passed a draft resolution written by the Georgian delegation calling on Russia to reverse its decision to recognize the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia from Georgia; a leader in the Russian delegation replied that Russia had recognized the right of the Abkhaz and Ossetian people to self-determination in accordance with the UN Charter.
- On August 8, the U.S. State Department urged Russia to reverse its recognition of the "so-called independence" of Abkhazia and South Ossetia and to end its "occupation of sovereign Georgian territory." In a separate statement, the U.S., Britain, Belgium, Estonia, France, Germany, and Poland expressed support for Georgia's sovereignty and territorial integrity, declared that they were "extremely concerned" by Russia's deepening ties with the two separatist regions, and called for the withdrawal of all military forces to their positions before the 2008 Russia-Georgia conflict began.
- On August 27, South Ossetia's Foreign Ministry protested the increased presence of Georgian troops and construction of Georgian fortifications near the border, following the construction of a fence along the border by Russian troops. South Ossetia demanded that the new Georgian construction (variously referred to as "fortifications," "a roadblock," "an observation post," "a police post," or "a checkpoint" in different news stories) be dismantled by August 30 or it would "take all legal measures to ensure security of the South Ossetian people and protect the state border." South Ossetia then deployed additional troops near the border and increased the frequency of patrols, and built its own checkpoint in the area on August 30; Georgia responded by deploying more troops to the border, and reportedly shooting down a South Ossetian drone on Sept. 1. Russia’s Foreign Ministry called on both sides to exercise restraint and accused Georgia of “repeatedly refusing to begin talks on delineating and demarcating the border” with South Ossetia. The EU Monitoring Mission in Georgia maintained 24 hour surveillance of the area; it was announced on August 30 that Georgian and South Ossetian representatives would meet on September 2 to discuss the matter.
- On September 5, South Ossetian forces reportedly occupied "a height at the border with Georgia" and raised a large South Ossetian flag.
Case Summaries: Peaceful Claim Management and Settlement
Claim numbers that end in "xx" indicate claims that have begun since the end of the publicly available data set in question and have not yet been assigned a number; this document will be updated in the future when these numbers have been determined.
Territorial Claims
Western Hemisphere
- Belize/Guatemala over Belize (Territory #66): Binding adjudication - ICJ (no agreement/case remains ongoing)
- This case remained under consideration at the International Court of Justice during the quarter.
- Colombia/Nicaragua over Quita Sueno-Roncador-Serrana (Territory #56 / Maritime #2062): Binding adjudication - ICJ (no agreement/case remains ongoing)
- This case remained under consideration at the International Court of Justice during the quarter.
- Guyana/Venezuela over Essequibo (Territory #112 / Maritime #2110): Binding adjudication - ICJ (no agreement/case remains ongoing) / Other (unofficial negotiations)
- This case remained under consideration at the International Court of Justice during the quarter.
- On September 5, the government of Venezuelan President Maduro released a recording allegedly showing an envoy of Maduro's political challenger Guaido -- who is recognized by some countries as Venezuela's legitimate president -- telling a UK representative that he would drop the Venezuelan claim to Guyanese territory if he were to take legal control of the Venezuelan government, and a recording of a U.S. official asking a Guaido advisor to “deliver the Essequibo” to Exxon Mobil. Guaido's representatives responded by claiming that Maduro and his predecessor Chavez had failed to defend Venezuelan interests in the Essequibo at the International Court of Justice hearings over the territory. On September 6, Maduro ordered prosecutors to lodge "high treason" charges against Guaido for conspiring to renounce Venezuela's historical claim to the territory, and refused to meet Guaido or his representatives until they renounce this plan (although his government later backtracked on this refusal and expressed a willingness to negotiate with the opposition).
- Argentina/UK over Falkland/Malvinas Islands (Territory #170): Other (confidence building)
- On September 2, the Argentine government approved a weekly flight between Sao Paulo, Brazil, and the Falkland/Malvinas Islands with a monthly stopover in Cordoba, Argentina; a similar arrangement already existed for a weekly flight between Punta Arenas, Chile, and the islands with a monthly stopover in Rio Gallegos, Argentina. The government of the Argentine state of Tierra del Fuego criticized the flight plan for complying with all British demands and for assisting the islanders with little tangible benefit for Argentina, but Argentine Foreign Minister Faurie replied that creating additional links and contacts between Argentines and the islanders would ultimately have the result of “building bridges and creating trust for sovereignty negotiations.”
Europe
- Kosovo/Serbia over Serbs in Northern Kosovo (Territory #340 / Identity #3338): other (peacekeeping)
- The UNMIK peacekeeping force continued operations during the quarter (see related documents and publications).
- French President Macron announced on July 15 that he would invite delegations from Serbia and Kosovo to meet in Paris with himself and German Chancellor Merkel to restart talks to normalize ties between the two. Serbian President Vucic responded that his country "would like peace and an agreement."
- On August 15, the embassies of the U.S., France, Germany, Italy, and UK in both Kosovo and Serbia called on Kosovo to end its tariffs on Serbian goods, Serbia to end its campaign to stop recognition of Kosovo, and both sides to renew their EU-mediated dialogue "to finally end the conflicts of the 1990s and provide a secure and prosperous future." German Chancellor Merkel met with Serbian President Vucic on September 24, after which Vucic announced that new steps would be taken after the conclusion of Kosovo's parliamentary elections in October, including a regional meeting and intensified negotiations between Serbs and Albanians.
- On September. 5-6 two U.S. senators (Republican Ron Johnson and Democrat Chris Murphy) visited Kosovo and Serbia and urged them to resume negotiations toward a final treaty after Kosovo's parliamentary elections are held on October 6.
- Bosnia/Croatia over Border near Una River (Territory #3xx): Bilateral (no agreement)
- The chairman of the tripartite Bosnian presidency met with Croatian government representatives on July 25 to discuss open issues between the two states, including the border near the Una River.
- Bosnia/Croatia over Neum-Klek-Peljesac bridge (Territory #348 / Maritime #2390): Bilateral (no agreement)
- The chairman of the tripartite Bosnian presidency met with Croatian government representatives on July 25 to discuss open issues between the two states. They agreed that Croatia has an indisputable right to build the Peljesac bridge, but with the need to respect Bosnia's sovereignty and territorial integrity, and to avoid threatening Bosnian rights under the law of the sea.
- Croatia/Slovenia over land border and Adriatic Sea (Territory #352 / Maritime #2386): binding adjudication - ECJ (no agreement/case remains ongoing)
- This case remained under consideration at the European Court of Justice during the quarter.
- The European Court of Justice held an oral hearing on July 8 to address Croatia's December 2018 objection that the court lacks jurisdiction to hear the case, because international borders are a matter of international rather than European law. Slovenia argued that the case is not about settling the border, because that was done in 2017 by the Permanent Court of Arbitration, but about Croatia refusing to implement that 2017 award -- which Slovenia describes as a violation of the EU's Lisbon Treaty articles governing rule of law and sincere cooperation between member states. The ECJ Advocate General indicated that he would release his opinion on the matter on November 6.
- Slovenian Foreign Minister Cerar met unofficially with new Croatian Foreign Minister Radman in August while vacationing in Croatia. No details were available about the meeting, but they were expected to hold a formal meeting at an EU conference in Helsinki at the end of August.
- Russia/Ukraine over Crimea (Territory #386): Other (proposed talks - not held)
- Ukrainian President Zelensky called on Russian President Putin to meet him in Minsk, Belarus, along with the leaders of the United States, France, Germany, and the United Kingdom. The goal of the meeting would be to discuss both sovereignty over the Crimean Peninsula and the situation in Donbass, eastern Ukraine. Putin's spokesman indicated that the Russian government would consider the offer of talks, seeking to determine what was involved in the new format and how likely the talks would be to produce meaningful results.
Africa
- Kenya/Uganda over Migingo/Lake Victoria Islands (Territory #534): Bilateral (no agreement)
- Kenyan Devolution Cabinet Secretary Wawalma told Kenyan fishermen that the government was working to end Ugandan harassment of Kenyan fishers, and that President Kenyatta would meet his Ugandan counterpart soon to resolve the issue. Numerous Kenyans had been reporting recently that Ugandan authorities were harassing, arresting, and torturing them for using illegal boats, nets, or other gear while fishing in Lake Victoria -- despite the gear being legal under Kenyan law and their belief that they were fishing in Kenyan waters.
- In August, Kenya began talks with Uganda over fishing in Lake Victoria, following many reports of its fishermen being harassed or arrested. Kenya's goal in the talks was to reach agreement over free fishing rights on the lake, following East African Community recommendations about the sharing of resources between member states.
- Kenya/South Sudan over Ilemi Triangle (Territory #550): Bilateral (procedural agreement)
- South Sudanese President Kiir and Kenyan President Kenyatta met in Nairobi on July 1 and agreed to form a joint border commission to address problems related to the Ilemi (Elemi) Triangle, including delimitation and demarcation of the disputed border as well as ethnic conflict among communities in the area. The governors of the two provinces in this portion of the border, Josphat Nanok of Kenya's Turkana County and Louis Lojore Lobong of South Sudan's Kapoeta State, met on July 2 and August 18, and agreed to take steps to pacify the communities along the border to promote regional peace and prepare them for the delimitation and demarcation process. Local leaders from the states on both sides of the border also endorsed the agreement on July 17 and thanked the national leaders for their efforts.
- South Sudan/Sudan over Abyei (Territory #576): Other (peacekeeping) / Bilateral (procedural agreement)
- The UNISFA peacekeeping force continued operations during the quarter (see related documents and publications).
- A Sudanese delegation headed by Prime Minister Hamdok visited Juba, South Sudan, on September 12 for talks. Among the topics to be discussed, they began negotiations over the status of Abyei.
- South Sudan/Sudan over border (Territory #576): Bilateral (no agreement)
- A Sudanese delegation headed by Prime Minister Hamdok visited Juba, South Sudan, on September 12 for talks. They agreed to set up a committee to address issues related to their 2012 cooperation agreement, including the demarcation of the border.
Middle East
- Israel/Lebanon border (Territory #740): other (peacekeeping)
- The UNIFIL (see related documents and publications) and UNTSO (see related documents and publications) peacekeeping forces continued operations during the quarter.
- U.S. Acting Assistant Secretary of State David Satterfield continued his efforts to mediate over the maritime issue, but the optimism that had been voiced in May and June seemed to have been misplaced. Satterfield met with Lebanese officials on July 2, in perhaps his last effort because he had recently been confirmed as U.S. ambassador to Turkey. Lebanon continued to insist that the mediation must address both the maritime and land borders simultaneously and that the UN participate, both of which Israeli officials had rejected in Satterfield's most recent visits. Lebanese Prime Minister Hariri met U.S. Secretary of State Pompeo on August 15, confirming Lebanon's commitment to continuing the process of settling its borders with Israel, and promised a "final decision" on the process in the coming months. Pompeo welcomed Hariri's commitment, and noted that the process would involve settling the last few disputed points in the Blue Line land border as well as discussing the maritime border.
- After Satterfield moved on to become U.S. ambassador to Turkey, David Schenker was appointed Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs, and visited Beirut on September 12 to restart negotiations over the maritime issue and perhaps the land border (if Israel should agree to the latter).
- Israel/Syria over Golan Heights (Territory #744): Other (peacekeeping)
- The UNDOF (see related documents and publications) and UNTSO (see related documents and publications) peacekeeping forces continued operations during the quarter.
- Iran/UAE over Abu Musa & Tunbs (Territory #768 / Maritime #2xxx): Bilateral (no agreement)
- Delegations from both countries met in Iran on July 30 for the sixth meeting of coast guards, and the first such meeting since 2013. The meeting was described as covering "border cooperation," and news agencies from both countries described the topics as including "issues related to shared borders, illegal entries, trespassing by fishermen, visits by citizens of each nation, and maritime connections." A UAE government spokesman described the meeting as "routine" and said that it was satisfied with the results.
Asia and Oceania
- China/Japan over Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands (Territory #820 / Maritime #2714): Bilateral (no agreement) / Other (deescalation/confidence building)
- Chinese Vice Foreign Minister Le met with Japanese Foreign Minister Kono and other officials in Tokyo on August 8-10. The meetings were described as a resumption of "strategic dialogue" that included "candid exchanges about bilateral and regional issues," and were widely seen as preparation for a spring summit between leaders.
- Chinese sources reported on August 16 that the Chinese government had instructed its fishermen to stay away from the waters around the islands, possibly to improve relations and avoid inflaming tensions with Japan.
- Japan/Russia over Kuril Islands/Northern Territories (Territory #828 / Maritime #2744): Bilateral (no agreement) / other (deescalation/confidence building)
- It was reported in mid-July that Russia had refused to open negotiations over the return of two of the four disputed islands, apparently referring to the content of the talks at the G-20 summit in late June. Japan had reduced its demand to only two islands in order to increase the likelihood of reaching a settlement, but after Russia refused, both sides decided to focus on non-sovereignty questions like joint economic activity on the islands.
- A delegation of Russian officials and island residents visited Hokkaido, Japan, on August 18 to begin a series of joint economic activities involving the islands. This initial visit involved plans to improve the waste incineration and recycling program on the islands.
- Russian President Putin and Japanese Prime Minister Abe met on September 5 on the sidelines of the Eastern Economic Forum meeting in Vladivostok, and discussed the islands issue. Abe raised the subject of finally negotiating a peace treaty to conclude World War II (calling this their "historical duty"), and Putin agreed on the importance of moving toward a peace treaty but noted that Japanese security ties with the U.S. were an impediment. They agreed to continue "future-oriented" negotiations and to preserve existing frameworks for negotiations, and confirmed that (as agreed in past talks) programs for joint economic activities and tourism on the islands would continue, but apparently made no new progress toward a settlement over the islands.
- Japan’s Deputy Foreign Minister Mori on Monday and Russia's Deputy Foreign Minister Morgulov met on September 9 in Tokyo to discuss a wide range of bilateral issues, including the possibility of a peace treaty that would settle the islands question. No agreements were reported.
- The heads of the Japanese and Russian national security councils met in Tokyo on September 16 to discuss bilateral cooperation in national security. They declared that it was important to sign a bilateral peace treaty, and agreed to work on creating conditions for signing the treaty.
- Meeting at the UN General Assembly on September 25, Japanese Foreign Minister Motegi and Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov agreed to meet soon to advance negotiations over the islands issue and a peace treaty, although they did not hold detailed discussions over the substantive issues during this meeting.
- Kazakhstan/Russia over border (Territory #844): Other (demarcation progress)
- The two countries' demarcation commission met from July 8-12 in Samara, Russia. The meeting approved the final drafts on demarcation of certain sections of the border, and made progress in negotiating the next steps; the next meeting was scheduled for August in Kazakhstan.
- Azerbaijan/Georgia over border/Davit Gareja Monastery (Territory #856): Bilateral (functional agreement)
- Preparations continued for the next round of talks over the border, following the 12th meeting of the commission for delimitation and demarcation of state borders on May 23-24. Expert groups from the Georgia-Azerbaijan Bilateral Border Delimitation Commission surveyed sections of the border from August 21-23 to resolve issues surrounding the 34% of the border that remains undefined. The next meeting of the commission was scheduled for September in Tbilisi.
- Following the July 14 incident between Azeri border guards and Georgian citizens, local authorities from both sides held talks to resolve the matter. They agreed to bar both states' citizens from the monastery for a few days so the situation could calm down, and Azerbaijan agreed to restore all previous access routes once the situation had calmed sufficiently.
- Kyrgyzstan/Tajikistan over Batken-Isfara (Territory #874): Bilateral (functional agreement)
- Following the July 22 incident between local Kyrgyz and Tajik residents, Kyrgyz Deputy Prime Minister Razakov and Tajik Deputy Prime Minister Ibrohim agreed on July 23 to undertake a joint investigation into the incident, joint patrols to maintain order in the area, and outreach to local communities to prevent future incidents. After taking these security precautions, the Batken-Isfana and Isfara-Vorukh roads were reopened on July 25 after being closed following the incident. Delegations began talks over solving border issues on July 24 in the Dacha district of Batken.
- Kyrgyz President Jeenbekov met with Tajik President Rahmon in the enclave of Vorukh (site of the recent incident) on July 26 before traveling to Isfara, Tajikistan, for a longer meeting and to Cholpon-Ata, Kyrgyzstan, to continue the talks on July 27. These talks discussed border delimitation and demarcation, among other issues, and agreed to accelerate the pace of border delimitation. After the presidents' meetings, spokesmen indicated that the intergovernmental working group for border delimitation and demarcation was working on the topic, with progress reported in July and further progress expected following the positive interaction between the presidents. Approximately 520 km of the 970 km-long border are agreed at this time, with 70 distinct areas remaining to be settled (including several enclaves/exclaves surrounded by the other state's territory).
- Following the September 16 clash, diplomats from each side attempted to negotiate over the issue.
- Kyrgyzstan/Uzbekistan (Territory #880): Bilateral (substantive agreement - possible claim end)
- Kyrgyz Prime Minister Abilgaziyev met with Uzbek Prime Minister Aripov on August 1 and expressed hope that the border would be finalized soon. He noted that bilateral work on border delimitation in undefined border sections remains in progress. One August 1 report from Azerbaijan's Trend news agency indicated that the two sides had abandoned the idea of exchanging disputed areas, but the details of the report were only available to paid subscribers.
- It was reported on September 12 that after extensive negotiations, the two sides had exchanged equivalent areas of territory, both measuring 407 hectares. Uzbekistan received territory near the reservoir near the village of Kerkidan, giving Uzbekistan the entire area of the reservoir (while allowing Kyrgyz access to the river before it reaches the reservoir); Kyrgyzstan received territory near the village of Gulbaar, giving it total control of the road between Osh and the Aravan region (which used to pass through Uzbek territory). Demarcation of the newly exchanged territory was to take place within one week.
- Turkmenistan/Uzbekistan (No ongoing claim): Other (demarcation progress)
- Working groups from the Uzbek-Turkmen Intergovernmental Commission on delimitation and demarcation met in Bukhara from July 22-28. They reviewed current proposals for demarcation of certain border segments, agreed to continue working on proposals for additional segments, and signed a final protocol at the conclusion of their meetings. Another meeting was held from July 24-30 in Turkmenabad, Turkmenistan, which led to agreement over additional work that had been done on border segments and over progress toward border demarcation.
- China/India over Arunachal Pradesh/Southern Tibet (Territory #912): Bilateral (no agreement)
- China and India postponed plans for the 22nd round of talks over the border; Chinese Foreign Minister Wang and Indian National Security Advisor Doval had been scheduled to meet on September 9-10 to discuss the border issue and to plan for a summit between heads of state in October. Sources disagreed over the reasons for the change; some sources suggested that China had decided to reschedule the talks due to the controversy over recent Indian actions in Kashmir, while others suggested that India had requested the postponement due to "scheduling issues."
- China/India over Aksai Chin/Ladakh (Territory #922): Bilateral (no agreement)
- Indian External Affairs Minister Jaishankar visited Beijing from August 11-13 to ease the strain in the bilateral relations. The official purpose of the visit was the second meeting of the India-China High-Level Mechanism on Cultural and People-to-People Exchanges, but Jaishankar also discussed the ongoing controversy over Ladakh/Aksai Chin in meetings with Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi and other leaders. Chinese officials warned that China opposes "any unilateral action that complicates the situation in the region," and noted that their government is "seriously concerned" that the Indian actions challenge China's "sovereign rights and interests." Jaishankar stressed that India's actions over Kashmir were strictly an internal matter and would have no bearing on its boundaries or relations with China, and declared that India would continue to work with China "to properly solve the border issue through consultations." While no details were released and no formal agreements appear to have been reached over the territorial question, they did agree on a number of initiatives on cultural and economic ties. The Jaishankar-Wang talks produced agreement that the next round of border talks would take place in the coming weeks, and Wang presented some proposals to Jaishankar during the meeting in hopes of producing an "early harvest" in the negotiations.
- China's Permanent Representative to United Nations, Zhang Jun, met his Indian counterpart Syed Akbaruddin at the UN in September. No details about their discussion were released, but it was believed that they were exchanging their countries' views over the Ladakh and Kashmir issues, as well as preparing for the next meeting between their states' leaders.
- India/Pakistan over [Indian-administered] Kashmir (Territory #922) and [Pakistani-administered] Kashmir (Territory #922): Other (peacekeeping) / Other (offered mediation by US-Saudi-UAE - not accepted)
- The UNMOGIP peacekeeping force continued operations during the quarter (see related documents and publications).
- While meeting with Pakistani Prime Minister Khan, U.S. President Trump offered to mediate the Kashmir problem between India and Pakistan, after claiming that Indian Prime Minister Modi had requested that he "mediate or arbitrate" the problem. India quickly denied having made this request and rejected Trump's offer, maintaining its longstanding position that Kashmir and other issued between India and Pakistan can only be addressed bilaterally. Trump again offered to mediate on August 3, leading to a similar Indian response. On August 19, Trump called the leaders of both India and Pakistan and called for them to exercise restraint and reduce tensions in Kashmir. Trump later stated on September 18 that he would soon be meeting separately with leaders of both states to try to help them reach a settlementl on September 23 he called on them to "come together" and resolve their differences and repeated his offer to mediate the talks in person if called upon to do so.
- Following India's August decision to end Kashmir's special constitutional status and to reorganize Jammu and Kashmir (including Pakistani- and Chinese-administered territories that India claimed), such countries as Russia, France, Iran, Malaysia, and Sri Lanka called for the two countries to manage and settle the issue peacefully, while others such as the United States indicated that they were monitoring the situation, and UN Secretary General Guterres stated that he was concerned by the situation and urged India and Pakistan not to take any steps that could affect the status of Jammu and Kashmir or exacerbate the human rights situation in the region.
- On August 13, Pakistan called for an urgent meeting of the UN Security Council, which met in private session on August 16. The Security Council declined to hold an emergency meeting or take any action, due to disagreements between the fifteen member states; multiple members saw the matter as an internal political matter within India rather than an interstate question that would merit their action. China's UN ambassador stated afterward that the Security Council was "seriously concerned" by the situation, and asked India and Pakistan to resolve the matter bilaterally and to refrain from taking any unilateral actions that might further aggravate the tension in the region.
- On August 20, Pakistani Foreign Minister Qureshi announced that his country would take the issue to the International Court of Justice, focusing on allegations that India was denying basic human rights to Muslim residents of Kashmir.
- Diplomats from Saudi Arabia and the UAE met with Pakistani leaders on September 3 to try to convince them to hold secret talks with India to reduce tensions between them. Pakistan refused.
- Bangladesh/India over Muhurir Char (Territory #930): Bilateral (no agreement)
- Delegations were scheduled to meet on August 7 in New Delhi to discuss the border issue. Bangladeshi officials entered the meeting hoping to reach a solution, while Indian officials sought agreement on undertaking a new survey of the 2km stretch of border that is involved.
- The bilateral Joint Rivers Commission held its first meeting since 2011 on August 8 in Dhaka. The plan was to discuss the ongoing river claims over the Teesta and Feni Rivers as well as the Manu, Muhuri, Khowai, Gumti, Dharla, Dudhkumar and other common rivers) and the territorial question of Muhurir Char, which relates to land that has shifted sides as the Muhuri River has changed course due to erosion on the Bangladeshi side and the construction of anti-erosion embankments on the Indian side
- Indonesia/Malaysia over land border (Territory #961): Bilateral (no agreement)
- Indonesian President Widodo visited Malaysia on August 8 to meet with Malaysia Prime Minister Mohamad. They were expected to discuss both land and maritime border issues, among many other topics.
- Cambodia/Laos over border (Territory #963): Bilateral (functional agreement)
- Following Laotian forces allegedly occupying territory in mid-August (described above), military and diplomatic representatives of the two countries met to avoid military escalation and to try to settle the matter peacefully. After a telephone conversation between the countries' prime ministers, they announced on August 24 that both sides' troops would be withdrawn from the unsettled border area around Mom Bei, and that negotiations would continue to work toward resolving the border issue completely. Generals from each military met to discuss the situation, and agreed that the troop withdrawal would occur on August 29 and that a joint committee of five military officers from each side would monitor the border afterward.
- Cambodian Foreign Minister Sokhonn met Lao Foreign Affairs Minister Kommasith in Vientiane on September 5-6. They discussed the border issue and ways to expand bilateral cooperation, and agreed that talks should continue in Cambodia the following week.
- Lao Prime Minister Sisoulith visited Cambodia for September 12-13 to discuss the border issue. They agreed to step up efforts to complete demarcation of the 14% of the 540 km border that remains unsettled, to formalize demarcation of the 86% that has already been agreed with boundary pillars and an agreed map, and to encourage their citizens to turn the border area into "a border of lasting peace, friendship and cooperation."
- Cambodia/Vietnam over border (Territory #964): Other (demarcation progress)
- The Cambodia-Vietnam Joint Commission held its 17th meeting on economic, cultural, and technological cooperation on August 21-22. Regarding the border, the Commission noted the progress that had been made in border demarcation, initialing two legal instruments to note the completion of demarcation and marker planting over 84% of the border and agreeing on the implementation roadmap until these documents could be formally signed.
- Delegations from Vietnam's Border Guard High Command and Cambodia's Ministry of National Defence met on August 27 to discuss border issues. They agreed to continue work toward border demarcation and border marker planting, and they agreed on various ways to increase cooperation between civilians on both sides of the border.
- Indonesia/Timor-Leste over border (Territory #974): Bilateral (tentative agreement)
- Timor-Leste's Minister of Strategic Planning and Investment, Xanana Gusmao, traveled to Jakarta on July 22 to meet Indonesia's Coordinating Minister for Political, Legal and Security Affairs, Wiranto, and Foreign Minister Marsudi. The meeting lead to the signing of an "agreement in principle" on the final two unresolved border segments, in the Noel Besi-Citrana and Bidjael Sunan-Oben areas, and reached arrangements for several pockets of Timorese land, including Batugade and Motaain, as well as for the border between Passabe and Haumeni’ana. These new agreements were scheduled to be finalized in an upcoming meeting of senior officials and then included in an addendum to the 2005 border agreement.
- Brunei/China/Malaysia/Philippines/Taiwan/Vietnam over Spratly Islands (Territory #984 / Maritime #2802): Multilateral negotiations (no agreement)
- The ASEAN summit in Bangkok discussed the South China Sea, noting the concerns that some members had over incidents and tensions in the area while reaffirming the need for self-restraint and mutual trust and confidence. The summit also welcomed progress between ASEAN and Chinese negotiators toward a code of conduct to govern the South China Sea, with the goal of producing a final code that all sides find acceptable by 2021. At the meeting, it was also reported that Chinese and ASEAN representatives had completed the first reading of the Single Draft Negotiating Text of the Code of Conduct (CoC) for the South China Sea.
- China/Malaysia over Spratly Islands (Territory #984 / Maritime #2802): Bilateral (functional agreement)
- On September 12, Malaysian Foreign Minister Abdullah and Chinese Foreign Minister Wang met in Beijing and agreed to establish a bilateral consultative mechanism to help manage their disagreements over the South China Sea. The mechanism would be run by the two states' foreign ministries, with the goal of improving dialogue and cooperation, but Malaysia was quite clear that it would not be used to negotiate the status of the South China Sea or its islands or resources.
- China/Philippines over Spratly Islands (Territory #984 / Maritime #2802): Bilateral (functional agreement)
- Chinese Vice-Foreign Minister Luo and Philippines Undersecretary of Foreign Affairs Manalo held the 22nd China-Philippines diplomatic consultation in Manila on July 30. They agreed to schedule the next meeting of the bilateral consultation mechanism over the South China Sea, which would be held in China soon. They also agreed that their countries would work together to manage the situation in the South China Sea, promote regional discussions over a code of conduct for the sea, and promote joint development.
- The verbal agreement between Philippines President Duterte and Chinese President Xi (which was discussed in last quarter's review) remained controversial during this quarter. Presidential Spokesman Panelo defended the agreement as a pragmatic way to maintain stability in the region while negotiations were underway for a permanent solution, and rejected criticisms that the agreement had been kept secret, was unconstitutional, or was one-sided or reached under duress. Panelo described the agreement as only granting China fishing rights, not territorial sovereignty, and declared that the military would continue to defend the country's territory; it was also reported that in exchange for these fishing rights China had agreed not to block Philippines fishermen from Panatag (Scarborough) Shoal.
- Philippines President Duterte traveled to China to meet with Chinese leaders from August 28-September 1. He raised the 2016 arbitral award that rejected Chinese claims over the South China Sea, which he termed "final, binding, and not subject to appeal." Chinese officials had warned before the meeting that China would continue to reject the arbitral award if Duterte brought it up at the meeting, and Chinese President Xi made clear to Duterte that his government would not reverse this position; a Philippines government spokesman indicated after the meeting that Duterte would not raise the ruling again in future talks with China, although a presidential spokesperson indicated several days later that the government was not going to give up on trying to enforce the ruling. The leaders did agree to practice self-restraint and avoid provocative acts, to resolve the issue through dialogue and negotiations, and to fast-track work toward a code of conduct for the South China Sea that was being negotiated by China and ASEAN. They also discussed the possibility of joint Chinese-Filipino oil exploration in the region, following up on a memorandum of understanding that had been signed in November 2018, and agreed to set up working groups of diplomats and businessmen to work out the details.
- Duterte announced on September 10 that he planned to pursue joint oil exploration with China in the disputed areas of the South China Sea near Reed Bank, setting aside the pro-Philippines ruling of the ITLOS tribunal in order to achieve a cooperative outcome with China. He noted that China had agreed to grant the Philippines 60% of the result of the joint exploration, although critics argued that he was giving China partial control over what should be Filipino waters. After criticism for abandoning the arbitral ruling that had favored the Philippines over China, a government spokesman clarified that Duterte was not abandoning the arbitral award entirely -- the government would continue to pursue peaceful negotiations over sovereignty, but the two countries were pursuing mutually beneficial arrangements in the mean time.
River Claims
Western Hemisphere
- Bolivia/Chile over Silala River (River #1124): Binding adjudication - ICJ (no agreement/case remains ongoing)
- The dispute remained under consideration at the International Court of Justice.
- Brazil/Paraguay over Parana River - Itaipu Dam (River #1106): Bilateral (substantive agreement - not implemented)
- A secret treaty signed in May revised the terms of the 1973 treaty governing electricity produced by the Itaipu Dam. Under the 1973 treaty the electricity was to be shared evenly between Brazil and Paraguay, but because Paraguay's far smaller population and economy keep it from using much of its allotment, it has sold the excess to Brazil at below market rates. This new agreement reached in May was kept secret until July, when the public learned its terms and began an outcry that led to the resignation of at least four top government officials and to calls for impeachment of others. Among other terms, the new treaty requires Paraguay to pay more for its electricity, and reduces the amount that it can charge for the excess electricity that is sold to Brazil. After the agreement's terms were publicized, Brazilian President Bolsonaro declared that his government was "willing to do justice on this issue" and "avoid problems" for his Paraguayan counterpart Abdo Benitez, and negotiators from the two states began work on a replacement - but Bolsonaro added that his government would not "give in" to Paraguay and would only agree to "small deviations" from the previous agreement.
Europe
- Hungary/Slovakia over Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project (River #1306): Binding adjudication - ICJ (no agreement/case remains ongoing)
- This case remained under consideration at the International Court of Justice during the quarter.
Africa
- Egypt/Ethiopia/Sudan over Nile River - Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (River #1500): Bilateral/multilateral (no agreement)
- Ethiopian Prime Minister Ahmed sent a message to Egyptian President al-Sisi on July 26 expressing his interest in resuming the tripartite talks over the dam between Ethiopia, Egypt, and Sudan. The message specifically mentioned the need to reach agreement on implementing the previous declaration of principles over the dam and on rules for filling and operating the dam's reservoirs in a way that would benefit all three states. Sisi agreed, reaffirming that any agreement would need to be based on mutual respect and common interests in the use of the Nile for each country's benefit.
- In late August, Egyptian Minister of Water Resources and Irrigation Abdel sent Ethiopia a government study suggesting a seven-year time frame for filling the reservoir for the dam (compared to the initial Ethiopian plan to fill it in three years), in order to minimize the impact on downstream Egyptian agriculture. Ethiopia acknowledged receipt of the study, but talks could not yet be renewed because instability had kept the Sudanese government from appointing a water minister to participate. Egyptian officials complained to European diplomats in September over the slow pace of discussions, arguing that they had offered Ethiopia a proposal that would meet the needs of both Ethiopia and Egypt but that no action had yet been taken.
- Representatives of Egypt, Ethiopia, and Sudan met on September 15-16 but did not reach any agreement over the dam issue. Ethiopia rejected Egypt's request for a 7-year time frame to fill the reservoir and for the annual release of at least 40 billion cubic meters of water from the dam, which Ethiopian Water Minister Sileshi described as "inappropriate" and a threat to Ethiopian sovereignty: "An Egyptian expert can't control our dam."
- The next round of talks by the trilateral scientific research group was scheduled for September 30-October 3 in Khartoum, to be followed by a meeting of the three countries' water ministers on October 4-5.
- Egypt's President El-Sissi met with new Sudanese Prime Minister Hamdok on September 18, discussing the dam issue as well as other bilateral matters.
Middle East
- Iraq/Turkey over Tigris River - Ilisu Dam (River #1724): Bilateral (no agreement)
- The Turkish government created a working group with fifty members to address Iraq's need for more water despite the Turkish need to fill the reservoir for the Ilisu Dam near the Iraqi border. The group worked to develop an action plan for Iraq that would improve water management (among other elements), and planned to meet with Iraqi officials on July 17 or 26 to discuss the matter.
- Turkey's Special Envoy for Water Affairs, Veysel Eroglu, met with Iraqi President Salih in Baghdad on July 31 to discuss the water issue. After the meeting, Salih stressed the need to "find a long-term and mutually satisfactory resolution to outstanding Iraqi-Turkish water issue," and expressed hope that a solution could be found that would protect the rights of both countries. Eroglu announced that the two sides had agreed to set up a water resources center in Baghdad to study and address water issues in the region, and had drafted an action plan to address the water issue. Along these lines, they discussed proposals to improve irrigation, land reclamation, sanitation, and drinking water in Iraq.
Asia and Oceania
- Bangladesh/India over Ganges River/Farakka Barage (River #1902): Bilateral (procedural agreement)
- The bilateral Joint Rivers Commission held its first meeting since 2011 on August 8 in Dhaka. The delegations agreed to establish a technical committee and to work together on water sharing and basin management regarding the Manu, Muhuri, Khowai, Feni, Gumti, Dharla, Dudhkumar and Teesta rivers, including dredging, pollution, and the construction of dams and embankments. They also formed a four-member technical committee to study the impact of the planned Farakka Barrage on the Ganges River in Bangladesh on both states.
- Bangladesh/India over Teesta River (River #1912): Bilateral (procedural agreement)
- he bilateral Joint Rivers Commission held its first meeting since 2011 on August 8 in Dhaka. The delegations agreed to establish a technical committee and to work together on water sharing and basin management regarding the Manu, Muhuri, Khowai, Feni, Gumti, Dharla, Dudhkumar and Teesta rivers, including dredging, pollution, and the construction of dams and embankments.
- Indian External Affairs Minister Jaishankar met Bangladeshi Foreign Minister Momen on August 20 to discuss the Teesta River issue, and no change was made to either side's position; Bangladesh continues to insist on 50% of the Teesta's waters, while India insists on 55% for itself.
- Bangladesh/India over Churni River pollution (River #19xx): Bilateral (procedural agreement)
- The bilateral Joint Rivers Commission held its first meeting since 2011 on August 8 in Dhaka. The delegations agreed to form a joint technical team to study two cross-border pollution issues: the Churni River, which branches off from the Mathabhanga River and flows from Darsana (Darshana), Bangladesh into India, has become polluted by effluent from a sugar mill, distillery, and pharmaceutical plant at Darsana; and the C&B Canal and Jazi Canal, which flow from Agartala, India into the Akhaura Canal and enter Akhaura, Bangladesh and have been polluted by industrial, household, and medical waste. The team was to take water samples from each of the affected rivers, then come up with a joint plan to reduce the pollution, including the installation of effluent treatment plants.
- Bangladesh/India over Akhaura Canal pollution (River #19xx): Bilateral (procedural agreement)
- The bilateral Joint Rivers Commission held its first meeting since 2011 on August 8 in Dhaka. The delegations agreed to form a joint technical team to study two cross-border pollution issues: the Churni River, which branches off from the Mathabhanga River and flows from Darsana (Darshana), Bangladesh into India, has become polluted by effluent from a sugar mill, distillery, and pharmaceutical plant at Darsana; and the C&B Canal and Jazi Canal, which flow from Agartala, India into the Akhaura Canal and enter Akhaura, Bangladesh and have been polluted by industrial, household, and medical waste. The team was to take water samples from each of the affected rivers, then come up with a joint plan to reduce the pollution, including the installation of effluent treatment plants.
- India/Pakistan over Indus River Basin rivers (various river claims): Bilateral (no agreement)
- The third secretary-level meeting between Indian and Pakistani delegations over the eastern rivers took place on July 15 in New Delhi. Substantial progress had reportedly been made since the previous meeting in discussing the contentions Indian projects on the eastern rivers.
- China vs. Thailand over Mekong River / Rapids blasting (River #1940): Bilateral (claim ended unilaterally?)
- Chinese Foreign Minister Wang met with Thai Foreign Minister Pramudwinai to discuss Mekong issues, and insisted that the blasting of Mekong rapids with explosives to open wider shipping lanes had been stopped. He also indicated that more talks would be held between the riparian states to reach agreement on fair and sustainable usage of the river.
Maritime Claims
Western Hemisphere
- Colombia/Nicaragua over Continental Shelf (Maritime #2064): Binding adjudication - ICJ (no agreement/case remains ongoing)
- This case remained under consideration at the International Court of Justice during the quarter.
- Argentina/UK over Falkland/Malvinas Islands fishing (Maritime #2126): Other (cooperation/confidence building)
- On September 4, Argentine and UK scientists began a two-week scientific cruise to assess the Southern blue whiting fish stock and to assess the population of a number of other fish in Falklands waters.
Europe
- Latvia/Lithuania over Baltic Sea (Maritime #2360): Bilateral (no agreement)
- Lithuanian President Nauseda visited Latvia on July 23 to meet with Latvian President Levits. Levits declared after the meeting that he and his government "have the good will to resolve the sea border issue" with Lithuania. Nauseda encouraged Latvia to ratify the 1998 maritime border treaty, which Lithania had ratified in 1999 but Latvia had never put up for ratification. Noting that the ratification process seemed to have stalled, Nauseda said there were options to resolve any remaining disagreements over the usage of the region's seabed resources; Latvia had previously suggested signing an agreement on economic cooperation that would cover an oil field located near the maritime boundary before ratifying this treaty.
- Russia/Ukraine over Kerch Strait and Sea of Azov (Maritime #2362): binding arbitration - PCA (no agreement/case remains ongoing) / binding arbitration - ITLOS (no agreement/case remains ongoing)
- This case remained under consideration at the Permanent Court of Arbitration and at the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea during the quarter.
- Russian and Ukrainian officials at various levels held talks during this quarter to consider an exchange of various prisoners held by each state, including the 24 sailors captured in the 2018 incident. This includes a July telephone call between Ukrainian President Zelensky and Russian President Putin and a meeting between human rights ombudsmen from the two states, possibly among others. Ukraine's human rights ombudsman announced on July 24 that an agreement had been reached and that the sailors would be released soon, but this was denied by both her Russian counterpart and the sailors' lawyer; she later clarified that talks were underway but that no agreement had yet been reached. They were ultimately released (without their ships) as part of an exchange of prisoners between Russia and Ukraine on September 7.
Africa
- Ghana/Ivory Coast over Atlantic Ocean (Maritime #2xxx): Other (implementation progress)
- Representatives of the two governments officially signed maps showing the maritime boundary line, as part of the process of implementation of the 2017 International Tribunal of the Law of the Sea (ITLOS) ruling on the boundary. They also signed a draft framework agreement over cooperation in exploiting hydrocarbon and seabed resources that straddle the maritime boundary, and an agreement to study the feasibility of building a thermal power plant at the border to provide electricity to both countries.
- Ghana/Togo over Gulf of Guinea (Maritime #2xxx): Bilateral (no agreement)
- Negotiations over the maritime border continued with the fifth meeting of the boundary committee on August 22-23. No settlement was reached, but the negotiating teams agreed to use a 1929 British-French colonial report as a working document to inform their negotiations, and they agreed on procedures for field work to determine the location of the Land Boundary Terminus (boundary pillar 1) as the starting point for drawing the maritime border. According to a Togolese negotiator, the meeting made substantial progress, and technical teams were scheduled to "meet to complete the task" between September 10-20 -- although it was not fully clear what "complete the task" means.
- Kenya/Somalia over Indian Ocean (Maritime #2xxx): binding adjudication - ICJ (no agreement/case remains ongoing)
- This case remained under consideration at the International Court of Justice during the quarter.
- Ethiopia sent emissaries to both claimants in early July, seeking to arrange a meeting over the maritime issue on July 13.
- Media reports on July 9 suggested that Somalia would soon agree to Kenya's demand to settle the issue bilaterally, rather than waiting for the ICJ to issue a ruling over the case. According to at least one report, this was suggested under U.S. mediation at a secret meeting in New York, although this remained unconfirmed. The Somali government denied these reports, and followup reports clarified that Somalia was considering delaying (rather than ending) the ICJ case to allow bilateral negotiations to occur "under special arrangements."
- Former South African President Mbeki led an African Union delegation to meet with top Somali officials in Mogadishu on July 20, after previously meeting with Kenyan President Kenyatta. Few details were released publicly, but the goal was reportedly to reach an out-of-court settlement over the Indian Ocean issue before the ICJ hearings were scheduled to begin in September.
- In mid-August, Kenya approached the African Union to ask it to mediate the issue before the ICJ hearings begin on September 9. Somalia refused the AU offer of mediation on August 21, arguing that it would be inappropriate to accept the invitation while the case is pending before the ICJ. The AU Peace and Security Council met on September 5 and called on the disputants to avoid any actions that might escalate the situation, urged them to intensify their engagements to produce a settlement, and asked the AU to use its good offices to help the countries reach a settlement. An AU spokesman indicated on September 6 that the AU lacked the authority to compel Somalia to drop the ICJ case, though, as Kenya had requested.
- On Sept. 3, Kenya asked the ICJ to delay the start of proceedings for the case, in order to allow Kenya to recruit a new defense team “due to exceptional circumstances.” Somalia opposed the request, but the hearing was postponed for two months from September 9-14 until November 4-8.
- Kenyan President Kenyatta met Somali President Farmaajo at the UN in New York on September 24, in a meeting mediated by Egyptian President al-Sisi (who is the current chairman of the African Union). They agreed to normalize relations, including the creation of a Kenyan-Somali Committee that would “work immediately on adopting measures for restoring confidence and resolving all problems so as to normalise bilateral relations." They made no progress on the maritime issue, though; Kenya continued to seek a bilateral solution while Somalia preferred to let the ICJ finish handling the case. Addressing the UN General Assembly later, Kenyatta called on Somalia to accept bilateral dialogue as "the most amicable way of solving disputes and finding a better solution," but Farmaajo replied in his own address by noting that bilateral talks had not worked and that the ICJ was thus the best place for the matter to be decided.
Middle East
- Israel/Lebanon over Eastern Mediterranean (Maritime #2670): Nonbinding mediation by USA (no agreement)
- U.S. Acting Assistant Secretary of State David Satterfield continued his efforts to mediate over the maritime issue, but the optimism that had been voiced in May and June seemed to have been misplaced. Satterfield met with Lebanese officials on July 2, in perhaps his last effort because he had recently been confirmed as U.S. ambassador to Turkey. Lebanon continued to insist that the mediation must address both the maritime and land borders simultaneously and that the UN participate, both of which Israeli officials had rejected in Satterfield's most recent visits. Lebanese Prime Minister Hariri met U.S. Secretary of State Pompeo on August 15, confirming Lebanon's commitment to continuing the process of settling its borders with Israel, and promised a "final decision" on the process in the coming months. Pompeo welcomed Hariri's commitment, and noted that the process would involve settling the last few disputed points in the Blue Line land border as well as discussing the maritime border.
- After Satterfield moved on to become U.S. ambassador to Turkey, David Schenker was appointed Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs, and visited Beirut on September 9 to meet President Aoun and Prime Minister Hariri and restart negotiations over the maritime issue. The leader of Hezbollah, Hassan Nasrallah, warned that Schenker is a "friend of Israel," implicitly suggesting that his mediation effort could not be trusted -- but Aoun noted that only a few sticking points remained and expressed his hope that Schenker would be able to resume the mediation process.
Asia and Oceania
- North Korea/Russia over fishing (Maritime #2xxx): Bilateral (functional agreement)
- Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Morgulov met with the North Korean Charge d’Affaires in Moscow on July 25 to discuss the North Korea seizure of a Russian fishing boat on July 17. The Russian government insisted on a rapid settlement of the problem, and warned that it would not hold any talks on fisheries cooperation -- including setting a quota to allow North Korea fishing in Russian waters -- until the boat was released. The boat and its crew were released on July 28 without any fines, although the Russian embassy stated that it would continue to investigate the circumstances of the ship's detention.
- Bangladesh/India over Bay of Bengal continental shelf (Maritime #2xxx): Bilateral (substantive agreement - possible claim end)
- After an August 20 meeting between foreign ministers, Bangladesh and India agreed to mutually withdraw their objections to each other's claimed continental shelves. India's claim, submitted to the UN in 2009, had cut off Bangladesh's access to the deep sea and created a dispute over 9000 sq km of areas claimed by Bangladesh, as well as including a coordinate located 2.3 miles inside Bangladeshi claimed territory; Bangladesh immediately filed an objection. Bangladesh had then submitted its claim in 2011, leading to an immediate Indian objection.
- Maldives/Mauritius over Indian Ocean (Maritime #2xxx): Bilateral (procedural agreement - submit to ITLOS) / Binding adjudication - ITLOS (new case - no agreement)
- The two states signed a special agreement on September 24 submitting their maritime border case to an ITLOS tribunal, which was then created on September 27.
- Indonesia/Vietnam over Natuna Islands fishing rights (Maritime #2816): Bilateral (procedural agreement)
- The two states' foreign ministers met at the ASEAN summit in Bangkok on July 30 to discuss steps toward resolving their maritime claims. They reached an agreement on additional steps toward settling the issue, while also agreeing on the need to reach a preliminary arrangement to prevent incidents between fishing vessels before the final maritime border was determined. At the same time, delegations met for a technical meeting over border-related issues in Jakarta.
- Indonesia/Malaysia over fishing (Maritime #2852): Bilateral (no agreement)
- Indonesian President Widodo visited Malaysia on August 8 to meet with Malaysia Prime Minister Mohamad. They were expected to discuss both land and maritime border issues, among many other topics.
- Australia/Timor-Leste over Timor Gap (Maritime #2862): Other (exchange of ratifications - claim end)
- Timor-Leste's parliament voted in favor of ratifying the 2018 maritime treaty on July 23, and Australia's parliament did the same on July 29. Australian Prime Minister Morrison visited Timor-Leste on August 30 for the formal exchange of ratifications, when the treaty officially entered into force. Controversy remained over the fact that Australia had continued to take 10% of the royalties from the Bayu Undan oil and gas field -- estimated at over $5 million -- since the signing of the treaty (which recognized that field as Timorese), as it had been allowed under previous agreements; many in East Timor sought the return of these royalties, although the Australian government refused to comment beyond noting the date when the treaty would formally take effect.
- Indonesia/Philippines over maritime border (Maritime #2xxx): Other (exchange of ratifications)
- The leaders of the two states exchanged ratification documents from their 2014 maritime treaty while meeting at the ASEAN summit in Bangkok, bringing the treaty into legal force.
Identity Claims
Western Hemisphere
- (None during this quarter)
Europe
- Cyprus/Turkey over Turks in TRNC (Identity #3xxx): other (peacekeeping)
- The UNFICYP peacekeeping force continued operations during the quarter (see related documents and publications).
- Turkish Foreign Minister Cavusoglu encountered Cyprus Foreign Minister Christodoulides at the United Nations General Assembly session on September 24. Christodoulides proposed agreeing to a federation model, wherein the TRNC would be incorporated into a single federated state of Cyprus. Cavusoglu declined, asking “First we need to decide what we are going to negotiate on, a two-state solution or something else?” Christodoulides responded by ruling out any potential two-state solution as an option, and no further progress was made.
- Moldova/Russia over Russians in Transnistria (Identity #3294): Nonbinding mediation by Ukraine & OSCE (no agreement) / Bilateral (no agreement)
- Moldovan and Transnistrian leaders met with the mediators and observers from the 5+2 (Russia, Ukraine, and the OSCE as mediators and the United States and EU as observers) on July 12. They agreed to invigorate settlement talks and to reach agreement over confidence building measures and disputed matters in a formal 5+2 negotiating round in Bratislava and a meeting of joint working groups in Munich to be held during the fall.
- Moldovan Foreign Minister Popescu and Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov met on September 11 to discuss Transnistria. Lavrov reaffirmed Russia's willingness to act as a mediator in talks between Moldova and Transnistria, and a guarantor with respect to confidence-building measures and progress toward settlement of the issue. On September 17, Moldovan Deputy Prime Minister for Reintegration Sova met with a Russian delegation and confirmed his government't interest in further 5+2 negotiations to settle the issue. The next 5+2 meeting was scheduled for October 8-10.
- Ukraine/Russia over Ukrainians in Crimea and Eastern Ukraine (Identity #3302): Binding adjudication - ICJ (no agreement/case remains ongoing)
- This case remained under consideration at the International Court of Justice during the quarter.
- Ukrainian President Zelensky called on Russian President Putin to meet him in Minsk, Belarus, along with the leaders of the United States, France, Germany, and the United Kingdom. The goal of the meeting would be to both sovereignty over the Crimean Peninsula and the situation in Donbas, eastern Ukraine. Putin's spokesman indicated that the Russian government would consider the offer of talks, seeking to determine what was involved in the new format and how likely the talks would be to produce meaningful results, and also awaiting the results of Ukraine's parliamentary elections in July. Zelensky and Putin also discussed the possibility of further talks (in this or another format) in a July 11 phone call.
- Representatives of both governments met in Paris with representatives of France and Germany to discuss "Normandy Four" talks on July 12. They discussed the need for a ceasefire and for the implementation of the Minsk Accords and planned for future talks, including a meeting of the Contact Group in Minsk the following week; the meeting was described as constructive.
- Russian presidential spokesman Peskov told reporters in July that the Contact Group (Ukraine, Russia, and the OSCE) had discussed the exchange of prisoners held by Russia and Ukraine, but that no agreement had yet been reached. Ukrainian President Zelensky and Russian President Putin also discussed prisoner exchange and settlement of the conflict in a July 11 phone call, agreeing that talks should continue at the expert level. A July 17 Contact Group meeting in Minsk reached agreement for the exchange of 208 separatists held by the Ukrainian government for 69 Ukrainians held by the separatists within the next month. Following that meeting, the Contact Group also issued a joint statement by representatives of Ukraine, Russia, the OSCE, and the separatist regions of eastern Ukraine on July 18 announcing that a comprehensive ceasefire would begin on July 21. Beyond stopping firing, this ceasefire included bans on reconnaissance missions, shelling, sniper attacks, placement of heavy weapons near civilians, and other activities. Similar ceasefires had failed soon after their announcement, but this was the first time all parties involved had participated in a joint statement. Dozens of incidents were reported in the first day of the new ceasefire, leading to the death of at least two Ukrainian soldiers, but both the Ukrainian government and the separatists insisted that they remained committed to the ceasefire.
- After four Ukrainian soldiers were killed on August 6, Ukrainian President Zelensky urged the convening of a Normandy Four summit between the leaders of Russia, Ukraine, France, and Germany to discuss the situation. French President Macron agreed that a summit was needed and began working to organize it, leading to an August 19 meeting in France with Russian President Putin. Afterward they expressed cautious optimism that progress could be made toward settling the conflict, although Putin called on Ukraine to make progress toward compliance with past agreements before beginning new talks and indicated that he had no interest in further talks for the sake of talks; no date was set for the next Normandy format meeting. German Foreign Minister Maas also discussed the Ukraine situation with Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov in Moscow on August 21, and German Chancellor Merkel discussed Ukraine with Russian President Putin on August 28 in preparation for the next Normandy format meeting. Representatives of the Normandy format leaders met in Berlin on September 2 but were unable to agree on a date for the next meeting; the Russian delegate reportedly insisted that all prior commitments such as disengagement in several sectors must be carried out fully before another meeting could be held. On September 9, U.S. President Trump offered to join the talks if his assistance was needed, but there was no response for the other participants suggesting that this would occur, and Ukrainian President Zelensky indicated on September 25 that the next meeting would continue to involve the four Normandy Format participants with no new additions. A Russian spokesman indicated on September 13 that new Normandy format talks needed to be held, but only after further progress on disengagement from three areas that had already been agreed, clarification about the election rules that would be used for the Donbass election, and agreement on how the summit results would be presented to the public.
- Ukrainian President Zelensky called Russian President Putin on August 7 to discuss the situation and to ask him to restrain the separatists from breaking the ceasefire; Putin responded by urging Zelensky to make sure that Ukrainian forces respect the ceasefire.
- Russia and Ukraine each released 35 prisoners on September 7, including 24 Ukrainian sailors who had been seized in a 2018 naval incident and the commander of a Ukrainian separatist air defense unit that allegedly shot down a Malaysian airliner over eastern Ukraine in 2014. Talks over the release had been held between Russian and Ukrainian officials since at least July. Leaders of both states described the release as a promising step toward improving relations and ending the war in eastern Ukraine. Further talks were held later in September to work toward the release of additional prisoners.
- The Contact Group (Ukraine, Russia, and the OSCE) met in Minsk on September 18 to discuss implementation of the Minsk Accords. Ukraine's representative insisted on a ceasefire, complete disengagement along the entire contact line, and full withdrawal of all foreign forces before his country would agree to the 2015 "Steinmeier Formula" granting special political status to the separatist region in order to hold elections there, which blocked the meeting from producing a signed document. Russia criticized this move as blocking progress toward peaceful settlement, arguing that representatives of the Normandy group had agreed earlier in the month that the Steinmeier Formula should be agreed in writing in preparation for the next full meeting of Normandy group leaders. After this failure to reach agreement, momentum to schedule the next Normandy meeting slowed.
- Ukrainian President Zelensky and Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov had a brief meeting at a reception on September 25 at the United Nations. A source indicated that they "discussed the situation around Russian-Ukrainian relations," but this appears to have been more conversational than an attempt to negotiate differences over their issues.
- Russia/Ukraine over Ukrainians in Crimea and Eastern Ukraine (Identity #3308): Binding adjudication by ICJ & ECHR (new ECHR case - no agreement) / Mediation by OSCE & France & Germany (functional agreement - release prisoners & ceasefire)
- This case remained under consideration at the International Court of Justice during the quarter.
- The European Court of Human Rights held its first hearings on a case brought by Ukraine on September 11 regarding allegations of Russian violations of human rights in Crimea. Russia rejected the Ukrainian case as political propaganda, and warned the ECHR that accepting the Ukrainian claims would risk opening a "Pandora's Box" of politically based cases.
Africa
- (None during this quarter)
Middle East
- (None during this quarter)
Asia and Oceania
- Armenia/Azerbaijan over Nagorno-Karabakh (Identity #3842): Nonbinding mediation - OSCE (no agreement)
- The foreign ministers of Armenia and Azerbaijan met with representatives of the OSCE's Minsk Group mediators in New York on September 23 at the United Nations. No progress was reported from the meeting, where Armenia demanded the safe return of Armenians who had been detained by Azerbaijan and Azerbaijan protested the Armenian killing of an Azerbaijani soldier earlier in the week. An OSCE statement afterward noted that during the meeting, the participants "continued their discussion of additional measures to reduce tensions and sustain an atmosphere conducive to peace and favorable to substantive talks," and the mediators called on the claimants to "minimize the use of rhetoric that is inflammatory or prejudges the outcome of negotiations."
- Georgia/Russia over Ossetians in South Ossetia (Identity #3850): Bilateral (no agreement)
- Georgia, Russia, and South Ossetian officials held a "technical meeting" in August 29 as the 95th meeting of the Incident Prevention and Response Mechanism (IPRM). This was held to discuss the recent controversy over Georgian construction of a checkpoint or fortification near the border. No agreement was reached, although the meeting reportedly contributed to the deescalation of the situation. Another meeting was held for four hours on September 2, ending with a decision to continue talks over the matter. Another meeting on September 6 failed to reach agreement, with South Ossetia demanding the the Georgian outpost being dismantled and Georgia refusing, although the parties agreed to meet again within a week and not to raise tensions further. Additional meetings on September 9 and 13 also failed to reach agreement for the same reason.
Case Summaries: Potential Claims
These cases have some elements of a territorial, river, maritime, or identity claim, but do not currently meet the complete ICOW definition. Typical reasons include the lack of explicit government statements (some of these demands were made by private citizens and not supported overtly -- or even disavowed publicly -- by their governments) or the lack of an explicit demand (e.g. governments stating the need for a route to the sea or better water security without stating the territory or river where this was sought). These cases are worth monitoring as potential future claims, should the situation or the demands made by the potential challenger state change, and they also help to illustrate ICOW coding rules regarding what does and does not qualify as codable claims.
Territorial Claims
- Albania/Kosovo over Kosovo?: No explicit contention
- The Russian Foreign Ministry issued a statement on July 8 expressing concern over a recent Albania-Kosovo agreement to share diplomatic missions in third countries, which it described as "provocative steps... in line with the Greater Albania idea." This does not currently qualify as a territorial claim because there is no evidence that either Albanian or Kosovar government officials are explicitly considering unification of their states, but it is worth monitoring in case such demands are eventually made.
- Armenia/Azerbaijan over Nagorno-Karabakh?: No explicit contention
- Armenian Prime Minister Pashinian visited Stepanakert, the capital of Nagorno-Karabakh, on August 5. He gave an hour long speech in which he declared that the region is "Armenian, and that's that" and led the crowd in chanting to call for the unification of Nagorno-Karabakh and Armenia. After Azerbaijan protested, the Armenian foreign ministry replied that the Azeris had misinterpreted the speech and that its goal had been to promote a "pan-Armenian agenda of unity, solidarity, development, and prosperity" of Armenia, Nagorno-Karabakh, and the Armenian diaspora rather than political unification. There have been periodic statements or actions like this over the years that imply an Armenian territorial claim for unification with Nagorno-Karabakh, but we have never been able to establish that this is the explicit goal of the Armenian government, so this remains coded as an identity claim (with Armenia promoting the independence of Nagorno-Karabakh rather than its unification with Armenia).
- Armenia/Georgia over border?: No explicit contention
- An Azeri news source reported in September that local Georgian residents reported Armenian border guards advancing the border into what had previously been considered Georgian territory. No other sources that we have seen confirmed these reports, though, leaving doubt as to their accuracy. We would need to see confirmation that these advances have happened and that they were ordered or supported by the Armenian government before this could qualify as a territorial claim to Georgian territory.
- Bangladesh/India over Tripura border?: No explicit contention
- The Indian state of Tripura began exploring ways to develop land outside the border fence for tea cultivation in August. Under 1971 and 1975 agreements, India established a barbed wire fence and Bangladesh built a line of border pillars, but both are 100 yards from the actual border -- leaving "no-man's land" on both sides of the border. This will not qualify as a territorial claim unless some of the tea cultivation is done in no-man's land on the Bangladeshi side of the border.
- Belarus/Russia over Belarus?: No explicit contention
- Before a July 18 meeting between the two states' presidents, Belarus President Lukashenko declared that the meeting would address closer integration between the states, but that there would be no discussion of unifying them into a single state. Belarusian Prime Minister Rumas stated on August 23 that his country would submit a draft program for integration to Russia on August 27, with the goal of removing popular fears about the loss of Belarusian sovereignty; the two prime ministers approved a total of 31 road maps toward increased integration on September 6 and planned to submit more concrete steps to the presidents for signature by December. Russian Economic Development Minister Oreshkin also explained on Sept. 1 that this is a project to integrate the countries' economies as equal partners, not a project to unify into a single country. Lukashenko reemphasizesd on September 26 that his country was determined to boost its economic integration with Russia, but that it had no concerns about threats to its sovereignty or independence. In late September, Belarus rejected a Russian request to host Russian warplanes at a Belarusian airbase, fearing that such an action would exacerbate regional tensions. As noted in the 2019 1st and 2nd quarter reviews, there has been speculation that integration could be a pretext for Russian annexation of Belarus, but both sides have consistently denied that speculation, and there remains no evidence of the type of explicit Russian demand for sovereignty over Belarus that would be needed for this to qualify as a territorial claim.
- Bosnia/Croatia over border?: No explicit contention
- On August 1, Bosnian Security Minister Mektic accused Croatian police of violating the border while returning illegal migrants who crossed from Bosnia into Croatia. Mektic alleged that the Croatian forces arrested the migrants, beat them, took any money and electronic devices they had with them, and crossed 1 km into Bosnian territory to return them. The mayor of the city of Bihac had made similar allegations several days earlier, arguing that the Croatian police ignore warnings that they are in Bosnian territory, saying that they are acting under orders. Croatian Prime Minister Plenkovic denied the charges and accused Bosnian officials of "exaggerated reactions"; the chairman of the Bosnian presidency repeated the accusations and accused Croatian officials of "meddling and lying." It does not appear that the Croatian government is claiming sovereignty over the territory along the border that its forces are accused of violating, which would be needed for this to qualify as a territorial claim.
- Cameroon/Equatorial Guinea over border (Territory #500)?: No explicit contention
- Soldiers from Equatorial Guinea crossed the bordering Ntem River in July and erected milestones in the Cameroonian town of Kye-Ossi, 1-2 km across the border. Cameroonian Army chief Meka visited the site of the encroachment in late July, noted the "expansionist ambitions" of the neighboring state, and warned that his army would not tolerate "any unlawful intrusion" into the country's territory. This is likely related to Equatorial Guinea's goal of building a wall along the border, which is intended to block migrants from crossing into the country (Cameroon had repeatedly been accused of allowing West African migrants to enter Equatorial Guinea illegally) as well as to block possible coup plotters after dozens of well-armed foreigners were arrested trying to cross the border in December 2017. Cameroon summoned the ambassador over the incident, and he confirmed the plan to build a border wall but rejected the reports of encroachment and border milestones being placed across the border. For now, based on the ambassador's denial, there does not appear to be an explicit claim here -- but this should be monitored closely for further evidence for or against a claim.
- China/Myanmar over border (Territory #940)?: No explicit contention
- China and Myanmar announced on September 17 that they would begin the process of joint inspections of the border early in 2020. Under their 1961 border protocol, this was to be done every five years, but it had only been done twice in the nearly sixty years since (1984-86 and 1992-95). The process will begin by taking aerial photographs of all border posts/markers, followed by a field study, remarking posts where needed, producing an updated map, and signing a protocol to complete the operation. There does not appear to be an ongoing territorial claim over the border, so this is just an effort to improve the demarcation of an already-agreed border. There have been occasional incidents along the border in recent years, such as a 2018 incident where Chinese villagers put up a fence nearly 30 meters inside Myanmar, but these appear to be the actions of private citizens; the fence was removed after the local Myanmar villagers complained to their government.
- China/UK over Hong Kong (Territory #814)?: No explicit contention
- As Chinese authorities faced large-scale protests from Hong Kong residents over perceived moves to restrict freedom and impose tighter control by the central government, UK Foreign Secretary Jeremy Hunt called on China not to use the protests as a “pretext for repressions” and warned of “serious consequences” if China breaches the commitments it made in the 1984 treaty that transferred Hong Kong to Chinese rule in 1998. On August 10, China warned Britain to stop "meddling" in Hong Kong affairs and "stirring up trouble" after recent exchanges over the treatment of protesters and the investigation of the protests, and on August 8 or 9 a local worker from the UK consulate in Hong Kong was arrested in China "for violating public security laws" while traveling to Shenzhen for a business conference. China's ambassador to the UK also warned members of Parliament on September 9 that they were free to express their opinions over Hong Kong, "as long as you do not interfere in Hong Kong’s affairs." The protestors in Hong Kong made several attempts during the quarter to attract British support, such as holding a rally outside the British consulate where they waved British flags and sang "God Save The Queen" while requesting that the UK act to enforce the 1984 treaty. There was no suggestion that the UK would consider the 1984 treaty invalidated or begin demanding the return of Hong Kong to UK rule, which would be necessary for a territorial claim to exist. Only trying to invoke the treaty to change Chinese policy, without demanding the return of UK sovereignty over Hong Kong, would not qualify as a territorial claim. This also can not qualify as an identity claim, because the EPR and TEK data sets do not identify any relevant ethnic groups as being shared by the UK and China.
- Costa Rica/Nicaragua over border?: No explicit contention
- Costa Rican authorities investigating possible smuggling confronted a group of six Nicaraguans 2 km inside Costa Rican territory on August 12. One of the six was killed while attempting to flee, and the others were arrested and returned to Nicaragua; the Nicaraguan government protested the death. Uniformed Nicaraguan military forces then reportedly entered the Costa Rican border town of Pocosol de San Carlos in late August and killed a Nicaraguan citizen; Costa Rica responded by deploying police to the border area. These incidents appear to be related to Nicaraguan political tension, as over 60,000 Nicaraguans had recently fled to Costa Rica to seek asylum and the Costa Rican government has supported the Nicaraguan political opposition; there does not appear to be any claim over territorial sovereignty in this area.
- Croatia/Italy over Dalmatia?: No government actor
- Local Italian officials in Trieste unveiled a monument to Gabriele D’Annunzio in September. Croatian officials protested, although noting that this was the action of local rather than national officials, because D'Annunzio was an Italian nationalist who had occupied the Croatian city of Rijeka/Fiume in 1919 and who was seen as a forerunner of Mussolini's fascism. This does not qualify as a territorial claim, both because the statue was created by local rather than national Italian officials and because it is just a state honoring an individual, not an explicit statement calling for Rijeka/Fiume or the larger territory of Dalmatia to be ceded to Italy.
- Cyprus/TRNC over unification?: No state actor
- The leaders of Cyprus and the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus met with the head of the UNFICYP peacekeeping mission on August 9. They discussed current and future confidence building measures between their entities, and expressed a readiness to meet with UN Secretary General Guterres to plan how to move toward peace talks. There is no codable interstate territorial claim here because the TRNC is not recognized by scholars as a nation-state (which would be needed for a Cyprus/TRNC claim), and Turkey does not claim sovereignty over northern Cyprus (which would be needed for a Cyprus/Turkey territorial claim in addition to their already existing identity claim over Turks in northern Cyprus).
- Czechia/Poland over Bogatyne border?: No explicit territorial contention
- The Polish city of Bogatyne approved a change to its zoning plan that allowed the Turow brown coal mine to expand its operations near the border. The Czech region of Liberec and the Czech Environmental Ministry protested that the plan had been approved without waiting for the result of bilateral consultations and without considering Czech objections. The Polish government acknowledged the objections and the Polish Directorate-General for Environmental Protection agreed to deliver information requested by the Czechs on such topics as the likely impact of the decision on water resources, agricultural land, and air and noise pollution, before a joint governmental meeting to discuss the situation on August 28. This seems to be more of a concern about environmental impacts of a Polish project across the border, rather than a concern about territorial sovereignty, which it would need to qualify as a territorial claim.
- Ethiopia/Kenya over border?: No government actor
- At least eight people were killed and nine wounded in several cattle rustling incidents near the border in late August that led to the theft of hundreds of head of cattle. The attackers were believed to have crossed into Kenya from Ethiopia, but they were believed to be criminals with no connection to either government, so this could not be coded as an interstate territorial claim even if the attackers disagreed with the location of the border.
- Finland/Russia over border?: No explicit contention
- A Russian airplane violated Finnish airspace near the city of Porvoo for about 2 minutes on July 17 before returning to Russian airspace. There are no ongoing claims over airspace or territorial sovereignty between Finland and Russia, and no reason to believe that this incident represents any sort of explicit Russian challenge to Finland.
- France (St. Martin) / Netherlands (St. Maarten) over Oyster Pond?: No explicit contention
- On September 13, Dutch Minister of Foreign Affairs Blok declared that he would meet with French Minister of Overseas Territories Girardin in October to resolve the Oyster Pond question. The question concerns Captain Oliver's Marina and Restaurant, a business that was established on Oyster Pond in 1983; the marina and restaurant were built on the Dutch side under a permit from the Dutch government in St. Maarten, while the adjoining hotel was built on the French side under a permit from the French government in St. Martin. The 1648 Treaty of Concordia did not fully lay out the entire course of the border along the island, leading to different interpretations of the border's location in the Oyster Bay area; the governments of France, St. Martin, the Netherlands, and St. Maarten agreed in 2014 to maintain the status quo in Oyster Pond until the larger question of border demarcation between St. Martin and St. Maarten has been settled. The maritime border was settled by treaty in April 2016, at which point attention turned toward the land border. After Hurricane Irma damaged the marina in September 2017, the French government -- considering that portion of Oyster Pond to be French -- blocked the owners from repairing the marina. When Dutch Minister of Foreign Affairs Koenders was questioned by parliament in 2016 about whether this situation could be considered a territorial dispute, he simply answered that French actions in Oyster Bay went against the 2014 agreement to maintain the status quo and that the situation had resulted from a difference in interpretation about the course of the border under the 1648 Treaty of Concordia, and noted that this question did not interfere with the excellent relations between France and the Netherlands. Similarly, Dutch Minister of Foreign Affairs Blok answered a questioner in parliament in 2019 by indicating that the difference of opinion over the border only affects the marina and restaurant on Oyster Pond, with no disagreements elsewhere on the island. At this point, this seems to be primarily a dispute about a single business, and the larger territorial question is described by the governments as a difference in interpretation of an existing treaty rather than a codable territorial claim, but we will continue monitoring this situation.
- Ghana/Togo over Western Togoland (Territory #438? / Identity #34xx?)?: No explicit contention
- In early July, Ghana dropped treason charges against separatists campaigning for an independent Western Togoland. There is no evidence that Togo is making demands for the territory or supporting the group's independence campaign, though, which would be needed for this to qualify as a territorial or identity claim.
- India/Myanmar over border (Territory #948)?: No explicit contention
- Shortly after announcing that it had reached agreement with China on resurveying and marking the China/Myanmar border, the government of Myanmar indicated that it was in negotiations to do the same with India, Laos, and Thailand. India had reportedly recently proposed demarcation of the border in the Kabaw valley in the Sagaing Region. There does not appear to be an ongoing territorial claim over the border, so this is just an effort to improve the demarcation of an already-agreed border.
- Ireland/UK over Northern Ireland (Territory #200)?: No government actor
- A poll taken in England, Scotland, and Wales for The Independent found that 52% of respondents supported allowing Northern Ireland to vote on whether to stay in the UK after Brexit or to unify with Ireland and remain in the EU, while only 19% opposed the idea. This is not an expression of government policy in either the UK or Ireland, though, so it can not qualify as a territorial claim.
- Israel/Palestine over West Bank?: No state actor
- Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu, campaigning ahead of the next election, on September 1 renewed his pledge to annex territory around Jewish settlements in the West Bank, and on September 10 broadened this to indicate that if reelected he would move quickly to annex the entire Jordan Valley (which makes up about 1/3 of the West Bank). The Israeli government approved a new Israeli settlement in the Jordan Valley on September 15, pending the outcome of the election on September 17. Palestinian leaders said that annexation would be "illegal" and would "bury any chance of peace," Palestinian Authority President Abbas warned that the annexation would end all agreements signed between his government and Israel, and the Arab League called the idea a "dangerous development" that would violate international law and "torpedo" the foundations of peace. The Palestinian Authority held its weekly cabinet meeting in the Jordan Valley on September 16 and vowed to "do everything we can to strengthen the presence of and protect our people in the Jordan Valley." This is not an interstate territorial claim because the Palestinian Authority is not currently a recognized nation-state (as determined by the Correlates of War project's interstate system membership list), and no other state has claimed sovereignty over the West Bank since Jordan renounced its claim in 1988.
- Kenya/South Sudan over Naivasha?: No explicit contention
- Kenya agreed to give South Sudan 10 acres of land at the Naivasha special economic zone for use as a dry port and container depot. This does not qualify as a territorial claim because it was a commercial action aimed at mutual economic interest, rather than a demand for sovereignty over a specific territory that both sides claimed as their own.
- Kenya/Tanzania over Lake Victoria border?: No explicit territorial contention
- In August, Kenya began talks with Tanzania over fishing rights in Lake Victoria. There does not appear to be an explicit disagreement over the location of the border in the lake, but the border is not well marked, and there are frequent incidents where Tanzanian authorities arrest or chase away Kenyan fishermen. Kenya's goal in the talks was to reach agreement over free fishing rights on the lake, following East African Community recommendations about the sharing of resources between member states.
- Kenya/Uganda over border?: No explicit contention
- Kenyan President Kenyatta and Ugandan President Museveni signed a memorandum of understanding over the UN-sponsored Kenya-Uganda Program for Peace and Sustainable Development on September 12. Among other elements, the MOU was designed to reduce the proliferation of firearms and to increase efforts at peace. security, and socioeconomic development on both sides of the border. As the program began implementation, local Ugandan officials expressed concern that Kenya had not fully committed to disarm its Turkana and Pokot peoples living along the border, after Uganda had disarmed its Karamajong people along the border in past years -- potentially exposing the Ugandans to security threats or weapon smuggling, and potentially requiring Ugandan troops to provide border security. There does not appear to be any interstate disagreement over the location of the land border. This memorandum of understanding appears to have been designed to improve relations between local communities living on both sides of the border.
- Kuwait/Saudi Arabia over Neutral Zone (Territory #760?): No explicit territorial contention
- Saudi and Kuwaiti officials discussed the issue in Kuwait in late July, and reportedly made good progress toward resolving the issue. Talks apparently continued, with Saudi energy minister Prince Abdulaziz bin Salman reporting in September that the talks had been "positive" and Kuwait's Deputy Foreign Minister indicating that the two governments were optimistic about ending the disagreement "soon." This does not appear to qualify as a renewal of the past territorial claims over the area, because the disagreements -- while not specified clearly in most reporting -- appear to involve oil licensing, exploration, and production in the neutral zone rather than territorial sovereignty over part or all of it.
- Laos/Myanmar over border (Territory #958)?: No explicit contention
- Shortly after announcing that it had reached agreement with China on resurveying and marking the China/Myanmar border, the government of Myanmar indicated that it was in negotiations to do the same with India, Laos, and Thailand. There does not appear to be an ongoing territorial claim over the border, so this is just an effort to improve the demarcation of an already-agreed border.
- Myanmar/Thailand over border (Territory #952)?: No explicit contention
- Shortly after announcing that it had reached agreement with China on resurveying and marking the China/Myanmar border, the government of Myanmar indicated that it was in negotiations to do the same with India, Laos, and Thailand. There does not appear to be an ongoing territorial claim over the border, so this is just an effort to improve the demarcation of an already-agreed border.
- Syria/Turkey over "security zone": No explicit territorial contention
- Turkish Foreign Minister Cavusoglu warned on July 22 that Turkey was ready to carry out another military intervention into Syria if efforts to set up a security zone along the border should fail and leave Turkish territory under threat. A meeting between Syria, the Syrian opposition, Russia, Iran, and Turkey in Kazakhstan on August 1-2 produced agreement on a ceasefire in the conflict zones of northern Syria, and the Syrian and Russian governments emphasized that they expected Turkey to comply with the provisions of this ceasefire -- which could be interpreted as a warning not to pursue creating a security zone on Syrian territory. In early August, Turkish leaders met with American military leaders who were stationed with Syrian Kurds and allied forces in northern Syria, attempting to work out the details of a possible 19-25 mile security zone along the Syria-Turkey border to protect Turkish territory from the Kurds or other potential threats, but threatening a military incursion if the U.S. failed to protect Turkish interests sufficiently. Turkish and U.S. diplomats reached agreement on August 7 to establish a joint operations center to manage a "safe zone" and "peace corridor" in northern Syria; details were not initially released, but the Syrian government rejected the plan as a "blatant attack" on Syrian sovereignty and warned that it “serves Turkey’s expansionist ambitions." A Turkish military convoy was attacked by Syrian and/or Russian warplanes on August 19 as it moved to reinforce a Turkish observation post near Idlib, Syria, with Turkey reporting that the strike killed three civilians and wounded twelve; other reports suggested that the only vehicle hit by the airstrike was driven by Turkish-backed rebels rather than the Turkish military or civilians. One of the Turkish observation posts around Idlib was also besieged during a Syrian government offensive against the rebels on August 21; the Turkish government responded by warning Syria not to "play with fire" and declaring that it would not abandon any of its posts. Turkish forces crossed the border on September 8 to join U.S. forces already in the area to enforce the security zone, after Syrian Kurdish forces moved south away from the border; Syria responded by protesting this as "a flagrant violation of international law, sovereignty and territorial integrity of the country." This is not currently a territorial claim because Turkey has made no explicit claim to sovereignty over the territory in northern Syria where this security zone would be located; for now this appears to be more of a temporary measure while the fighting lasts in the Syrian civil war and there is a potential threat to Turkish territory across the border.ails
River Claims
- Canada/USA over St. Croix River - Forest City dam?: No national government actor
- Local residents near the Forest City dam, located on the East Branch of the St. Croix River at East Grand Lake between Maine (USA) and New Brunswick (Canada), protested a possible decision by the U.S. government or the dam's current owner (the company Woodland Pulp) to remove the dam or close the two U.S. gates of the dam and rely only on the one Canadian gate. Such action could lower the lake's water level by up to 6-7 feet, with the exposed land becoming the property of the dam's owner and the hundreds of current lakefront property owners losing their homes' most attractive feature (lakefront property). For now, this is an internal matter within the United States rather than an interstate issue, but Canadian and New Brunswick officials are attending all public hearings and closely monitoring the situation because both the dam and the lake are shared between the United States and Canada.
- China/Myanmar over Irrawaddy River - nickel mine pollution?: No government actor
- Residents of Myanmar villages located near the Tagaung Taung nickel mine in Myanmar's Sagaing region demanded compensation from the Chinese owners of the mine. When the mine was first built in 2007, the Chinese company that operates it (CNMC Nickel Company Ltd. or CNICO) agreed to pay compensation to the owners of land that was used for its operations. The new demands for compensation come after allegations that the plant's waste runoff was polluting nearby fields as well as the Irrawaddy River. This does not currently qualify as a river claim because the demands are being made by local residents, not the government of Myanmar; furthermore, the target of these demands is a Chinese company rather than the Chinese government, and concerns the operations of a mine within Myanmar rather than across the border in China.
- Mexico/USA over Tijuana River - Santa Cruz River pollution?: No national government actor
- As mentioned in the previous quarterly review, raw or partially-treated sewage from Mexican cities near the border has entered the Tijuana River, which then empties into Pacific Ocean near San Diego and affects the quality of water, beaches, and the local environment. San Diego beaches were closed because of this sewage at least fifty times between January and July, including the week of the 4th of July (traditionally the biggest beachgoing time of the year). State and local officials have met with their Mexican counterparts, but there is no formal U.S. government demand that would qualify as a river claim; the governments on both sides of the border (so far) have been working cooperatively to address the issue.
- North Korea/South Korea over Ryesong River - uranium contamination?: No government actor
- Jacob Bogle, a U.S. blogger who studies satellite maps of North Korea, reported on Aug. 3 that radioactive waste from the Pyongsan uranium mine was leaking from a pipeline into the Ryesong River, which carries it into the Yellow Sea; this appeared to have been happening at least as far back as 2003 (the earliest satellite maps of the area that Bogle could access). Other analysts noted that the amount of leakage visible in the images appeared to have increased in recent months, although noting that the satellite images could not distinguish between radioactive waste and other possible sources such as sewage. On Aug. 23, the South Korean government began collecting seawater samples from areas that might be affected to determine whether the water had been contaminated; tests from seven different sites failed to detect any unusually high readings. The UN Security Council reported on September 5 that North Korea appeared to be continuing to operate the Pyongsan uranium mine, and there were reports in mid-September that North Korea had deployed a large number of soldiers at the site, but there did not appear to be any evidence of a leakage of radioactive waste reaching South Korea or the sea. The South Korean government did not appear to make any formal protests or demands over the contamination, so this does not currently qualify as a river claim.
- Russia/Ukraine over Dnieper River - Crimea supply?: No national government actor
- Crimean officials indicated on August 12 that they would soon ask the Russian government to demand that Ukraine restore the flow of Dnieper River water into Crimea. Before Russia annexed Crimea in 2014, the North Crimean Canal through Ukrainian territory had supplied 90% of Crimean water needs -- but Ukraine stopped the flow of Dnieper water through the canal in April 2014. Deputy Chairman of the Crimean Council of Ministers Muradov argued, "This is not Dnieper River water belonging to Ukraine, this is our water flowing from Russian territory."
- Tajikistan/Uzbekistan over Vakhsh River - Rogun dam (River #1852)?: No explicit contention
- Tajikistan commissioned the second turbine in its Rogun dam project on September 9, after the first turbine had begun operation in November 2018; four more turbines remained to be completed by 2028 in what would be the world's tallest dam project. This would decrease the flow of water to downstream Uzbekistan, which was already experiencing great water shortages; a long-running river claim was only ended in March 2018 when a new Uzbek leader dropped his predecessor's claim and agreed to buy power from the dam while his Tajik counterpart promised "We will never leave our neighbors without water." This is worth monitoring for a potential renewed claim if the water shortages caused by the dam's operations cause problems in Uzbekistan.
Maritime Claims
- Barbados/Trinidad & Tobago?: No explicit contention
- Trinidad & Tobago Prime Minister Rowley led a delegation to Barbados on August 24 to sign a memorandum of understanding regarding cooperation in energy developing for hydrocarbons that extend beyond their maritime border. Natural gas deposits had recently been discovered in the northeastern portion of Trinidadian waters, some near the Barbadian border, so the two governments decided to agree on how to handle any future discoveries that cross the border. This does not qualify as a maritime claim because there are no competing demands here; the two sides agree on the maritime border, and they are acting to make sure that no disagreements arise over any resources that might be discovered across the border.
- China/Philippines over Sibutu Strait passage?: No explicit contention
- The Filipino government protested to China on July 31 following reports that Chinese warships had passed through Sibutu Strait in the southern Philippines at least four times in 2019 without prior notification or clearance. Three more ships passed through the strait in August, but they quickly left the area once they were observed and monitored by the Philippines military. This violates the diplomatic custom of prior notification before innocent passage by warships, and the Filipino government additionally argued that the route taken by the ships was not consistent with innocent passage -- but for now this does not constitute a new maritime claim (and this was not directly related to the China/Philippines territorial and maritime claim over the Spratly Islands). Philippines President Duterte raised the issue in a meeting with Chinese President Xi on August 29, asking that Chinese vessels give advance notification; Xi did not respond to this directly at the meeting, but Philippines Foreign Affairs Secretary Locsin reported on September 4 that China had agreed to ask for permission before its vessels crossed through Philippine waters in the future.
- China/Philippines over Filipino EEZ?: No explicit contention
- On August 3, the Chinese oceanographic survey ship Zhanjian entered waters in the Filipino EEZ some 75-80 nautical miles east of the Philippines, and a few days later the survey ship Dong Fang Hong 3 was seen in waters near the Philippine island of Luzon. These areas are not part of the South China Sea (and thus not directly included in that claim), and it was not clear whether the Philippines government had been informed of the activity (or whether it had approved of the activity) or what type of activity it was undertaking, but observers speculated that this might be an additional form of pressure related to the South China Sea. Filipino Foreign Secretary Locsin protested the activities of these ships on August 9, and on August 12 announced that Chinese survey ships were banned from operating in Philippines waters -- although the next day after legal consultations suggested that the blanket ban was not legal, he amended this to say that foreign surveys need government permission and that he would not grant this. On August 20, Filipino President Duterte warned that all foreign vessels passing through Philippines territorial waters would need to get government approval in advance, and that vessels that did not receive such authorization would be driven away. This does not qualify as a new maritime claim without any evidence of a specific demand made by China for access to waters or resources in the Philippines’ claimed EEZ.
- China/Russia/South Korea over airspace?: Other (over ADIZ - not territorial or maritime)
- While taking part in a joint exercise involving five Russian and Chinese planes that crossed into South Korea's Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ), a Russian surveillance plane entered South Korea airspace twice near the Dokdo/Takeshima islands (disputed between Japan and South Korea). South Korean fighter jets intercepted it and fired 20 warning flares and 360 machine gun rounds, and the government protested to both Russia and China afterward. Russia claimed afterward that two of its planes had been carrying out a planned drill over neutral waters and denied that shots had been fired. According to South Korean sources, a Russian military attache expressed deep regret for the incident, which was claimed to have resulted from a technical problem -- although the Russian embassy later denied having apologized. This incident appeared to involve airspace rights, perhaps connected to challenges over claimed ADIZ zones -- Russia does not recognize South Korea's claimed ADIZ and China does not consider the ADIZ to be territorial airspace that is closed to foreign aircraft; there is no evidence so far of a Russian challenge to South Korean-claimed maritime zones in the area or to sovereignty over the islands themselves.
- China/USA or UK over South China Sea/East China Sea/Taiwan Strait?: No explicit contention
- On August 28, the guided missile destroyer U.S.S. Wayne E. Meyer sailed near the Chinese-administered Fiery Cross and Mischief Reefs on a mission to "challenge excessive maritime claims and preserve access to the waterways as governed by international law." China warned the ship that it was passing through Chinese waters without permission and asked it to leave, and a Chinese military spokesman later urged the U.S. to "immediately stop such kinds of provocative acts, to avoid causing unexpected incidents." In September, a Chinese spokesperson warned the US and UK that it would view further entry of foreign warships into Chinese waters as a "hostile action" with "serious consequences," and that it would not tolerate violations of Chinese sovereignty. On September 13, the U.S.S. Wayne E. Meyer passed near the Paracel (Hoang Sa) islands in a freedom of navigation operation, with China claiming the following day that it had "expelled" the destroyer after it "trespassed" in Chinese waters. Freedom of navigation operations like this, where the U.S. is seeking to ensure that navigation rights are not limited, do not qualify as maritime claims unless there is an explicit disagreement over navigation in specific waters.
- Guyana/Suriname over fishing?: No government actor
- Surinamese authorities arrested five Guyanese fishermen on September 24 for fishing illegally in Surinam's waters, and seized their fishing boat and equipment. It appears that they were acting as private citizens, and that there is no ongoing maritime claim between the two governments.
- Indonesia/Philippines over fishing?: No government actor
- The Oblates of Notre Dame - Hesed Foundation, an NGO, tried to work with the Philippines government to secure the release of 24 Filipino fishermen who had been arrested for fishing illegally in Indonesian waters in July and August, and to improve efforts to educate local fishermen to prevent such problems from arising in the future. The arrest of these fishermen does not qualify as a maritime claim because the Philippines government is not trying to change the maritime border (indeed, the 2014 treaty establishing the border took legal effect during this quarter); these fishermen were acting as private citizens.
- Indonesia/Singapore over airspace: Other (over flight control - not territorial or maritime)
- Indonesia approached Singapore about transferring control of the flight information region over the Riau Islands, which Singapore had operated since 1946. Indonesian defense officials see this as a matter of sovereignty and national security, and wish to take control of their own airspace. This does not qualify as a maritime (or territorial) claim, though, because there is no question of ownership or usage of the islands' territory or surrounding maritime area -- this is only about flight control in airspace over them.
- Iran vs. USA/UK/Europe over Strait of Hormuz?: No explicit contention
- Following several attacks on shipping that the U.S. blamed on Iran, in early July the U.S. proposed an international naval force to protect commercial shipping in strategic areas like the Strait of Hormuz and the Bab al-Mandeb, and announced on July 20 that it was proceeding with plans for such a force; European powers also discussed a possible multinational force that did not include the United States. Iran seized the Panamanian flagged oil tanker MT Riah on July 18 and an Iraqi tanker on August 4 for allegedly smuggling oil, as well as several others in September, and the U.S. claimed to have downed an Iranian drone over the Strait on July 18. Kuwait's foreign ministry expressed concern that Iran's actions could pose a threat to navigation through the Strait, but Iranian Foreign Minister Zarif issued assurances on July 20 that Iran would guarantee the security of the Persian Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz. Iran also criticized the proposals for a multinational force to safeguard shipping as "hostile" and "provocative," and declared itself to be "the biggest agent of maritime security in the Persian Gulf." These actions do not currently qualify as a maritime claim, as there is no explicit Iranian attempt to block navigation through the strait, but an Iranian decision to do so would likely produce a claim between Iran, the U.S., and possibly other powers.
- UK forces seized an oil tanker, the Panama-flagged Grace 1, in Gibraltar on July 4. The tanker was believed to be carrying Iranian crude oil to a refinery in Syria, violating EU sanctions against Syria. Iran protested the "illegal seizure," demanded the immediate return of the ship, and threatened to respond by seizing a British ship. The UK then alleged that five Iranian boats tried to impede or seize a British oil tanker in the Strait of Hormuz on July 10 until a naval escort ship intervened and stopped them; Iran denied this allegation. Iranian forces then seized a UK-flagged tanker, the Stena Impero, in the Strait of Hormuz on July 19, in what the Iranian government described as a "reciprocal action" after the seizure of the Grace 1. This does not qualify as a maritime claim because the initial British seizure was meant to enforce multilateral sanctions, not to dispute navigation rights in a specific body of water, and the subsequent Iranian seizure was a response to the first incident rather than an attempt to block all navigation.
- Japan/South Korea over Pacific Ocean - Fukushima water release?: No explicit maritime contention
- On August 19, the South Korean government summoned Japanese diplomats to express concern about a reported Japanese plan to release radioactive water from the Fukushima nuclear plant disaster into the Pacific Ocean, which would likely spread to the East Sea/Sea of Japan. The Japanese government responded that it had not yet decided how to dispose of the radioactive water, but that it would be transparent with South Korea and the rest of the international community about any steps it might decide to take. Later in the month, Japan's environment minister expressed his personal view that releasing the water into the sea (where it would be diluted by the massive volume of water in the ocean) was the only viable option, and South Korea soon asked the International Atomic Energy Agency to monitor the situation. This does not qualify as a maritime claim because there is no provision for pollution in the maritime claims data set (although this would likely qualify as a river claim if it involved a river rather than the ocean, because the river claims data set does code pollution as the basis for a claim).
- Maldives/Sri Lanka over fishing?: No explicit contention
- Inclement weather threatened a number of Sri Lankan boats that had been fishing in international waters. The Sri Lankan government requested and received permission from the Maldives to allow them to shelter in Maldivian waters, without any incidents occurring; the matter was handled cooperatively, so there was no maritime claim here.
- Saudi/Yemen over fishing?: No explicit contention
- Human Rights Watch reported in August that the Saudi-led coalition intervening in the Yemeni civil war had killed at least 47 Yemeni fisherman and arrested more than 100 others during the fighting, often despite the fisherman waving white flags or otherwise trying to show that they were not combatants or other legitimate military targets. These incidents are not coded as part of a maritime claim because there is no evidence that the attacks were related to a maritime claim between Saudi Arabia and Yemen rather than to the civil war.
Identity Claims
Identity claims have another requirement that can keep some potential claims from qualifying for the data set. Rather than reinvent the wheel by trying to create our own new list of ethnic groups that are shared by two or more countries, we use the groups as identified by the Ethnic Power Relations (EPR) and Transborder Ethnic Kin (TEK) data sets, which are the leading data sources for scholars of ethnic conflict. This means that any events involving groups that are not coded by those data sets can not be coded in our data set -- which typically occurs in situations where the group in question has very few members in the potential target state, or where the group members are not politically organized in the target state or do not share loyalty to the group beyond their borders.
- Abkhaz (no TEK number): Georgia/Russia?: Group not in TEK data
- On July 7, the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly's Committee on Political Affairs and Security passed a draft resolution written by the Georgian delegation calling on Russia to reverse its decision to recognize the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia from Georgia; a leader in the Russian delegation replied that Russia had recognized the right of the Abkhaz and Ossetian people to self-determination in accordance with the UN Charter. On August 7, Georgia protested a meeting between Russian President Putin and the leader of Abkhazia as a violation of Georgia's sovereignty. Russia continued to support the independence of Abkhazia, with Putin ordering Russia to help modernize the Abkhazian armed forces on September 23, and sending a telegram to the Abkhaz leader on September 30 pledging that "Russia will continue to provide assistance to Abkhazia to support its national security, as well as to solve topical challenges in social and economic development." Abkhaz people are included in the EPR data set in both Georgia and Russia, but they are not coded by the TEK data set as a transborder ethnic kin group.
- Anglophones (no TEK number): Cameroon/Nigeria?: Group not in TEK data
- After Cameroonian authorities had alleged that separatists in Cameroon's Anglophone regions had been supported by and trained in Nigeria, Cameroonian and Nigeria officials met for security talks in early July. Nigeria reassured Cameroon that the allegations were false, and promised to assist Cameroon in combating the separatists and bringing peace to the region. Even if Nigeria (or Nigerians) were to support the separatists, though, they do not come from any ethnic group that the TEK data set identifies as being shared by Cameroon and Nigeria.
- Bengali/Bengali Muslims (TEK #352): Bangladesh/India?: No explicit contention
- The Indian state of Assam aggressively pursued immigrants, mostly Bengali Muslims who had migrated from Bangladesh, seeking to force them to prove Indian citizenship or be deported. Hundreds of people were reportedly arrested on suspicion of being a illegal immigrant, large detention camps were built to hold them, and Foreigners Tribunals were created to hear their cases. While this current campaign is limited to Assam, the government of Prime Minister Modi has vowed to extend the campaign to other parts of India as part of its Hindu nationalist program. Relatedly, at the end of August, the Assam government published an updated National Register of Citizens (NRC) that had been under work since 2015. The NRC lists Assam residents whose families had lived in Assam at the time of the first such NRC in 1951, as well as those whose names had appeared in national electoral rolls or other official documents before 1971 when a wave of migrants or refugees crossed into Assam from Bangladesh. An estimated 1.9 million residents were left out of the NRC, and were given 120 days to have an appeal heard before they would be classified as foreigners and possibly jailed or deported as illegal immigrants; this was reduced from the approximately four million names that had been left off in a draft NRC in 2018. Assam deployed large numbers of security forces before publishing the NRC to ensure order.
- The UN High Commission for Refugees responded to the situation by indicating that India has the sovereign right and authority to determine who is an Indian national, but that it has a responsibility to minimize the risk that its actions will lead individuals to become stateless. The UNHCR also called on Indian authorities not to detain or deport anybody whose nationality had not been verified.
- This does not currently qualify as an identity claim because the government of Bangladesh has not protested or made any demands over the treatment of Muslims in Assam, and indeed Bangladesh explicitly argues that the individuals who are affected by the NRC are not Bangladeshis -- although there is some concern over the matter in Bangladesh and a claim could potentially begin in the future if large numbers are expelled from India to Bangladesh. On July 13, Bangladeshi Foreign Minister Momen indicated that there was "some anxiety" in Bangladesh over events in India because Bangladesh is already the most densely populated country in the world, particularly with the addition of over 1 million Rohingya refugees from Myanmar; he also denied Indian allegations that the affected individuals were Bangladeshi migrants: "The people that have been there for 75 years, they are [India’s] citizens not ours." On August 31, Momen indicated that he had discussed the matter with Indian External Affairs Minister Jaishankar on August 20 because many people in Bangladesh were concerned; after Jaishankar stressed that it was an internal matter for India and would not be a problem for Bangladesh, Momen accepted Jaishankar's assurance and ruled out any concern by the Bangladeshi government, although declaring again that the individuals in question are not Bangladeshi. Other government sources were reportedly keeping a "close watch" on developments, though, worried by the potential for large-scale expulsions to Bangladesh. Bangladeshi Prime Minister Hasina mentioned the issue while meeting Indian Prime Minister Modi at the United Nations on September 27, noting that it had become "a matter of great concern" in her country, but Modi assured her that there would be "no impact on Bangladesh."
- Chinese (TEK #500): Australia/China?: No explicit contention
- Amid reports of growing public distrust of the Asian/Chinese community in Australia, Gladys Liu -- a Hong Kong-born member of the Australian legislature -- was interviewed on Sky News by a conservative commentator. In the interview she declared that she does not work for the Chinese Communist Party, but observers considered many of her other answers to be evasive, such as whether she remembered her past membership in organizations affiliated with the CCP and whether she had any opinions on the South China Sea dispute or the protests in Hong Kong. Her political opponents called on her to declare her allegiance to Australia (where she has lived since the 1980s) and asked intelligence agencies to investigate her potential links to the Chinese government; these requests were rejected as racist by the leadership of her political party, as well as by the Chinese government. At this point there is no codable demand being made by any government regarding the status of Chinese in Australia, but the Australian government is aware of the growing distrust of possible Chinese government influence and the Chinese government is also aware of the controversy (as reflected in its reaction to the Liu case), so the situation is worth monitoring in the future.
- Chinese (TEK #500): China/Malaysia?: No government actor
- An Indian Muslim preacher living in Malaysia, Zakir Naik, made controversial statements over the status of the Hindu and Chinese minorities in Malaysia relative to the Muslim minority in India, leading many in the country to call for the cancellation of his permanent residency in Malaysia. In response to these calls, he argued that Malaysia's Chinese minority should be expelled as well. This does not qualify as an identity claim because he does not represent any state government; a claim would require demands between the Chinese and Malaysian governments over the treatment or status of ethnic Chinese in the country. Rumors spread on Malaysian social media in September about Chinese nationals being granted Malaysian citizenship indiscriminately, with the apparent goal of inflaming tensions between Chinese and Malays. These rumors were false, and led to criminal charges against some of the posters. There is also no government involvement, as the posts were made by (and aimed at) private Malaysian citizens with no Chinese government protests or other involvement.
- Crimean Tatars (no TEK number): Russia/Turkey?: Group not in TEK data
- Turkish President Erdogan declared on August 8 that “Our Crimean brothers and sisters are an important element of the historic and human connections between Ukraine and Turkey” and that the plight of Crimean Tatars is “a priority” for Turkey. This does not qualify as a codable identity claim, though, because the EPR data set does not code Crimean Tatars as being present in Turkey.
- Croats (TEK #210): Croatia/Serbia (Identity #3316)?: No government actor
- After an early August disagreement over the nationality of the inventor Nikolai Tesla (whom the Croatian government referred to as "a Croatian of Serbian descent"), the leader of the Democratic Alliance of Vojvodina Croats (DSHV) in the Serbian Parliament called on the Serbian government to spend less time and resources on symbolic controversies like Tesla and more on preserving the local Croatian cultural heritage and religious sites within Serbia. This does not qualify as a codable identity claim because the speaker is part of the Serbian government, so this is an internal government debate, and the Croatian government did not get directly involved.
- Hindus (TEK #355): India/Pakistan?: No government actor
- Pakistan detained the Hindu principal of a school in the southern town of Ghotki for blasphemy, after local residents began rioting over allegations that the principal had insulted Islam. Local Muslim leaders spent the night with Hindu leaders at the local Hindu temple in a show of solidarity, and the police deployed in large numbers to maintain order. India did not make any demands over the treatment of Hindus in Pakistan following the incident, which would be required for this to qualify as an identity claim.
- Kazakhs (TEK #218): China/Kazakhstan?: No government actor
- Dozens of members of the group Atazhurt Eriktileri (Volunteers of the Fatherland) protested in Almaty on July 12 to demand the release of their leader, Serikzhan Bilash. Bilash had been arrested on charges of inciting ethnic discord for organizing several protests over the Chinese treatment of ethnic Kazakhs in Xinjiang (along with Uyghurs and others). His trial began on July 29, and he remained under house arrest until being released on August 16 after signing a plea deal agreeing to stop his activism for seven years in order to avoid seven years in jail. Kazakh opposition held numerous subsequent protests against improving ties with China, but their government dismissed their demands and warned Kazakh citizens against participating in illegal rallies, and dozens of the protestors were arrested. This does not qualify as an identity claim because the Kazakh government has not supported the protesters against the Chinese government. It is only private citizens who are protesting the treatment of ethnic Kazakhs, and the Kazakh government arrested and charged Bilash following accusations from China.
- Kurds (TEK #302): Iraq/Turkey?: No explicit contention
- Turkish military forces entered Iraq in mid-July to destroy shelters and bases used by PKK Kurdish rebels that were operating in Turkey from bases in northern Iraq. These events do not currently qualify as an identity claim, because the Turkish government is not making any explicit demands against the Iraqi government -- it is just attacking the Kurds; a claim could begin if Turkey starts to make such demands.
- Poles (TEK #224): Poland/Ukraine?: No government actor
- A monument to the Ukrainian Rebel Army, a World War II-era partisan formation, was vandalized in Kharkiv in late July and early August, including spray painting the colors of the Polish flag and a Polish curse word. Observers speculated that this was actually an attempt by Russians or other outsiders to create ethnic discord within Ukraine, as with similar acts in recent years targeting ethnic Hungarians, Poles, Bulgarians, and Jews. In any case, the incidents were not explicitly supported by the Polish government or protested by the Ukrainian government, meaning that this is not an interstate identity claim.
- Rohingya/Muslim Arakanese (TEK #356): Bangladesh/Myanmar?: No codable EPR/TEK group
- Bangladesh announced in late August that it was unable to continue bearing the economic burden of caring for hundreds of thousands of Rohingya refugees who had fled from Myanmar, and on August 22 arranged bus transport for those wishing voluntary return to Myanmar -- but not a single returnee showed up. Speaking to the UN General Assembly on September 28, Bangladeshi Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina proposed a plan for repatriation of the Rohingya to Myanmar, which (among other things) called for Myanmar to address the root causes of the group's problems and to allow the deployment of international monitors to guarantee their security and safety; Rohingya activists welcomed this proposal. This currently doesn't qualify as a codable identity claim, because the EPR and TEK data sets don't include a relevant group in both states (the group known popularly as Rohingya is coded by EPR and TEK as "Muslim Arakanese", which is coded in Myanmar as TEK #356 along with the group "Indians"; the only other states currently coded with members of TEK group #356 are India and Mauritius).
- Shi'a Arabs (TEK #303) or Palestinians (TEK #308): Israel/Jordan?: No explicit contention
- Jordan -- which officially supervises the Muslim holy sites in Jerusalem -- summoned the Israeli ambassador and met with EU representatives on August 18 to protest against Israeli actions at Muslim holy sites in Jerusalem, particularly the closure of the gates to the Al Aqsa mosque, restrictions on entry to the mosque, and use of tear gas, rubber bullets, and sound grenades against Palestinian/Arab worshippers in recent days after the Israeli government decided to revoke its initial decision to keep Jews from the mosque during the Muslim festival of Eid al-Adha. Jordan also protested against recent comments by Israeli Minister of Public Security Erdan that suggested that Jewish worshippers should be permitted to worship in the Al Aqsa mosque, where they are currently only allowed to visit; the mosque is built at what Jews call the Temple Mount, the site of two historical Jewish temples. Erdan had added that the change -- demanded by members of Prime Minister Netanyahu's coalition government -- should come through "political agreements and not by force," but Jordan's foreign ministry condemned the comments and demanded "an immediate stop to Israel's violations and all its attempts to change the historic and legal status quo" at the site. This is a potential identity claim, but it currently appears to be framed in terms of Jordan's role as protector of the holy sites rather than demands over the overall status or treatment of Muslims or Palestinians in Israel.
- Shia Muslims (not shared in TEK): Iran/Nigeria: No government actor
- In July, Nigerian police clashed with Shiite protesters from the Islamic Movement of Nigeria outside the National Assembly, where they were protesting the 2015 detention of their leader. Two protesters were killed, other protesters and eight police were wounded, and at least forty protesters were arrested; the group was banned on July 29. The group held a march on September 10 for the religious commemoration of Ashoura; the police had warned them in advance not to march because any gathering involving their group was considered illegal, and a crackdown on the march reportedly killed at least 12 marchers. The group is pro-Iranian and many of its leaders have studied in Iran, but the Iranian government -- which had protested after a 2015 crackdown on the group -- did not protest or make any explicit demands over the treatment of the group; even if it had, though, the TEK data set does not show Shias (or any other group) as present in both Iran and Nigeria.
http://www.paulhensel.org/rev2019q3s.html
First posted: 31 December 2019 (Last updated 25 January 2020)
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